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22Type Crossings: Sentential Meaninglessness in the Border Area of Linguistics and PhilosophyPhilosophical Quarterly 17 (69): 366. 1967.
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20The paradox defendedPhilosophical Studies 18 (1-2). 1967.This is a defense of the article "The Paradox of the Non-communicator," which appears in Philosophical Studies 15, pp. 92-96, against objections raised by Karel Lambert and Robert W. Beard in separate articles in Philosophical Studies 17.
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19Reply to Martin on type crossingsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (1): 136-139. 1969.THIS IS A DEFENSE OF DRANGE'S BOOK "TYPE CROSSINGS"\n(MOUTON, 1966) AGAINST OBJECTIONS RAISED BY ROBERT MARTIN\nIN HIS DISCUSSION ARTICLE "DRANGE ON TYPE CROSSINGS" (SAME\nISSUE). DRANGE DEFENDS HIS ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT TYPE\nCROSSINGS (E.G., THE SENTENCE "VIRTUE IS BLUE") ARE BOTH\n(NECESSARILY) FALSE AND (CONCEPTUALLY) MEANINGLESS. HE ALSO\nDEFENDS THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD IN THE BOOK WHICH AIM AT\nREFUTING THE VIEW THAT THERE ARE TYPE=RULES IN EFFECT IN\nORDINARY LANGUAGE. FOR THE MOST PART,…Read more
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16Paradox regainedPhilosophical Studies 20 (4). 1969.This is a defense of the article "The Paradox of the Non-communicator," which appears in Philosophical Studies 15, pp. 92-96, against objections raised by J. Michael Dunn in his article "Drange's Paradox Lost," Philosophical Studies 18, pp. 94-95.
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10Nonbelief as Support for AtheismThe Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 36 59-64. 1998.The Canadian philosopher J.L. Schellenberg has recently put forward an argument for atheism based on the idea that God is supposed to be perfectly loving and so would not permit people to be deprived of awareness of his existence. If such a deity were to exist, then, he would do something to reveal his existence clearly to people, thereby causing them to become theists. Thus, the fact that there are so many non-theists in the world becomes good reason to deny the existence of God conceived of in…Read more
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6Type Crossings: Sentential Meaninglessness in the Border Area of Linguistics and PhilosophyWalter de Gruyter. 1966.
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4I argue that Pardi's criticisms of Drange's version of the argument from nonbelief (ANB) do not refute ANB, although they may or may not require peripheral corrections or clarifications on Drange's part. I focus not so much on Drange's formulation, but on what I take to be the central intuitions of ANB and on the inadequacy of Pardi's objections. I assume some familiarity with Pardi's paper and with ANB, although I present what I consider to be ANB's central claims.
Morgantown, West Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |