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62Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First‐Person PerspectivePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 840-843. 2008.
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319On the Phenomenology of IntrospectionIn Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 129. 2012.
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20Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: A Reply to LycanPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.Lycan is concerned that I fail to explain my sense of 'phenomenal consciousness' sufficiently, and that I would unjustifiably criticize his "inner sense" theory for consciousness neglect. In response, I argue that my explanation of what I mean provides an adequate basis for disambiguating and answering Lycan's questions about the relation of phenomenal consciousness to "visual awareness" and the like. While I do not charge Lycan's theory with consciousness neglect, I do argue it employs a notion…Read more
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62What Dennett can't imagine and whyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2): 93-112. 1993.Woven into Dennett's account of consciousness is his belief that certain possibilities are not conceivable. This is manifested in his view that we are not conscious in any sense in which we can imagine that philosophers? ?zombies? might not be conscious, and also in his claims about ?Hindsight?, and what possibilities this can coherently suggest to us. If the possibilities Dennett denies none the less seem conceivable to us, then if he does not give us reason to think they are actually incoheren…Read more
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86Review of Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1). 2008.
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50First-Person Reflection and Hidden Physical Features: A Reply to WitmerPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9. 2003.My response to Witmer comes in three sections: In the first I address concerns about my book's blindsight thought-experiment, remarking specifically on the role imagination plays in it, and my grounds for thinking that a first-person approach is valuable here. In Section Two I consider the relation of the thought-experiment to theses regarding possibility and necessity, and Witmer's discussion of ways of arguing for the impossibility of "Belinda-style" blindsight, despite its apparent conceivabi…Read more
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198Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First‐Person Perspective (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 840-843. 2008.No Abstract
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496Phenomenality and Self-ConsciousnessIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford University Press. pp. 235. 2013.
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23Saving appearances: A dilemma for physicalistsIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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