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Daniel Stoljar

Australian National University
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
PhD
Homepage
Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
0000-0003-4506-3614
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Metaphilosophy
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  414
    The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical
    Philosophical Perspectives 15 393-413. 2001.
    The conceivability argument against physicalism1 starts from the prem- ises that: It is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, i.e., that there is someone who is physically identical to me and yet who lacks phenomenal con- sciousness; and If it is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, then it is possible that I have a zombie-twin. These premises entail that physicalism is false, for physicalism is the claim—or can be assumed for our purposes to be the claim2—that
    Zombies and the Conceivability Argument