J. Edward Hackett

In the following article, I discuss the root of Scheler’s account of the person, its origin in phenomenology and the larger impact that view has as an alternative to other conceptions of the person. My thesis in this article intends to show why we should start with Scheler’s phenomenology over other approaches to the person. First, I take a look at what theoretical resources Scheler’s phenomenology has to offer us, and secondly, I outline the cultural conditions as to why the value of the person must be affirmed in light of the 20th century and past philosophical mistakes in ethics. I, then, end on affirming the reasons why we ought to revive Scheler’s account of the person.

In this paper, I will argue that the experiential-based approaches of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and William James’s radical empiricism can help inform an account of humanism more rooted in concrete experience. Specifically, I will outline a form of humanism closely connected to the conceptual similarities between James’s radical empiricism and the general character of Husserl’s phenomenology of experience. Whereas many forms of humanism are underscored by an eliminativist impulse, I sketch a humanism of lived-experience more motivated by the restrictive and experiential impetus closer to pragmatism and phenomenology than humanism defended on metaphysically eliminativist grounds.This paper is organized in the following way. In the first section, I explain the general character of Husserl’s phenomenology and explain the methodological commitments that underscore his concept of experience. In the second section, I outline the conceptual similarities between James’s later radical empiricism and Husserl’s thought. Finally, in the third section, James’s critique of metaphysics and his radical empiricism allow for a limited acceptability of religious interests in experience as well as scientific interests. These interests result from how we experience the world and affirm freedom and individuality of every person’s lived-experience.