•  64
    Responsibility, Agency, and Cognitive Disability
    In Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson (eds.), Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 201--223. 2010.
    This is a reprint of the paper "Responsibility and Disability," first published in Metaphilosophy in 2009. It articulates some similarities and differences between psychopaths and individuals with mild intellectual disabilities that have important implications for both types of agents' moral and criminal responsibility.
  •  15
    Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
    Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a forum for outstanding new work in an area of vigorous and broad-ranging debate in philosophy and beyond. What is involved in human action? Can philosophy and science illuminate debate about free will? How should we answer questions about responsibility for action?
  •  91
    Me and mine
    Philosophical Studies 175 (1): 1-22. 2018.
    In this paper we articulate and diagnose a previously unrecognized problem for theories of entitlement, what we call the Claims Conundrum. It applies to all entitlements that are originally generated by some claim-generating action, such as laboring, promising, or contract-signing. The Conundrum is spurred by the very plausible thought that a later claim to the object to which one is entitled is a function of whether that original claim-generating action is attributable to one. This is further a…Read more
  •  387
    Personal Identity and Ethics
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    What justifies our holding a person morally responsible for some past action? Why am I justified in having a special prudential concern for some future persons and not others? Why do many of us think that maximizing the good within a single life is perfectly acceptable, but maximizing the good across lives is wrong? In these and other normative questions, it looks like any answer we come up with will have to make an essential reference to personal identity. So, for instance, it seems we are just…Read more
  •  128
    Moral responsibility and the self
    In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self, Oxford University Press. pp. 487--521. 2011.
    This paper discusses two features of the "morally responsible self." The first has to do with the preconditions of personal identity assumed to inhere in a morally responsible self. The paper argues that it is not a requirement of moral responsibility that the self held responsible for some action is one and the same individual as the self that performed it. the second feature involves what's known as the "deep self" theory of responsibility. The paper discusses the history of the theory, as…Read more