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102Sender-Receiver Systems within and between OrganismsPhilosophy of Science 81 (5): 866-878. 2014.Drawing on models of communication due to Lewis and Skyrms, I contrast sender-receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they function in the bridging of space and time. Within the organism, memory can be seen as the sending of messages over time, communication between stages as opposed to spatial parts. Psychological memory and genetic memory are compared with respect to their relations to a sender-receiver model. Some puzzles about “genetic information” can be resolve…Read more
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85Senders, receivers, and genetic information: comments on Bergstrom and RosvallBiology and Philosophy 26 (2): 177-181. 2011.
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54Senders, Receivers, and Symbolic ArtifactsBiological Theory 12 (4): 275-286. 2017.A “sender–receiver” framework based on models developed in several fields can provide a general treatment of communicative and symbolic phenomena, replacing traditional semiotic theories that have failed to live up to the hopes of their advocates. Sender–receiver models have mostly been applied to linguistic behavior, gestures, and other ephemeral interactions between individuals. I look at the application of this framework to enduring artifacts, including pictures, using indigenous rock art in …Read more
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69Signs and Symbolic BehaviorBiological Theory 9 (1): 78-88. 2014.Research in archaeology and anthropology on the evolution of modern patterns of human behavior often makes use of general theories of signs, usually derived from semiotics. Recent work generalizing David Lewis’ 1969 model of signaling provides a better theory of signs than those currently in use. This approach is based on the coevolution of behaviors of sign production and sign interpretation. I discuss these models and then look at applications to human prehistoric behavior, focusing on body or…Read more
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588Recurrent transient underdetermination and the glass half full (review)Philosophical Studies 137 (1). 2008.Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
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45Reply to RosenbergBiology and Philosophy 33 (3-4): 19. 2018.I respond to two of the main arguments in Rosenberg’s commentary on “Mind, Matter, and Metabolism.” Rosenberg’s claim that metabolic activities are “modularized” in a way that sets them apart from cognitive processes is not true given the broad sense of the “metabolic” employed in my paper, and contemporary neuroscience, including the work on navigation cited by Rosenberg, has begun to yield an understanding of subjectivity and “point of view.”
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34R. G. Millikan: "Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (n/a): 556. 1988.
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42Reasoning as deliberative in function but dialogic in structure and originBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2): 80-80. 2011.Mercier and Sperber (M&S) claim that the main function of reasoning is to generate support for conclusions derived unconsciously. An alternative account holds that reasoning has a deliberative function even though it is an internalized analogue of public discourse. We sketch this alternative and compare it with M&S's in the light of the empirical phenomena they discuss
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55Procrustes probably: Comments on Sober's "physicalism from a probabilistic point of view"Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2): 175-181. 1999.
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9Some central ideas associated with developmental systems theory are outlined for non-specialists. These ideas concern the nature of biological development, the alleged distinction between “genetic” and “environmental” traits, the relations between organism and environment, and evolutionary processes. I also discuss some criticisms of the DST approach.
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118In the beginning there was information?Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 80 101239. 2020.
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146Individuality, subjectivity, and minimal cognitionBiology and Philosophy 31 (6): 775-796. 2016.The paper links discussions of two topics: biological individuality and the simplest forms of mentality. I discuss several attempts to locate the boundary between metabolic activity and ‘minimal cognition.’ I then look at differences between the kinds of individuality present in unicellular life, multicellular life in general, and animals of several kinds. Nervous systems, which are clearly relevant to cognition and subjectivity, also play an important role in the form of individuality seen in a…Read more
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71Is it a revolution?Biology and Philosophy 22 (3): 429-437. 2007.Jablonka and Lamb's claim that evolutionary biology is undergoing a ‘revolution’ is queried. But the very concept of revolutionary change has uncertain application to a field organized in the manner of contemporary biology. The explanatory primacy of sequence properties is also discussed.
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104Information, arbitrariness, and selection: Comments on Maynard SmithPhilosophy of Science 67 (2): 202-207. 2000.Maynard Smith is right that one of the most striking features of contemporary biology is the ever-increasing prominence of the concept of information, along with related concepts like representation, programming, and coding. Maynard Smith is also right that this is surely a phenomenon which philosophers of science should examine closely. We should try to understand exactly what sorts of theoretical commitment are made when biological systems are described in these terms, and what connection ther…Read more
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150Indication and adaptationSynthese 92 (2): 283-312. 1992.This paper examines the relationship between a family of concepts involving reliable correlation, and a family of concepts involving adaptation and biological function, as these concepts are used in the naturalistic semantic theory of Dretske's "Explaining Behavior." I argue that Dretske's attempt to marry correlation and function to produce representation fails, though aspects of his failure point the way forward to a better theory.
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263Group fitness and multi-level selection: Replies to commentaries (review)Biology and Philosophy 17 (4): 539-549. 2002.
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70Gradualism and the Evolution of ExperiencePhilosophical Topics 48 (1): 201-220. 2020.In evolution, large-scale changes that involve the origin of complex new traits occur gradually, in a broad sense of the term. This principle applies to the origin of subjective or felt experience. I respond to difficulties that have been raised for a gradualist view in this area, and sketch a scenario for the gradual evolution of subjective experience, drawing on recent research into early nervous system evolution.
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140Explanatory symmetries, preformation, and developmental systems theoryPhilosophy of Science 67 (3): 331. 2000.Some central ideas associated with developmental systems theory (DST) are outlined for non-specialists. These ideas concern the nature of biological development, the alleged distinction between "genetic" and "environmental" traits, the relations between organism and environment, and evolutionary processes. I also discuss some criticisms of the DST approach
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178Evolving Across the Explanatory GapPhilosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 11 (1): 1-13. 2019.One way to express the most persistent part of the mind-body problem is to say that there is an “explanatory gap” between the physical and the mental. The gap is not usually taken to apply to all of the mental, but to subjective experience, the mind’s “qualitative” features, or what is now referred to as “phenomenal consciousness.” The “gap” formulation is due to Joseph Levine. He acknowledged the appeal of intuitions of separability between physical facts, of any kind we can envisage, and this …Read more
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132Dewey on naturalism, realism and scienceProceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3). 2002.An interpretation of John Dewey’s views about realism, science, and naturalistic philosophy is presented. Dewey should be seen as an unorthodox realist, with respect to both general metaphysical debates about realism and with respect to debates about the aims and achievements of science.
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52Dewey and the Question of RealismNoûs 47 (4): 73-89. 2013.An interpretation is given of John Dewey's views about “realism” in metaphysics, and of how these views relate to contemporary debates. Dewey rejected standard formulations of realism as a general metaphysical position, and interpreters have often been taken him to be sympathetic to some form of verificationism or constructivism. I argue that these interpretations are mistaken, as Dewey's unease with standard formulations of realism comes from his philosophical emphasis on intelligent control of…Read more
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25Chapter Two. Laws, Mechanisms, and ModelsIn Philosophy of Biology, Princeton University Press. pp. 11-27. 2013.
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20Chapter Seven. Species and the Tree of LifeIn Philosophy of Biology, Princeton University Press. pp. 100-119. 2013.
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573On the evolution of behavioral complexity in individuals and populationsBiology and Philosophy 13 (2): 205-31. 1998.A wide range of ecological and evolutionary models predict variety in phenotype or behavior when a population is at equilibrium. This heterogeneity can be realized in different ways. For example, it can be realized through a complex population of individuals exhibiting different simple behaviors, or through a simple population of individuals exhibiting complex, varying behaviors. In some theoretical frameworks these different realizations are treated as equivalent, but natural selection distingu…Read more