Frank Hindriks

In his recent book Shared and Institutional Agency, Bratman (2022) argues that institutional agents consist of social rules of procedure. Those rules are policies that are shared among many of their members. In this review essay, I argue that the theory can plausibly be interpreted in terms of ontological holism. It shows how a holistic theory can be constructed out of individualistic building blocks. At the same time, Bratman rejects mental holism, the idea being that institutional agents form only a limited range of mental states. Furthermore, he claims that they can perform actions literally for no reason. I propose that, if this is indeed possible, a morally accountable agent will avoid doing so.

People should take immediate action to prevent climate harms. Although intuitive, this claim faces two important problems. First, no individual can avert a climate harm on their own. Second, too few people are typically willing to contribute. In response, I point out that individuals can sometimes help prevent harm to the climate, and I argue that they should take preventive action when the prospect of success is good enough. Furthermore, when too few are willing to contribute, an individual may be required to activate others to increase their number. This serves to increase the prospect of success. Crucially, this prospect may be good enough well before enough people have become willing to engage. It follows that people should start saving the planet soon, if not immediately.

Social sustainability plays a prominent role in the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals, but a proper analysis of the concept is still lacking. According to a widespread conception, a system is sustainable when it is preserved or developed in a robust manner. I argue, however, that social sustainability is best understood in explicitly normative terms. Formulating suitable development goals requires a conception of the kind of society that is worth sustaining. I propose that, for a system to be socially sustainable is for it to secure a range of values, including justice. Furthermore, I argue that social sustainability is first and foremost a property of institutions. I go on to ask what it takes for an institution to secure values and why justice is so important for institutions. The answers culminate in a social sustainability framework, which explains why making institutions more sustainable is so challenging.

Institutions can be analyzed in terms of constitutive rules that forge intimate connections between statements about facts and norms. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether constitutive rules thereby bridge the gap between is-statements and ought-statements. I use the status account of constitutive rules that I have proposed elsewhere to explain that they are partly descriptive and partly normative, and I argue that they support the derivation of objective ought-statements, but only against the background of a normative principle. Hence, they do not as such bridge the Is-Ought gap.

Institutions depend on rules. But on what kind of rules? It has been argued that they depend on constitutive rules, this in contrast to ordinary social practices, which depend on regulative rules instead. The underlying idea is that constitutive rules differ categorically from regulative rules. Against this, I argue that regulative rules can be transformed into constitutive rules by doing little more than introducing a status term. The presence or absence of a status term does not make a difference to whether a social practice qualifies as an institution. In light of this, I propose that, pace Searle, there can be institutions without constitutive rules. Furthermore, even if it sounds somewhat paradoxical, regulative rules can constitute institutions. This implies that the distinction between social practices and institutions cannot be drawn in terms of these two kinds of rules. Following Tuomela, I propose to draw this distinction in terms of social norms instead: in contrast to ordinary social practices, institutions are governed by social norms. Hence, what is distinctive of institutions is that they feature deontic powers.