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Theodore Drange

West Virginia University
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Morgantown, West Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Religion
  •  55
    Review of Jordan Howard Sobel's logic and theism (2006) (review)
    The book is long, abstruse, technical (making ample use of symbolic logic and Bayesian notation), and written in a rather difficult style. Nevertheless, for those up to reading it who have an interest in its topics, it is a most valuable work. It is directed mainly at professional analytical philosophers with a background in both deductive and inductive logic. For such readers, I recommend this book most highly.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicBayesian Reasoning, MiscLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
  •  144
    Is “God Exists” Cognitive?
    Philo 8 (2): 137-150. 2005.
    The title question is approached by distinguishing two senses of “God” and two senses of “cognitive” (or “cognitively meaningful”), producing four separate questions. Each is given an affirmative or negative answer, which is defended against possible objections. At the end, the debate between atheism and theological non-cognitivism is addressed, with the atheist side argued to have the preferable outlook.
    Meaning, MiscDivine Attributes, Misc
  •  116
    A Response to Parrish on the Fine-Tuning Argument
    Philosophia Christi 2 (1): 61-67. 2000.
    This is response to Stephen Parrish’s article "Theodore Drange on the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Critique," ’Philosophia Christi’, Series 2, 1 (No. 2, 1999), which attacked a section of my book ’Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for God’s Nonexistence’ (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998). The Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) maintains that the physical constants of our universe exhibit evidence of "fine-tuning" by an intelligent designer. In opposition, I suggest alternate explanations which are at lea…Read more
    Fine-Tuning in Cosmology
  •  167
    The fine tuning argument (1998)
    Fine-Tuning in Cosmology
  •  192
    Slater on Self-Referential Arguments
    Analysis 54 (1): 61-64. 1994.
    This is a reply to B. H. Slater's article "Liar Syllogisms and Related Paradoxes" (Analysis 51, 146-153), which raised an objection to one of the arguments considered in my article "Liar Syllogisms" (Analysis 50, 1-7). Slater's objection is shown to be a failure. In effect, the paradoxicality of liar syllogisms is vindicated.
    Liar Paradox
  •  1106
    Nonbelief vs. Lack of Evidence
    Philo 1 (1): 105-114. 1998.
    Here are two atheological arguments, called the “Lack-of-evidence Argument” (LEA) and “the Argument from Nonbelief” (ANB). LEA: Probably, if God were to exist then there would be good objective evidence for that. But there is no good objective evidence for God’s existence. Therefore, probably God does not exist. ANB: Probably, if God were to exist then there would not be many nonbelievers in the world. But there are many nonbelievers in the world. Therefore, probably God does not exist. Reasons …Read more
    Arguments Against Theism, MiscDivine Hiddenness