Ori Simchen

The distinction between the use of a linguistic item and its mention is widely recognized as one of the basic tenets of contemporary philosophy of language. A common misconception of what is entailed by this distinction is that when an expression is being mentioned it is thereby not being used in its ordinary use. In this work I explore the workings of this false assumption and argue against it by rehabilitating linguistic reflexivity as an everyday mode of expression. By showing that our ordinary means for mentioning linguistic items are highly sensitive to context, I argue that expressions are often used and mentioned simultaneously, a fact that has far-reaching consequences also outside the philosophy of language proper. ;The first chapter, "Mentionability in Frege and Russell", is devoted to identifying common strands in the works of these two pioneers of the analytic tradition as providing a deep source for the idea that mentioned expressions, by the very fact of being mentioned, are not simultaneously being used. In the second and third chapters I explore different manifestations of this notion in theories of quotation. In the second chapter, "Ideal Quotation", I discuss Sellars' theory and locate it at the locus of a large epistemological concern to distinguish sharply between an empirical aspect of language and a formal aspect. Whatever the merits of such a theory are for Sellars' specific theoretical purposes, it leaves little room for considering quotation as an actual, everyday means for mentioning expressions. The third chapter, "Quotation and the Mixing of Use and Mention", is devoted to an examination of contemporary attempts to account for our actual quoting practices. I argue that of the five theories of quotation currently available only a recent version of the demonstrative theory can accommodate the simultaneity of use and mention. The fourth chapter, "Norms and Mention", applies the results of the preceding chapters to a particular vexing problem which lies at the heart of the intersection between language and normativity---the threat of a normative skepticism inspired by Lewis Carroll's parable about licensing inferences in "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles"