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13Spontaneous Blindsight and Immediate Availability: A Reply to CarruthersPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.Carruthers' "immediate availability" theory of consciousness is criticized on the grounds that it offers no reasonable alternative to asserting the metaphysical impossibility of spontaneous blindsight. In defense, Carruthers says he can admit a spontaneous blindsight that relies on unconscious behavioral cues, and deny only its possibility without such mechanisms. I argue: This involves him in an unwarranted denial of the possibility that conscious visual discrimination could depend on behaviora…Read more
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75Phenomenal thoughtIn Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 236-267. 2011.
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20Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge and Phenomenal Intentionality A Reply to LevinePSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9. 2003.Levine suggests the following criticisms of my book. First, the absence of a positive account of first-person knowledge in it makes it vulnerable to eliminativist refutation. Second, it is a relative strength of the higher order representation accounts of consciousness I reject that they offer explanations of the subjectivity of conscious states and their special availability to first-person knowledge. Further, the close connection I draw between the phenomenal character of experience and intent…Read more
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78Consciousness, Intentionality, and Self-Knowledge Replies to Ludwig and ThomassonPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8. 2002.Both Ludwig and Thomasson question my claim that many phenomenal features are intentional features. Further, Ludwig raises numerous objections to my claim that higher order mental representation is not essential to phenomenal consciousness. While Thomasson does not share those objections, she wonders how my view permits me to make first-person knowledge of mind depend on phenomenal consciousness. I respond to these challenges, drawing together questions about the forms of mental representation, …Read more
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165Socratic introspection and the abundance of experienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1): 63-91. 2011.I examine the prospects of using Hurlburt's DES method to justify his very 'thin'view of experience, on which visual experience is so infrequent as to be typically absent when reading and speaking. Such justification would seem to be based on the claim that, in DES 'beeper' samples, subjects often deny they just had any visual experi-ence. But if the question of 'visual experience' is properly construed, then it is doubtful they are deny-ing this. And even if they were, that would not generally …Read more
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41Respecting Appearances: A Phenomenological Approach to ConsciousnessIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology, Oxford University Press. 2012.This chapter reports the philosophy focusing mainly on just three foundational concerns. These are: the character of a phenomenological approach; its use to clarify the notion of phenomenal consciousness ; and its application to questions about a specifically sensory phenomenality and its ‘intentionality’ or ‘object-directedness’. Phenomenology involves the use of ‘first-person reflection’. The ways into the notion of phenomenality are elaborated. The ‘subjective experience’ conception of phenom…Read more
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100For Analytic PhenomenologyIn Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 95-110. 2016.
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111Attention and sensorimotor intentionalityIn David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 270. 2005.
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