Sam Coleman

This chapter tries to answer the combination problem by defending an alternative understanding of the proto-mental nature of basic particulars to that posited by panpsychism. It starts out from a critical discussion of the alleged virtues of panpsychism and describes panqualityism as the thesis that the world’s intrinsic nature consists of qualities that are ‘unexperienced qualia.’ It discusses how this approach fares in light of the various forms of the combination problem introduced by Chalmers. It shows that panqualityism together with a HOT approach to consciousness helps answer the subject combination problem. The chapter closes with an evaluation of Chalmers’s awareness zombies, which have been introduced as an example against HOT-panqualityism.

Consideration of a weakness in Nagel’s argument for panpsychism, as highlighted by Rosenthal, points us in the direction of a modified argument for a nearby position. On _panqualityism_ the basic building blocks of the physical world are qualitative without being yet phenomenally qualitative (that is, intrinsically conscious). Panqualityism is developed and propounded as a promising form of physicalism; with qualities made the categorical nature of fundamental physical goings-on, while physical laws remain intact. It is argued that physical dispositions logically supervene on the fundamental qualities. This yields a synoptic vision of the physical evolution of consciousness. On this basis an objectivizing account is given of consciousness and subjectivity. Thus qualia are made physical properties and panqualityism emerges as an enriched form of physicalism.

Traditional marks of the mental invoke intentionality or consciousness, or some combination or disjunction of these. Intentionality-based views suggest that mental states could exist without qualitative character. And consciousness-based views wrongly cast mental states as mere determinates of consciousness. I propose a view on which content is the prime mental notion, understood as a 'hylomorphic' compound of cognitive-intentional form and qualitative matter, and argue that mentality understood as such can exist unconsciously. This view, I suggest, makes better sense of the range, as well as the unity, of our mental states, while doing justice to the role of unconscious mentation. I end by trying to fit consciousness itself into this framework, as a contributor to mental content in its own right.

Russellian physicalism endeavours to combine the good things about Russellianmonism and the good things about physicalism. If it could be successfully made out, it would be a very appealing metaphysics of mind. Focusing on Christopher Devlin Brown's clever development of Russellian physicalism in The Hope and the Horror of Physicalism, I argue that Russellian physicalism faces a problem. Proponents need to be able to rule out 'panqualityism' - a species of panprotopsychism featuring irreducible qualitative properties - as a kind of Russellian physicalism, but it seems that they cannot do so, given the way Russellian physicalism is defined in terms of via negativa physicalism. This 'panqualityism challenge' casts serious doubt on the prospects of describing a coherent and stable Russellian physicalist position, doubtswhich may also affect the wider project to define physicalism by the via negativa.

The current debate about mental imagery revolves around the puzzling fact that a sizable minority of people can do the sorts of task most of us perform with the help of mental imagery, but profess being unaware of any imagery in their own cases as they perform these tasks. The question is what to say about such ‘non-imagers’, and what to say about the utility of conscious imagery as a result. For example, if non-imagers lack imagery altogether, or are utilising unconscious imagery, the threat emerges that conscious imagery may simply be epiphenomenal as regards task performance: a ‘cognitive luxury’. This paper contributes to the debate by advancing a new position, and arguing that it is preferable to notable alternatives defended by Eric Schwitzgebel (2011), Ian Phillips (2014), and Bence Nanay (2021). The novel suggestion is that just as conscious mental imagery features mental qualitative properties in virtue of which it contributes to task performance (‘mental qualities’), unconscious mental imagery also features relevant mental qualities, albeit in unconscious form. This view, it is argued, has the best prospects of safeguarding various plausible theses about mental imagery and its role in mental life. The alternative views, by contrast, all involve giving up either the causal relevance of conscious imagery, or our introspective access to it.

Stephen Yablo suggested that the relation of mental properties to physical properties is the same as that between red and scarlet: one of determinable property to determinate property. So just as being scarlet is a specific way of being red, on Yablo’s proposal a subject’s having a certain neurological property (c-fibres firing, say) is a specific way of a subject’s having a certain mental property (pain, in this case). I explain the virtues of this theory, in particular as defended and developed by Jessica Wilson, but raise some problems for it. I then describe a novel theory of the mental/physical relationship, which inverts the Yablo-Wilson proposal. On this theory mental properties, notably phenomenal properties – or, as I will say, qualia – are determinates of determinable physical properties. I explain the virtues of this view, and argue that they at least match, and plausibly exceed, those of the Yablo-Wilson theory. In particular, this new theory is able to account for certain prominent perplexities of the mind/body problem that tend to go unexplained. I distinguish the view from nearby theories, in particular the increasingly popular ‘Russellian monism’. I end by likening it to a recent interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind due to David Charles.

Barbara Montero and Sam Coleman address the question of whether a life that involves psychedelic drug use can be meaningful and answer in the affirmative. Specifically, they contend that, on the conception of life’s meaning they defend, which they call “meaning-of-life externalism” (the view that the meaningfulness of one’s life is, at least partly, but essentially, a function of the relation between the content of one’s of mind, on the one hand, and truth and reality, on the other), the use of psychedelics, in appropriate contexts, is no bar to, but can contribute to, a meaningful life. They argue that, because psychedelics alter one’s perception in such a way as to leave both the world and one’s contact with it intact, the use of such drugs does not render one’s life any less meaningful. In making this case they contrast the clinical use of psychedelics with the prospect of sustained engagement in virtual reality (VR), recently discussed by Chalmers, which (as they put it) “does impede one’s ability to lead a meaningful life in the externalist sense because VR, in contrast to psychedelics, changes the world yet holds experience constant.” What is key for life’s meaning, then, is engagement with external reality.

David Pitt argues that whereas conscious thinking must be understood in qualitative terms, unconscious processes that feed into thought and cognition can be modelled without this commitment — hence without positing unconscious qualitative characters. Qualityfree neural-computational processes, instead, perform the functions we would have expected genuine unconscious mentality to fulfil, so Pitt suggests. I argue, against Pitt, that we need to extend the qualitative conception of mental content, especially thought content, to the unconscious. The core reason I give is that the phenomenal intentionalist critique of causal naturalist approaches to content, that accounts of content in terms of causation cannot capture the determinacy of conscious thought, applies also to Pitt's attempt to do without unconscious qualitative characters when modelling the unconscious processes that feed into conscious thought and cognition. Phenomenal intentionalists are right that only mental qualities can enable the mind–brain to dice contents and content-related operations sufficiently finely as to capture the way cognition actually works. Hence, as well as a quality of conscious thought we must posit qualities of unconscious thought. A thoroughgoing phenomenal intentionalism, thus, in view of the role of unconscious cognition in mental life overall, needs to posit unconscious qualitative characters, notably of thought.

Conscious mental qualities, aka phenomenal qualities, are seemingly a leading factor in much of our behaviour. Pains make us recoil from painful stimuli, itches make us scratch, feelings of anger sometimes make us shout, visually perceiving red leads us to halt at stop lights, and so on. To relinquish this claim about the efficacy of conscious mental qualities would mean surrendering a major component of our everyday, intuitive self-conception; hence, the claim enjoys considerable prima facie plausibility. Unconscious mental qualities, however, have been posited by a mere handful of philosophers historically, and are nowadays almost universally rejected. Via a case study of ‘restless legs syndrome’, I argue that there is a hitherto unnoticed cost to this prevailing rejection of unconscious mental qualities: the causal efficacy of conscious mental qualities is threatened. In fact, I argue, we face a dilemma: To endorse epiphenomenalism about conscious mental qualities, or to posit unconscious mental qualities. Since it is so plausible that conscious mental qualities are causally efficacious, this reasoning constitutes an argument for unconscious mental qualities. Moving beyond the sensory case, I explain how analogous reasoning might apply to other mental faculties where phenomenal qualities seem causally involved: notably, emotions and mental imagery.

