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50Negation, Contrariety, and Practical Reasoning: Comments on Millikan’s Varieties of Meaning (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3). 2007.
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92The Interface Problem and the Scope of Commonsense Psychology: Reply to PaternosterSWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3). 2006.
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161Locke, metaphysical dualism and property dualism1British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2): 223-245. 1996.No abstract
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49Aspects of the self: John Campbell's Past, Space, and SelfInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 38 (4): 1-15. 1995.
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38Review of Mary Margaret McCabe, mark Textor (eds.), Perspectives on Perception (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (4). 2008.
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120Peacocke's Argument Against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Representational ContentMind and Language 9 (4): 402-418. 1994.
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Phenomenology of Bodily PerceptionAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (T): 25-36. 2011.Since this is colloquium on phenomenological and experimental approaches tocognition I’d like to set up te problem I want to address in terms of two of the differentstrands that we find in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about the phenomenology of thebody. One of these strands is profoundly insightful. The other one, however, seemsto me to be lacking in plausibility – or rather, to put it less confrontationally and morein keeping with the spirit of the colloquium, the second strand seems to stand in th…Read more
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8Do non-linguistic creatures possess second-order propositional attitudes? Reply to ShantonSWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3). 2006.
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Nonconceptual self-awareness and the paradox of self-consciousnessIn Albert Newen & Kai Vogeley (eds.), Selbst und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbewusstsein und seine Neurobiologischen Grundlagen, Mentis. 2000.
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60The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did It Have Ancient or Mediaeval Antecedents?History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (4). 2000.
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88Consciousness, higher-order thought, and stimulus reinforcementBehavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 194-195. 2000.Rolls defends a higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness, mapping the distinction between conscious and non-conscious states onto a distinction between two types of action and corresponding neural pathways. Only one type of action involves higher-order thought and consequently consciousness. This account of consciousness has implausible consequences for the nature of stimulus-reinforcement learning.
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243Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disordersMind and Language 16 (5): 457-493. 2001.Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders
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186Bodily awareness and self-consciousnessIn Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self, Oxford University Press. 2011.This article argues that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. It clarifies the nature of bodily awareness, categorises the different types of body-relative information, and rejects the claim that we can have a sense of ownership of our own bodies. It explores how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness and highlights the importance of certain forms of bodily awareness that share an imp…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |