Joseph Agassi

As a new field, cognitivism began with the total rejection of the old, traditional views of language acquisition and of learning ─ individual and collective alike. Chomsky was one of the pioneers in this respect, yet he clouds issues by excessive claims for his originality and by not allowing the beginner in the art of the acquisition of language the use of learning by making hypotheses and testing them, though he acknowledges that researchers, himself included, do use this method. The most important novelty of Chomsky's work is his idealization of the field by postulating the existence of the ideal speaker-hearer and his suggestion that the hidden structure of sentences is revealed by studying together all sentences that are logically equivalent to each other. This is progress, but his tests of equivalence are insufficient, as they all are within classical logic. This limitation rests on the greatest shortcoming of Chomsky's view, his idea that every sentence has one subject or subject-part, contrary to the claim of Frege and Russell that assertions involving relations (with two-place predicates) are structurally different from those involving properties (with one-place predicates). (See the Appendix below.).

The traditional hermeneutic ruling not to use reports and legends for questioning edicts and rules signifies the tacit recognition, contrary to explicit statement, of the part of the Rabbinical leadership, of the inevitability of change in diverse aspects if Jewish life. This may invite criticism of the conduct of the ancient leadership, which, as always, is questionable and useless. Rather, an open discussion should be instituted on the proposal to make future changes openly, not surreptitiously; particularly the change from surreptitious changes to open changes is better done openly.

Hopefully, critical rationalism will improve. The best way to improve is to be open to criticism and respond to it with no defensiveness. Future criticism is unpredictable, but one can seek weak spots that invite criticism. It is not easy to view Popper’s institutionalism as minimal; it should be minimal in different ways, relative to diverse ends, theoretical and practical, just as critical rationalism is minimalist and as the minimum is relative to ends. Popper’s third world is a meta-institution of sorts, and efforts to apply it to diverse problems are welcome in a minimal manner. Finally, Popper declared optimism obligatory; this is open to interpretation the way Jarvie viewed utopianism as useful for diverse ends, thus criticizing Popper’s anti-utopianism.

In the first place, Hans Albert is famous as the spokesperson of Karl Popper’s critical rationalism in the German-speaking world. This is chronologically a bit odd, given that Popper’s first vintage, his Logik der Forschung, appeared in German in 1935 and that his The Open Society and Its Enemies of 1945 appeared in German in 1958. Yet Albert did much to earn this fame: his decades-long indefatigable response to criticisms of Popper’s views in the post-war German philosophical literature and his constant contrast between Popper’s critical rationalism and competing views that were popular in Germany at the time.