J. Edward Hackett

In this paper, I will argue that the experiential-based approaches of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and William James’s radical empiricism can help inform an account of humanism more rooted in concrete experience. Specifically, I will outline a form of humanism closely connected to the conceptual similarities between James’s radical empiricism and the general character of Husserl’s phenomenology of experience. Whereas many forms of humanism are underscored by an eliminativist impulse, I sketch a humanism of lived-experience more motivated by the restrictive and experiential impetus closer to pragmatism and phenomenology than humanism defended on metaphysically eliminativist grounds.This paper is organized in the following way. In the first section, I explain the general character of Husserl’s phenomenology and explain the methodological commitments that underscore his concept of experience. In the second section, I outline the conceptual similarities between James’s later radical empiricism and Husserl’s thought. Finally, in the third section, James’s critique of metaphysics and his radical empiricism allow for a limited acceptability of religious interests in experience as well as scientific interests. These interests result from how we experience the world and affirm freedom and individuality of every person’s lived-experience.

This volume illustrates the relevance of phenomenology to a range of contemporary concerns. Displaying both the epistemological rigor of classical phenomenology and the empirical analysis of more recent versions, its chapters discuss a wide range of issues from justice and value to embodiment and affectivity. The authors draw on analytic, continental, and pragmatic resources to demonstrate how phenomenology is an important resource for questions of personal existence and social life. The book concludes by considering how the future of phenomenology relates to contemporary philosophy and related academic fields.