Stephen A. Makin

This paper concerns the variety of uses Aristotle makes of the notion of potentiality, focusing on his physics and biology. The main argument of the paper turns on a contrast between two types of potentiality: those which are binary (which are either exercised or inactive, e.g. the capacity to build) and those that are Scalar (which can be exercised to a greater or lesser degree, e.g. the capacity to heat). Potentialities of the second sort are involved when there is Mutual interaction (the hot iron heats the cold water just as the cold water cools the hot iron), and I say something about what the notion of genuine mutual interaction consists in. I then argue that the notion of optimal conditions for the exercise of these scalar capacities makes no sense while it does make sense for binary capacities). It then follows that the Aristotelian response to the familiar objection that appeals to potentialities cannot be explanatory—a response developed at length in Metaphysics Θ, and crucially involving the notions of optimal conditions for exercise—will not apply to capacities the exercise of which is scalar. That result is offered as a partial explanation for Aristotle’s subsumption of lower level interactive biological capacities (e.g. to heat and cool) to higher level non-interactive capacities (e.g. to develop into bone, to develop from embryo to child).

Aristotle draws two sets of distinctions in Metaphysics 9.2, first between non-rational and rational capacities, and second between one way and two way capacities. He then argues for three claims: [A] if a capacity is rational, then it is a two way capacity [B] if a capacity is non-rational, then it is a one way capacity [C] a two way capacity is not indifferently related to the opposed outcomes to which it can give rise I provide explanations of Aristotle's terminology, and of how [A]-[C] should be understood. I then offer a set of arguments which are intended to show that the Aristotelian claims are plausible. \\\ [Nicholas Denyer] In De Caelo 1: 11-12 Aristotle argued that whatever is and always will be true is necessarily true. His argument works, once we grant him the highly plausible principle that if something is true, then it can be false if and only if it can come to be false. For example, assume it true that the sun is and always will be hot. No proposition of this form can ever come to be false. Hence this proposition cannot be false. Hence it is necessarily true, and so too is anything that follows from it. In particular, it is necessarily true that the sun is hot. Moreover, if the sun not only is and always will be hot, but also always has been, then it follows by similar reasoning that the sun not only cannot now fail to be hot, but also never could have failed. Anything everlastingly true is therefore, in the strictest sense of the term, necessarily true.

This paper is a reflection on some of Elizabeth Anscombe's influential work on causation, in particular on some comments in her Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge, published as ‘Causality and Determination’. One of Anscombe's major concerns in that paper is the relation between causation and necessitation, and she critically discusses the cast of mind which links causality with some kind of necessary connection or with exceptionless generalisation. In place of a semi-technical analysis of causation, Anscombe identifies the obvious and yet little considered core of the causal relation as follows

This paper offers an interpretation of the arguments Aristotle offers in "Metaphysics" 9.4, 1047b14-30, for the two modal theses [1] if (if A is the case then B is the case) then (if A is possible then B is possible) [2] if (if A is possible then B is possible) then (if A is the case then B is the case) Aristotle's arguments for these theses have not typically impressed commentators. I offer two arguments which are relatively faithful to Aristotle's text. The arguments rest on the following pair of claims concerning conditionals and possibility respectively [COND] 'if A then B' is true if and only if in any circumstances in which A obtains, B obtains also [TEST] 'possibly A' is true in a range of circumstances C1... $\text{C}_{\text{n}}$ if and only if assuming A true in any C1 gives rise to no impossibilities, once any further required adjustments are taken into account The arguments and the premises on which they rest are stated without formalisation of the theses [1] and [2]. The argument for [1] is a defensible and persuasive argument. The argument for [2] is invalid, though plausible. That is consistent with our differential verdicts on [1] and [2]. [2] appears to be false: the argument provided for [2] explains why Aristotle might nevertheless have asserted it. The aim of the paper is to justify a more positive verdict on Aristotle's arguments than is usual among commentators

In this lucid and insightful study, Stephen Makin investigates a form of argument widespread in ancient Greek philosophy, where the absence of a reason for one alternative to be the case rather than another is used to establish substantive conclusions—where the alternatives are “indifferent”. Examples abound: Anaximander engages in such reasoning to show that the Earth does not move; Zeno of Elea to show that what is cannot be divided; Democritus to argue for finite divisibility, on the one hand, and the infinite variety of atoms and worlds, on the other; not to mention the extensive use of such arguments in ancient skepticism.

Modalities enter into practically every area of contemporary philosophy. Great progress has been made in understanding the variety of differences between what is possible, what is actual, and what is necessary. But things were not always so clear. We owe a great debt in this area, as in so many others, to Aristotle, who had a lot to say on the topic, part of which comprises his discussion and use of the actuality/potentiality distinction. One important task in understanding his discussion of actuality and potentiality is locating the distinction within the wider area of modality in general. One very general area in which modalities are significant is the assessment of arguments. Aristotle provides us with the basics of a modal logic, and in Metaphysics V 12, treats the family of modal notions expressed by the Greek noun dunamis and its cognates. This article explores his account of energeia and dunamis, matter and substance, capacities, natures, and dispositions.

I will offer a defence of Anselm's Ontological Argument, building on some suggestions made by Prior. The defence offered avoids one of the objections commonly levelled against the Ontological Argument. I will not consider whether the use of this objection involves a misinterpretation of the argument as put forward by Anselm. It might, for example, be held that the argument of Proslogion 2 is programmatic, and points forward to Prosiogion 3, and arguments given by Anselm in his Reply to Gaunilo. In particular it might be denied that Anselm holds that what is greater about what exists in reality is just that it exists in reality. While what I have to say will start from points made by Prior, I do not intend to suggest that Prior holds that there is a defence possible for Anselm's argument such as I will offer. What I have to say involves emphasizing modal notions, and treating Anselm's argument as a modal argument. Thus it comes down to defending Anselm's argument in Proslogion 3 in preference to the Proslogion 2 argument

This paper engages with the idea at the core of my co‐symposiast's paper ‘Ethics of Substance’ : that the Aristotelian concept of substantial being has ethical implications, and an alternative understanding of existence in terms of affecting and being affected will help us more easily to accommodate relational values, which are thought to sit uneasily within the Aristotelian framework.I focus on two questions. First, is there really is a tension between an Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and concern for others? The answer depends on how we understand the relation between my valuing something indeterminate but determinable and my valuing the particular way in which that determinable is contingently determined. I agree that Carpenter is correct in identifying the tension she does.Second, does the alternative Buddhist influenced view of what it is to exist shift our attention from ethical values such as independence and autonomy onto interpersonal and relational values? I consider an example which reflects another aspect of Aristotle's outlook: his account of the ontological status of the simple material elements. I suggest that once we abandon the idea that such elements exist in virtue of specific intrinsic structures, then questions about their persistence through the changes by reference to which they are identified at the very least admit of no determinate answer. This suggestion also supports the line taken in Carpenter's paper.