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1Consciousness and intentionalityIn Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
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Understanding ConsciousnessDissertation, University of California, Berkeley. 1994.My aim is to clarify a certain concept of consciousness, to describe its relation to intentionality, and to explain its importance. ;I begin by arguing that one has a knowledge of one's own mind distinct in kind from that one has of another's, and propose that we rely on this distinctively first-person knowledge in thinking about consciousness. Adopting this first-person approach, I discuss certain kinds of illustrative instances, both actual and possible, of consciousness and its absence. The a…Read more
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4ConsciousnessIn Hubert L. Dreyfus & Mark A. Wrathall (eds.), A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism, Wiley-blackwell. 2006.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Brentano Husserl Heidegger Sartre Merleau‐Ponty.
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22Book reviews (review)Philosophical Psychology 9 (3): 391-410. 1996.The engine of reason, the seat of the soul: a philosophical journey into the brain, Paul M. Churchland. Cambridge: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 1995 ISBN: 0–262–03244–4Cognition in the wild, Edwin Hutchins. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. ISBN: 0–262–08231–4Dimensions of creativity, Margaret A. Boden, (Ed.) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994 ISBN 0–262–02368–7Contemplating minds: a forum for Artificial Intelligence, William J. Clancey, Stephen W. Smoliar & Mark J. Stefik (Eds) Cambridge: Bradford Book…Read more
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Phenomenological approachesIn Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
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Speaking Up for ConsciousnessIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge. pp. 199-221. 2013.
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48Why we need descriptive psychologyEuropean Journal of Philosophy 31 (2): 341-357. 2023.This article defends the thesis that in theorizing about the mind we need to accord first-person (“introspective” or “reflective”) judgments about experience a “selective provisional trust.” Such an approach can form part of a descriptive psychology. It is here so employed to evaluate some influential interpretations of research on attention to conclude that—despite what conventional wisdom suggests—an “introspection-positive” policy actually offers us a better critical perspective than its cont…Read more
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29The Phenomenal basis of intentionality, by Angela A. Mendelovici. Oxford University Press, 2018. 296 pages. ISBN:9780190863807 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4): 1097-1100. 2019.
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16The Phenomenal basis of intentionality, by Angela A.Mendelovici. Oxford University Press, 2018. 296 pages. ISBN:9780190863807 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4): 1097-1100. 2019.European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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69On needing time to think: consciousness, temporality, and self-expressionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3): 413-429. 2020.I examine an argument proposed by Tye and Wright, inspired by Geach, which holds that a correct understanding of how conceptual thought occurs in time demands we expel it from experience. This would imply—pace William James— that the “stream of consciousness” is not, even in part, a “stream of thought.” I argue that if we closely examine what seems to support crucial premises of their argument, we will find this undermines its other assumptions, and points us to a way of placing thought in time …Read more
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44Who's Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 1-21. 2007.There are general aspects of mental life it is reasonable to believe do not vary even when subjects vary in their first‐person judgments about them. Such lack of introspective agreement gives rise to “phenomenological disputes.” These include disputes over how to describe the perspectival character of perception, the phenomenal character of perceptual recognition and conceptual thought, and the relation between consciousness and self‐consciousness. Some suppose that when we encounter such disput…Read more
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2Phenomenality and intentionality---which explains which?: reply to GertlerJournal of Experimental Psychology 10 (2). 2004.In Chapter 7 I argue that we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having phenomenal features. According to Gertler, my claim needs, but does not receive from me, a defence against the allegedly rival thesis that phenomenal features are explained by intentional ones. I maintain that this criticism involves a misunderstanding of my view’s implications. In my book I oppose the “rival” thesis only to this extent: where my conception of consciousness conflicts with broad ways of trying to explain…Read more
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302In favor of (plain) phenomenologyPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 201-220. 2007.Plain phenomenology explains theoretically salient mental or psychological distinctions with an appeal to their first-person applications. But it does not assume that warrant for such first-person judgment is derived from an explanatory theory constructed from the third-person perspective. Discussions in historical phenomenology can be treated as plain phenomenology. This is illustrated by a critical consideration of Brentano’s account of consciousness, drawing on some ideas in early Husserl. De…Read more
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64Self-knowledge and rationality: Shoemaker on self-blindnessIn Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Ashgate. pp. 131. 2003.
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228The Significance of ConsciousnessPrinceton University Press. 1998."This is a marvelous book, full of subtle, thoughtful, and original argument
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98Precis of The Significance of ConsciousnessPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6. 2000.The aims of this book are: to explain the notion of phenomenal consciousness in a non-metaphorical way that minimizes controversial assumptions; to characterize the relationship between the phenomenal character and intentionality of visual experience, visual imagery and non-imagistic thought; and to clarify the way in which conscious experience is intrinsically valuable to us. It argues for the legitimacy of a first-person approach to these issues--one which relies on a distinctively first-perso…Read more
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86Review of Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1). 2008.
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50First-Person Reflection and Hidden Physical Features: A Reply to WitmerPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9. 2003.My response to Witmer comes in three sections: In the first I address concerns about my book's blindsight thought-experiment, remarking specifically on the role imagination plays in it, and my grounds for thinking that a first-person approach is valuable here. In Section Two I consider the relation of the thought-experiment to theses regarding possibility and necessity, and Witmer's discussion of ways of arguing for the impossibility of "Belinda-style" blindsight, despite its apparent conceivabi…Read more
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49Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First‐Person Perspective (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 840-843. 2008.No Abstract
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497Phenomenality and Self-ConsciousnessIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford University Press. pp. 235. 2013.
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23Saving appearances: A dilemma for physicalistsIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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676Is the appearance of shape protean?PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12 1-16. 2006.</b>This commentary focuses on shape constancy in vision and its relation to sensorimotor knowledge. I contrast “Protean” and “Constancian” views about how to describe perspectival changes in the appearance of an object’s shape. For the Protean, these amount to changes in apparent shape; for Constance, things are not merely judged, but literally appear constant in shape. I give reasons in favor of the latter view, and argue that Noë’s attempt to combine aspects of both views in a “dual aspect” a…Read more
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13Spontaneous Blindsight and Immediate Availability: A Reply to CarruthersPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.Carruthers' "immediate availability" theory of consciousness is criticized on the grounds that it offers no reasonable alternative to asserting the metaphysical impossibility of spontaneous blindsight. In defense, Carruthers says he can admit a spontaneous blindsight that relies on unconscious behavioral cues, and deny only its possibility without such mechanisms. I argue: This involves him in an unwarranted denial of the possibility that conscious visual discrimination could depend on behaviora…Read more
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