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92Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth DimensionSocial Theory and Practice 31 (1): 51-75. 2005.This paper defends the permissibility of stem cell research against a theological objector who objects to it by appealing to "souls."
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155Selves and Moral UnitsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4): 391-419. 1999.Derek Parfit claims that, at certain times and places, the metaphysical units he labels *'selves" may be thought of as the morally significant units (I.e., the objects of moral concern) for such things as resource distribution, moral responsibility, commitments, etc. But his concept of the self is problematic in important respects, and it remains unclear just why and how this entity should count as a moral unit in the first place. In developing a view I call *'Moderate Reductionism," I attempt t…Read more
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813The Stony Metaphysical Heart of AnimalismIn Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 303-328. 2016.Animalism—the view that the identity across time of individuals like us consists in the persistence of our animal organisms—does poorly at accounting for our identity-related practical concerns. The reason is straightforward: whereas our practical concerns seem to track the identity of psychological creatures—persons—animalism focuses on the identity of human organisms who are not essentially persons. This lack of fit between our practical concerns and animalism has been taken to reduce animal…Read more
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157Responsibility and disabilityMetaphilosophy 40 (3-4): 438-461. 2009.This essay explores the boundaries of the moral community—the collection of agents eligible for moral responsibility—by focusing on those just inside it and those just outside it. In particular, it contrasts mild mental retardation with psychopathy, specifically among adults. For those who work with and know them, adults with mild mental retardation are thought to be obvious members of the moral community (albeit not full-fledged members). For those who work with and theorize about adult psychop…Read more
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996Personal identity and practical concernsMind 116 (462): 317-357. 2007.Many philosophers have taken there to be an important relation between personal identity and several of our practical concerns (among them moral responsibility, compensation, and self-concern). I articulate four natural methodological assumptions made by those wanting to construct a theory of the relation between identity and practical concerns, and I point out powerful objections to each assumption, objections constituting serious methodological obstacles to the overall project. I then attempt …Read more
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15Levy, Neil, Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. xiv + 346, AUD$99.00, US$57.99 (paper) (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1): 184-187. 2010.This Article does not have an abstract
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711Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral ResponsibilityEthics 121 (3): 602-632. 2011.Recently T. M. Scanlon and others have advanced an ostensibly comprehensive theory of moral responsibility—a theory of both being responsible and being held responsible—that best accounts for our moral practices. I argue that both aspects of the Scanlonian theory fail this test. A truly comprehensive theory must incorporate and explain three distinct conceptions of responsibility—attributability, answerability, and accountability—and the Scanlonian view conflates the first two and ignores the im…Read more
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
3 more
Moral Responsibility |
Agency |
Moral Psychology |
Persons |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Applied Ethics |
Free Will |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |