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102Distinctions in distinctionIn Jesper Kallestrup & Jakob Hohwy (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Causation and Explanation in the Special Sciences, Oxford University Press. 2007.This chapter begins with a putative puzzle between non-reductive physicalism according to which psychological properties are distinct from, yet metaphysically necessitated by, physical properties, and Hume's dictum according to which there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. However, the puzzle dissolves once care is taken to distinguish between distinct kinds of distinction: numerical distinctness, mereological distinctness, and what the chapter calls ‘weak modal distinctn…Read more
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75Should Moore Have Followed His Own Method?Philosophical Studies 129 (3): 609-618. 2006.I discuss Soames’s proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore’s moral philosophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be self-evident. The method in Moore’s epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In review of the distance between something’s being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames’s proposal is mistaken.
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209Is there a Lockean argument against expressivism?Analysis 63 (1): 76-86. 2003.It is sometimes suggested that expressivism in meta-ethics is to be criticized on grounds which do not themselves concern meta-ethics in particular, but which rather concern philosophy of language more generally. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1998; see also Jackson and Pettit 1999, and Jackson 2001) have recently advanced a novel version of such an argument. They begin by noting that expressivism in its central form makes two claims—that ethical sentences are not truth evaluable, and that to …Read more
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6Précis of Ignorance and ImaginationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3): 748-755. 2009.
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98On Biological and Cognitive NeuroscienceMind and Language 13 (1): 110-131. 1998.Many philosophers and neuroscientists defend a view we express with the slogan that mental science is neuroscience. We argue that there are two ways of interpreting this view, depending on what is meant by ‘neuroscience’. On one interpretation, the view is that mental science is cognitive neuroscience, where this is the science that integrates psychology with the biology of the brain. On another interpretation, the view is that mental science is biological neuroscience, where this is the investi…Read more
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27IntroductionIn Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary, Mit Press. 2003.Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, i…Read more
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59Uriah Kriegel: The Varieties of Consciousness (review)Journal of Philosophy 112 (12): 678-682. 2015.This is a review of Kriegel's *The Varieties of Consciousness*.
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14Comments on Galen Strawson 'Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism'Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 170-176. 2006.
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70Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism, by Robert J. Howell (review)Mind 125 (498): 608-611. 2016.Review of Howell's *Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism*.
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34Review of Christopher S. hill, Consciousness (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (9). 2010.This is a review of Christopher Hill's *Consciousness*.
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752There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (edited book)MIT Press. 2004.The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
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766PhysicalismRoutledge. 2010.Physicalism, the thesis that everything is physical, is one of the most controversial problems in philosophy. Its adherents argue that there is no more important doctrine in philosophy, whilst its opponents claim that its role is greatly exaggerated. In this superb introduction to the problem Daniel Stoljar focuses on three fundamental questions: the interpretation, truth and philosophical significance of physicalism. In answering these questions he covers the following key topics: (i)A brief hi…Read more
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217The deflationary theory of truthStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the statement itself. For example, to say that ‘snow is white’ is true, or that it is true that snow is white, is equivalent to saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary theory, is all that can be said significantly about the truth of ‘snow is white’.
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145Four Kinds of Russellian MonismIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge. pp. 17. 2014.“Russellian Monism” is a name given to a family of views in philosophy of mind. The family is exciting because it seems to present an alternative both to materialism and to dualism. After briefly setting out the need for this alternative, I distinguish four different kinds of Russellian Monism (RM), and assess their pros and cons. My own feeling, as will emerge in the final section of the paper, is that only the fourth of these represents a viable version of the view. But my main aim is less t…Read more
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146Strawson's realistic monismJournal of Consciousness Studies. forthcoming.There is at least one element in Strawson
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75Actors and zombiesIn Alex Byrne & J. Thomson (eds.), Content and Modalities: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, Oxford University Press. pp. 1. 2006.Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by the intersection of three topics: physicalism, the conceivability argument, and the necessary a posteriori. I will be concerned here to describe the consensus view of these topics; to explain why I think this account is mistaken; and to briefly sketch an alternative.
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71Physicalism plus intentionalism equals error theoryBehavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6): 790-791. 2003.Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) combine physicalism about color with intentionalism about color experience. I argue that this combination leads to an “error theory” about color experience, that is, the doctrine that color experience is systematically illusory. But this conflicts with another aspect of B&H's position, namely, the denial of error theory.
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174On the self-locating response to the knowledge argumentPhilosophical Studies 155 (3): 437-443. 2011.On the self-locating response to the knowledge argument Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9612-2 Authors Daniel Stoljar, Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT, 0200 Australia Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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378Introspection and Consciousness: An OverviewIn Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2012.Introspection stands at the interface between two major currents in philosophy and related areas of science: on the one hand, there are metaphysical and scientific questions about the nature of consciousness; and on the other hand, there are normative and epistemological questions about the nature of self-knowledge. Introspection seems tied up with consciousness, to the point that some writers define consciousness in terms of introspection; and it is also tied up with self-knowledge, since intro…Read more
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772Does the exclusion argument put any pressure on dualismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1): 96-108. 2017.The exclusion argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism if not to refute it outright. We argue to the contrary that, whether or not their position is ultimately true, dualists have a plausible response. The response focuses on the notion of ‘distinctness’ as it occurs in the argument: if 'distinctness' is understood one way, the exclusion principle on which the argument is founded can be denied by the dualist; if it is understood another way, the argument is not persuasi…Read more
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331The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physicalPhilosophical Perspectives 15 393-413. 2001.The conceivability argument against physicalism1 starts from the prem- ises that: It is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, i.e., that there is someone who is physically identical to me and yet who lacks phenomenal con- sciousness; and If it is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, then it is possible that I have a zombie-twin. These premises entail that physicalism is false, for physicalism is the claim—or can be assumed for our purposes to be the claim2—that
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128Chomsky, London and LewisAnalysis 75 (1): 16-22. 2015.This article suggests that Chomsky’s notorious ‘London’ argument against semantics looks much more plausible that it is usually interpreted as being when seen in the light of something apparently remote from its concerns, viz., David Lewis’s distinction between natural and non-natural properties
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22Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (review)Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213): 616-618. 2003.Review of Perrys *Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness*.
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1186Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness (edited book)MIT Press. 2019.Perhaps more than any other philosopher of mind, Ned Block synthesizes philosophical and scientific approaches to the mind; he is unique in moving back and forth across this divide, doing so with creativity and intensity. Over the course of his career, Block has made groundbreaking contributions to our understanding of intelligence, representation, and consciousness. Blockheads! (the title refers to Block's imaginary counterexample to the Turing test—and to the Block-enthusiast contributors) off…Read more
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640Physicalism and phenomenal conceptsMind and Language 20 (2): 296-302. 2005.A phenomenal concept is the concept of a particular type of sensory or perceptual experience, where the notion of experience is understood phenomenologically. A recent and increasingly influential idea in philosophy of mind suggests that reflection on these concepts will play a major role in the debate about conscious experience, and in particular in the defense of physicalism, the thesis that psychological truths supervene on physical truths. According to this idea—I call it the phenomenal conc…Read more
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184Introduction to There's Something About MaryIn Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), There's Something About Mary, . 2004.Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, i…Read more
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154The Ontology of Mind: Events, States and Processes (review)Philosophical Review 108 (3): 418. 1999.The aim of this book is to argue that issues in metaphysics—in particular issues about the nature of states and causation—will have a significant impact in philosophy of mind. As Steward puts it: “the category of state has been so grossly misunderstood that some theories of mind which are supposed to encompass entities traditionally regarded as falling under the category, e.g., beliefs and desires, cannot so much as be sensibly formulated, once we are clearer about the nature of states”. Accordi…Read more
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18Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Dictionary of American PhilosophersIn John R. Shook (ed.), The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, . 2005.THOMSON, Judith Jarvis (1929– ) Judith Jarvis Thomson received her BA from Barnard College in 1950, her MA from Cambridge University in 1956, and a Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1959. Her first teaching position was at Barnard where she was a lecturer from 1955–9, an instructor from 1959–60, and then Assistant Professor from 1960–2. In 1963, she moved to Boston, first as an Assistant Professor at Boston University (1963–4), and then to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she has…Read more
Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphilosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |