•  66
    The Selves of Social Animals: Comments on Gruen
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1): 66-74. 2014.
    In this commentary on Lori Gruen's “Death as a Social Harm,” I first lay out the basics of Gruen's argument, then I offer some critical discussion, and finally I explore whether there might be some metaphysical structure that would support her most provocative idea—that death harms our social selves. What would it take for this idea to be more than metaphor, so that when a loved one dies a part of me has died? In constructing one possibility, I draw from the distinction between identity and what…Read more
  •  64
    Responsibility, Agency, and Cognitive Disability
    In Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson (eds.), Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 201--223. 2010.
    This is a reprint of the paper "Responsibility and Disability," first published in Metaphilosophy in 2009. It articulates some similarities and differences between psychopaths and individuals with mild intellectual disabilities that have important implications for both types of agents' moral and criminal responsibility.
  •  15
    Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
    Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a forum for outstanding new work in an area of vigorous and broad-ranging debate in philosophy and beyond. What is involved in human action? Can philosophy and science illuminate debate about free will? How should we answer questions about responsibility for action?
  •  90
    Me and mine
    Philosophical Studies 175 (1): 1-22. 2018.
    In this paper we articulate and diagnose a previously unrecognized problem for theories of entitlement, what we call the Claims Conundrum. It applies to all entitlements that are originally generated by some claim-generating action, such as laboring, promising, or contract-signing. The Conundrum is spurred by the very plausible thought that a later claim to the object to which one is entitled is a function of whether that original claim-generating action is attributable to one. This is further a…Read more