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50My answer to the title question is a qualified "Yes." A certain rare form of creationism is in principle testable and compatible with natural law, and therefore scientific, however, this is a moot point. I arrive at my conclusions purely through thought experiments. But before getting to that, let us first consider the issues of what creationism is and what it means for a theory to be scientific.
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592The Fine-Tuning Argument RevisitedPhilo 3 (2): 38-49. 2000.A version of the Fine-tuning Argument (FTA) considered in a previous essay is replaced by an improved version, which is then refuted.Advocates of FTA must proclaim that there is no world ensemble, that a great many alternatives to the physical constants of our universe are physically possible and roughly equal in probability to them, and that alternate hypothetical worlds are all, or almost all, uninteresting in comparison to our universe. But no reason has been produced to believe any of these …Read more
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81Slater on Self-Referential ArgumentsAnalysis 54 (1). 1994.This is a reply to B. H. Slater's article "Liar Syllogisms and Related Paradoxes" (Analysis 51, 146-153), which raised an objection to one of the arguments considered in my article "Liar Syllogisms" (Analysis 50, 1-7). Slater's objection is shown to be a failure. In effect, the paradoxicality of liar syllogisms is vindicated.
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31Nonbelief vs. Lack of EvidencePhilo 1 (1): 105-114. 1998.Here are two atheological arguments, called the “Lack-of-evidence Argument” (LEA) and “the Argument from Nonbelief” (ANB). LEA: Probably, if God were to exist then there would be good objective evidence for that. But there is no good objective evidence for God’s existence. Therefore, probably God does not exist. ANB: Probably, if God were to exist then there would not be many nonbelievers in the world. But there are many nonbelievers in the world. Therefore, probably God does not exist. Reasons …Read more
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32The Pluralizability Objection to a New-Body AfterlifeIn Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 405-408. 2015.This paper presents and defends that an afterlife in which a person receives a new body after his or her old body is destroyed (as it is on some notions of bodily resurrection) is conceptually impossible. The main idea behind this argument is that such an afterlife would conceptually require that a person be a kind of thing that could be rendered plural. But since persons are not that type of thing, such an afterlife is not conceptually possible.
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507This online essay puts forth and defends precise definitions of the terms "atheism," "agnosticism." and "[theological] noncognitivism."
Morgantown, West Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Religion |