Two important questions arise concerning the properties that constitute the phenomenal characters of our experiences: first, where these properties exist, and, second, whether they are tied to our consciousness of them. Such properties can either exist externally to the perceiving subject, or internally to her. This article argues that phenomenal characters, and specifically the phenomenal characters of colours, may exist independently of consciousness and that they are internal to the subject. We defend this combination of claims against a recent criticism according to which the unconscious phenomenal character of colours exists externally to the subject. We defend internalism about (potentially unconscious) phenomenal character by appealing to recent neuroscientific and behavioural evidence, and by rejecting the claim that externalism about phenomenal character is dialectically in a better position than internalism. In addition, we briefly present certain difficulties for externalist views of phenomenal character. These concern cases where the perceptual relation fails, but a perceptual experience still results. These points suffice to defuse the externalist critique of our view, and support the internalist variant of the consciousness-independence claim as the most plausible account of the unconscious phenomenal character of colours.

According to L.A. Paul, conscious experiences can be transformative. But can unconscious experiences also be transformative? After a preliminary clarification of what it means to have an unconscious experience, we marshal three cases of unconscious experiences to support the idea that unconscious experiences can be transformative: one inspired by Anna Karenina, another by a case of Freud’s, and a third by the medical condition hemispatial neglect. Such examples, we argue, suggest not only that you may have had more transformative experiences than you are aware of, but also that the sphere of the authentic subject, from a first-person perspective, outstrips what is in her consciousness at any time. A full account of transformative decision making, we suggest, must take this into consideration.

Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to whom these properties belong. However, it is impossible to explain the generation of a macro-subject (like one of us) in terms of the assembly of micro-subjects, for, as I show, subjects cannot combine. Therefore the panpsychist explanatory project is derailed by the insistence that the world’s ultimate material constituents are subjects of experience. The panpsychist faces a choice of giving up her explanatory ambitions, or of giving up the claim that the ultimates are subjects. I argue that the latter option is preferable, leading to neutral monism, on which phenomenal qualities are irreducible but subjects are reducible. So panpsychists should be neutral monists.

Notwithstanding its phenomenological appeal, physicalists have tended to shun the notion that we are ‘acquainted’ with our mental states in consciousness, due to the fact that the acquaintance relation seems mysterious, irreducible, and consequently unnatural. I propose a model of conscious experience based on the idea of ‘mental quotation’, and argue that this captures what we want from acquaintance but without any threat to naturalism. More generally the chapter embodies a complaint that reductionists seem unable to look past the representation relation to do the implementing of consciousness, and a call for theorists to investigate other relations to model our connection to our conscious states, like the constitution/part-whole relationship. This mundane relation has what it takes to give us natural acquaintance with our conscious-mental states.

According to Brentano, mentality is essentially intentional in nature. Other philosophers have emphasized the phenomenal-qualitative aspect of conscious experiences as core to the mind. A recent philosophical wave – the ‘phenomenal intentionality programme’ – seeks to unite these conceptions in the idea that mental content is grounded in phenomenal qualities. However, a philosophical and scientific current, which includes Freud and contemporary cognitive science, makes widespread use of the posit of unconscious mentality/mental content. I aim to reconcile these disparate, influential strands of thought concerning mentality’s essence, by defending a conception of the mark of the mental as consisting in content-carrying qualitative character (or mental qualities) – but understood as properties that can exist both in conscious (i.e. phenomenal) form and unconsciously. I describe this conception, deal with major historical objections to the notions of unconscious qualitative character and mentality, and explain the virtues of construing the mark of the mental in this way.

What should advocates of phenomenal intentionality say about unconscious intentional states? I approach this question by focusing on a recent debate between Tim Crane and David Pitt, about the nature of belief. Crane argues that beliefs are never conscious. Pitt, concerned that the phenomenal intentionality thesis coupled with a commitment to beliefs as essentially unconscious embroils Crane in positing unconscious phenomenology, counter-argues that beliefs are essentially conscious. I examine and rebut Crane’s arguments for the essential unconsciousness of beliefs, some of which are widely endorsed. On the way I sketch a model of how belief states could participate in the stream of consciousness. I then consider Pitt’s position, arguing in reply, along Freudian lines, that we should posit not just dispositional but occurrent unconscious beliefs. This result, I argue, indeed requires advocates of phenomenal intentionality to posit unconscious qualia to fix these unconscious occurrent thoughts, and I defend the coherence of the notion of unconscious qualia against some common attacks. Ultimately, I claim, the combination of taking seriously the occurrent unconscious, and a commitment to phenomenal intentionality, should lead us to expand William James’s conception of the stream of consciousness to encompass, additionally, a stream of unconscious mental life—or, perhaps better, to posit a single partly conscious partly unconscious qualia-stream of mental goings-on.

