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25Why Monarchy Should Be AbolishedThink 22 (65): 39-44. 2023.Monarchy is a form of government that, roughly, dictates that the right to rule is inherited by birth by a single ruler. But monarchy (absolute or constitutional) breaches fundamental moral principles that undergird representative democracy, such as basic moral equality, dignity and desert. Simply put, the monarchs (and their family) are treated as morally superior to ordinary citizens and as a result ordinary citizens are treated in an unfair and undignified manner. For example, monarchs are re…Read more
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24Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and COVID-19 irrationalitiesPhilosophical Psychology 36 (6): 1037-1061. 2023.We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinfo...
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23Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, editted by Nathan Ballantyne and David DunningInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1-6. forthcoming.
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21'Metaepistemology' Internet Encyclopedia of PhilosophyInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.
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19Skepticism, Mental Disorder and RationalityInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (1): 1-30. 2023.I stipulate and motivate the overlooked problem of demarcating radical skeptics (perceptual and moral) from mentally disordered persons, given that both deny that they know ordinary Moorean propositions (e.g., that they have hands or that killing for fun is morally wrong). Call this ‘the demarcation problem’. In response to the demarcation problem, I develop a novel way to demarcate between mentally disordered persons and radical skeptics in an extensionally adequate way that saves the appearanc…Read more
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18Varieties of skeptical invariantism IIPhilosophy Compass 16 (10). 2021.AbstarctIn the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science-based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science-based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge but still qu…Read more
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18The Moral Argument Against Monarchy (Absolute or Constitutional)Res Publica 30 (1): 171-182. 2024.I argue that monarchies, in any possible form (absolute or constitutional), should be abolished once and for all. This is because of the deeply immoral presuppositions such a system of government upholds (implicitly or explicitly). Call this _‘the moral argument against monarchy’_. I identify three basic moral principles that monarchy by definition breaches: ‘the basic moral equality principle’, ‘the basic dignity principle’ and ‘the basic moral desert principle’. Finally, I examine and reply to…Read more
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17Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & IIPhilosophy Compass 16 (10). 2021.I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent literature: two non‐traditional and one more traditi…Read more
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16Moral Fixed Points, Error Theory and Intellectual VicePhilosophia 51 (4): 1785-1794. 2023.Ingram (2015) has argued that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s (2014) ‘moral fixed points’ theory entails that error theorists are conceptually deficient with moral concepts. They are conceptually deficient with moral concepts because they do not grasp moral fixed points (e.g. ‘Torture for fun is pro tanto wrong’). Ingram (2015) concluded that moral fixed points theory cannot substantiate the conceptual deficiency charge and, therefore, the theory is defeated. In defense of moral fixed points theory, K…Read more
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15How Not to Be a FallibilistThe Monist 106 (4): 423-440. 2023.I develop one partial explanation of the origins of our fallibilist intuitions about knowledge in ordinary language fallibilism and argue that this explanation indicates that our epistemic methodology should be more impartial and theory-neutral. First, I explain why the so-called Moorean constraint (cf. Hawthorne 2005, 111) that encapsulates fallibilist intuitions is fallibilism’s cornerstone. Second, I describe a pattern of fallibilist reasoning in light of the influential dual processing and h…Read more
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14Epistemic Contextualism. A Defense: by Peter Baumann, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, vi +265 pp., £49.99 (hardback), ISBN: 9780198754312 (review)International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1): 128-135. 2020.Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 128-135.
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13Is Spinoza's Ethics Metaethically Constructivist?History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (2): 131-146. 2022.Charles Jarrett and P. D. Zuk have argued on independent grounds that Spinoza's Ethics delineates a moral antirealist/constructivist position. I reconstruct their basic arguments, present their textual evidence, and suggest that the evidence is, in principle, compatible with moral realism. As I argue, Jarrett and Zuk have opted for an antirealist/constructivist interpretation of the adduced textual evidence because they tacitly rely on a mistaken metaethical assumption: that relational normativi…Read more
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12Varieties of skeptical invariantism IIPhilosophy Compass 16 (10). 2021.AbstarctIn the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science-based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science-based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge but still qu…Read more
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10Matthieu Queloz, the Practical Origins of Ideas. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2021. ISBN: 9780198868705, £72, Hbk (review)Journal of Value Inquiry 1-5. forthcoming.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |