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Models, ScientificIn Robert Fastiggi (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia (Supplement 2012-13: Ethics and Philosophy), Gale-cengage Learning. 2013.
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CounterintuitiveIn Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press. 2015.
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664On the value of faith and faithfulnessInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2): 7-29. 2017.There was a time when Greco-Roman culture recognized faith as an indispensable social good. More recently, however, the value of faith has been called into question, particularly in connection with religious commitment. What, if anything, is valuable about faith—in the context of ordinary human relations or as a distinctive stance people might take in relation to God? I approach this question by examining the role that faith talk played both in ancient Jewish and Christian communities and in the…Read more
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121How values in scientific discovery and pursuit Alter theory appraisalPhilosophy of Science 76 (5): 598-611. 2009.Philosophers of science readily acknowledge that nonepistemic values influence the discovery and pursuit of scientific theories, but many tend to regard these influences as epistemically uninteresting. The present paper challenges this position by identifying three avenues through which nonepistemic values associated with discovery and pursuit in contemporary pollution research influence theory appraisal: (1) by guiding the choice of questions and research projects, (2) by altering experimental …Read more
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1Empirical AdequacyIn Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press. 2015.
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40Special issue: approaches to faith: Guest editorial prefaceInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2): 1-6. 2017.According to many accounts of faith—where faith is thought of as something psychological, e.g., an attitude, state, or trait—one cannot have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. According to other accounts of faith, one can have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. Call the first sort of account doxasticism since it insists that faith requires belief; call the second nondoxasticism since it allows faith without belief. The New Testament may seem to favor doxasticism o…Read more
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26Backtracking and the Ethics of Framing: Lessons from Voles and VasopressinScience 338 (6112): 341-344. 2012.When communicating scientific information, experts often face difficult choices about how to promote public understanding while also maintaining an appropriate level of objectivity. We argue that one way for scientists and others involved in communicating scientific information to alleviate these tensions is to pay closer attention to the major frames employed in the contexts in which they work. By doing so, they can ideally employ useful frames while also enabling the recipients of information …Read more
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Ockham’s RazorIn Robert Fastiggi (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia (Supplement 2012-13: Ethics and Philosophy), Gale-cengage. 2013.
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Constructive EmpiricismIn Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press. 2015.
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84Re presenting vague opinionPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2): 341-344. 2012.http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p341 Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. An…Read more
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350Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of SciencePhilosophy of Science 81 (1): 1-21. 2014.Recent efforts to argue that nonepistemic values have a legitimate role to play in assessing scientific models, theories, and hypotheses typically either reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values or incorporate nonepistemic values only as a secondary consideration for resolving epistemic uncertainty. Given that scientific representations can legitimately be evaluated not only based on their fit with the world but also with respect to their fit with the needs of their users…Read more
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HopeIn Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press. 2015.
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725Introduction: Cognitive attitudes and values in scienceStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53 57-61. 2015.
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1Religious ViolenceIn Graham Robert Oppy (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, Routledge. 2015.
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Character Traits and the Neuroscience of Social BehaviorIn Christian R. Miller, Michael Furr, Angela Knobel & William Fleeson (eds.), Character: New Perspectives in Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology, Oxford University Press. 2015.
APA Eastern Division
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Faith |
Philosophy of Biology |
PhilPapers Editorships
Faith |