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146Rationality and the backwards induction argumentAnalysis 59 (4). 1999.Many philosophers and game theorists have been struck by the thought that the backward induction argument (BIA) for the finite iterated pris- oner’s dilemma (FIPD) recommends a course of action which is grossly counter-intuitive and certainly contrary to the way in which people behave in real-life FIPD-situations (Luce and Raiffa 1957, Pettit and Sugden 1989, Bovens 1997).1 Yet the backwards induction argument puts itself forward as binding upon rational agents. What are we to conclude from this?…Read more
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16V-The Sources of Self-consciousnessProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1): 87-107. 2002.
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15From Two Visual Systems to Two Forms of Content?PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13. 2007.This commentary on Jacob and Jeannerod’s Ways of Seeing evaluates the conclusions that the authors draw from the two visual systems hypothesis about the nature and phenomenology of visual experience.
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492Personal and sub‐personal; A difference without a distinctionPhilosophical Explorations 3 (1): 63-82. 2000.This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and facts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal l…Read more
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50Negation, Contrariety, and Practical Reasoning: Comments on Millikan’s Varieties of Meaning (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3). 2007.
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92The Interface Problem and the Scope of Commonsense Psychology: Reply to PaternosterSWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3). 2006.
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49Aspects of the self: John Campbell's Past, Space, and SelfInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 38 (4): 1-15. 1995.
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161Locke, metaphysical dualism and property dualism1British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2): 223-245. 1996.No abstract
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38Review of Mary Margaret McCabe, mark Textor (eds.), Perspectives on Perception (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (4). 2008.
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120Peacocke's Argument Against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Representational ContentMind and Language 9 (4): 402-418. 1994.
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Phenomenology of Bodily PerceptionAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (T): 25-36. 2011.Since this is colloquium on phenomenological and experimental approaches tocognition I’d like to set up te problem I want to address in terms of two of the differentstrands that we find in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about the phenomenology of thebody. One of these strands is profoundly insightful. The other one, however, seemsto me to be lacking in plausibility – or rather, to put it less confrontationally and morein keeping with the spirit of the colloquium, the second strand seems to stand in th…Read more
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8Do non-linguistic creatures possess second-order propositional attitudes? Reply to ShantonSWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3). 2006.
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Nonconceptual self-awareness and the paradox of self-consciousnessIn Albert Newen & Kai Vogeley (eds.), Selbst und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbewusstsein und seine Neurobiologischen Grundlagen, Mentis. 2000.
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60The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did It Have Ancient or Mediaeval Antecedents?History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (4). 2000.
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88Consciousness, higher-order thought, and stimulus reinforcementBehavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 194-195. 2000.Rolls defends a higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness, mapping the distinction between conscious and non-conscious states onto a distinction between two types of action and corresponding neural pathways. Only one type of action involves higher-order thought and consequently consciousness. This account of consciousness has implausible consequences for the nature of stimulus-reinforcement learning.
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243Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disordersMind and Language 16 (5): 457-493. 2001.Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders
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186Bodily awareness and self-consciousnessIn Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self, Oxford University Press. 2011.This article argues that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. It clarifies the nature of bodily awareness, categorises the different types of body-relative information, and rejects the claim that we can have a sense of ownership of our own bodies. It explores how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness and highlights the importance of certain forms of bodily awareness that share an imp…Read more
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471Self-deception, intentions and contradictory beliefsAnalysis 60 (4): 309-319. 2000.Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.
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118The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure ReasonEuropean Journal of Philosophy 2 (3): 213-240. 1994.
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131Knowledge, Naturalism, and Cognitive Ethology: Kornblith’s Knowledge and its Place in NaturePhilosophical Studies 127 (2): 299-316. 2006.This paper explores Kornblith's proposal in "Knowledge and its Place in Nature" that knowledge is a natural kind that can be elucidated and understood in scientific terms. Central to Kornblith's development of this proposal is the claim that there is a single category of unreflective knowledge that is studied by cognitive ethologists and is the proper province of epistemology. This claim is challenged on the grounds that even unreflective knowledge in language-using humans reflects forms of logi…Read more
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103Rational decisions , Ken Binmore. Princeton university press, 2009, X + 200 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 26 (1): 95-101. 2010.
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457What is at stake in the debate on nonconceptual content?Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1). 2007.It is now 25 years since Gareth Evans introduced the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content in The Varieties of Reference. This is a fitting time to take stock of what has become a complex and extended debate both within philosophy and at the interface between philosophy and psychology. Unfortunately, the debate has become increasingly murky as it has become increasingly ramified. Much of the contemporary discussion does not do full justice to the powerful theoretical tool orig…Read more
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10IntroductionIn Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, Clarendon Press. 2005.The framework for the papers in this volume is set by the wide-ranging philosophical contributions of Gareth Evans, who died in 1980 at the age of 34. In the papers gathered together in the posthumously published Collected Papers and in The Varieties of Reference Evans made a number of important contributions to the philosophy of language, the philosophy of thought, and philosophical logic. Evans was a far more systematic thinker than is usual in contemporary analytical philosophy and the first …Read more
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17th/18th Century Philosophy |