How could physicalism be true of a world in which there are no fundamental physical phenomena? A familiar answer, due to Barbara Gail Montero and others, is that physicalism could be true of such a world if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentality. Christopher Devlin Brown has produced a counterexample to that solution. We show how to modify the solution to accommodate Brown’s example: physicalism could be true of a world without fundamental physical phenomena if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentally constituted mentality. This solution is independently plausible and is available to physicalists of virtually all significant varieties.

Frank Jackson's case of Mary the colour scientist, and the knowledge argument against physicalism built upon it, are well known. This paper starts from Jackson's other, more neglected, thought experiment, about Fred, who sees a unique shade of red. It explores two senses in which properties are said to be 'objective', roughly corresponding to the ideas of a property's being intersubjectively accessible, on the one hand, and its being knowable without the need for special experiences, on the other. These senses of the objective are contrasted, and their links to the doctrine of physicalism explored, and it is argued that, in the sense of objectivity we should embrace, mental qualities come out as objective and physical properties. The paper ends up by proposing a novel theory about how mental qualities fit into the world—as determinates of determinable physical properties, a view that is distinguished from the closely related 'Russellian monism'.

According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Morris and Brown (Journal of Consciousness Studies 2016, 2017) argue that protophenomenal properties cannot serve this purpose, given assumptions Russellian monists typically make about the modal profile of such properties. Those assumptions, it is argued, entail that protophenomenal properties are ‘experience specific’, that is, they are individuated by their potential to constitute phenomenal properties, and are thus not genuinely physical. However, we argue, that reasoning assumes that physical inscrutables must be individuated in terms of their (actual or possible) grounding roles. Not only is that assumption questionable: it is antithetical to Russellian monism.

According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this makes its consciousness‐constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating consciousness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaegwon Kim's well‐known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds.

Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness.2 In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief history of a major objection to it. I suggest that this objection is ultimately ineffectual, but that behind it lies a reason to look beyond Rosenthal's theory to another sort of HOT theory. I then offer my own HOT theory as a suitable alternative, before concluding in a final section. Resumo Durante muitos anos, e em muitas publicações, David Rosenthal desenvolveu, defendeu e aplicou sua justamente reconhecida teoria da consciência, intitulada high-order thought. Neste artigo, explico a teoria e, em seguida, forneço uma breve história de uma objeção maior feita a ela. Sugiro que essa objeção é, em última análise, ineficaz, mas que por trás disso há uma razão para olhar além da teoria de Rosenthal, para outro tipo de teoria HOT. Então ofereço minha própria teoria HOT como uma alternativa adequada, antes de concluir, em uma seção final, a respeito de questões filosóficas aqui envolvidas.

In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing the universe as a person. If successful, it removes one bar to endorsing pantheism. I do this by examining a rising school of thought on personhood, on which persons, or selves, are understood as identical to episodes of consciousness. Through a critique of this experiential approach to personhood, I develop a theory of self as constituted of qualitative mental contents, but where these contents are also capable of unconscious existence. On this theory, though we can be conscious of our selves, consciousness turns out to be inessential to personhood. This move, I then argue, provides resources for responding to the pantheist’s problem of God’s person.

Frank Jackson's knowledge argument imagines a super-smart scientist, Mary, forced to investigate the mysteries of human colour vision using only black and white resources. Can she work out what it is like to see red from brain-science and physics alone? The argument says no: Mary will only really learn what red looks like when she actually sees it. Something is therefore missing from the science of the mind, and from the 'physicalist' picture of the world based on science. This powerful and controversial argument remains as pivotal as when it was first created in 1982, and this volume provides a thorough and incisive examination of its relevance in philosophy of mind today. The cutting-edge essays featured here break new ground in the debate, and also comprehensively set out the developments in the story of the knowledge argument so far, tracing its impact, past, present, and future.