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Douglas Ehring

Southern Methodist University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    71
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    42

 More details
  • Southern Methodist University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Physical Science
  • All publications (71)
  •  105
    "Normal" intentional action
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1): 155-157. 1985.
    Intentional Action
  •  153
    Motion, causation, and the causal theory of identity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2). 1991.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    PersistenceTheories of Causation, MiscIdentityMaterial Objects
  •  70
    The system-property theory of goal-directed processes
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (4): 497-504. 1984.
    Philosophy of Social Science, MiscellaneousTeleology
  •  216
    Causal relata
    Synthese 73 (2). 1987.
    Causal Relata
  •  91
    The Brownian Direction of Causation
    Journal of Critical Analysis 8 (2): 51-56. 1980.
    The Direction of Causation
  •  244
    Papineau on causal asymmetry
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1): 81-87. 1987.
    The Direction of CausationThe Direction of Time
  •  118
    Causation and causal factuals
    Erkenntnis 25 (1). 1986.
    Martin bunzl in "causal factuals" ("erkenntnis" 21, 1984) attempts to adapt and improve upon an approach to causation associated with the counterfactual theory of causation. Bunzl proposes to use possible world semantics to analyze causal sentences without reference to counterfactuals. In this paper I argue that bunzl's analysis is subject to problem cases which bear a close resemblance to those which plague counterfactual theory
    Counterfactual Theories of CausationPossible World Semantics
  •  160
    Review: Physical causation (review)
    Mind 112 (447): 529-533. 2003.
    Process Theories of CausationPhilosophy of Physics, Misc
  •  140
    Nonbranching and Nontransitivity
    Analysis 50 (4). 1990.
  •  50
    Enç On Functions
    Philosophical Inquiry 7 (2): 74-81. 1985.
  •  145
    Trope persistence and temporary external relations
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3). 1998.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Relations
  •  68
    Cohen, Exploitation, and Theft
    Dialogue 26 (2): 299-. 1987.
    G. A. Cohen in “More on Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value” defends the thesis that the Marxist charge of exploitation against the capitalist cannot be supported by way of the labour theory of value. He suggests an alternative, non-labour-theoretic argument for this charge which depends on premises he takes to be more obvious than the labour theory of value. Cohen claims that his argument is the only way a Marxist couldjustify attributions of “exploitation” to the capitalist, if any suc…Read more
    G. A. Cohen in “More on Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value” defends the thesis that the Marxist charge of exploitation against the capitalist cannot be supported by way of the labour theory of value. He suggests an alternative, non-labour-theoretic argument for this charge which depends on premises he takes to be more obvious than the labour theory of value. Cohen claims that his argument is the only way a Marxist couldjustify attributions of “exploitation” to the capitalist, if any such justification is possible. In this paper, I will argue that, given Cohen's objections to the labour-theoretic argument, his “Plain Argument” itself retains too great a similarity to that argument. A new interpretation of the basis of the charge of exploitation is offered which requires neither the labour theory nor that which is dubious in Cohen's formulation.
    Exploitation
  •  151
    Spatial relations between universals
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1). 2002.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Universals
  •  199
    Personal identity and the r-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3): 337-346. 1995.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Fission and Split BrainsWhat Matters in Survival
  •  150
    Bunzl on causal overdetermination
    Philosophical Studies 39 (2). 1981.
  •  171
    On Mackie’s New Account of Causal Priority
    Analysis 41 (2). 1980.
    The Direction of Causation
  •  429
    Mental causation, determinables, and property instances
    Noûs 30 (4): 461-80. 1996.
    The Exclusion ProblemDeterminates and Determinables
  •  165
    The transference theory of causation
    Synthese 67 (2). 1986.
    Process Theories of Causation
  • Counterfactual theories, preemption, and persistence
    In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, Routledge. 2003.
    Counterfactual Theories of CausationCausal PreemptionPersistenceThree- and Four-Dimensionalism
  •  130
    The causal argument against natural class trope nominalism
    Philosophical Studies 107 (2). 2002.
    In this paper, I consider an objection to ``natural class''trope nominalism, the view that a trope's nature isdetermined by its membership in a natural class of tropes.The objection is that natural class trope nominalismis inconsistent with causes' being efficacious invirtue of having tropes of a certain type. I arguethat if natural class trope nominalism is combinedwith property counterpart theory, then this objectioncan be rebutted.
    Tropes
  •  194
    Causation and persistence: a theory of causation
    Oxford University Press. 1997.
    Ehring shows the inadequacy of received theories of causation, and, introducing conceptual devices of his own, provides a wholly new account of causation as the persistence over time of individual properties, or "tropes.".
    Theories of Causation, MiscCausal Relata
  •  225
    Part-whole physicalism and mental causation
    Synthese 136 (3): 359-388. 2003.
    A well-known ``overdetermination''argument aims to show that the possibility of mental causes of physical events in a causally closed physical world and the possibility of causally relevant mental properties are both problematic. In the first part of this paper, I extend an identity reply that has been given to the first problem to a property-instance account of causal relata. In the second, I argue that mental types are composed of physical types and, as a consequence, both mental and physical …Read more
    A well-known ``overdetermination''argument aims to show that the possibility of mental causes of physical events in a causally closed physical world and the possibility of causally relevant mental properties are both problematic. In the first part of this paper, I extend an identity reply that has been given to the first problem to a property-instance account of causal relata. In the second, I argue that mental types are composed of physical types and, as a consequence, both mental and physical types may be causally relevant with respect to the same physical effect, contrary to the overdetermination argument. In further sections, I argue that mental types have causal powers, consider some objections and reject an alternative version of part-whole physicalism. Throughout I assume that causal relata are tropes and property types are classes of tropes.
    The Exclusion Problem
  •  185
    Property counterparts and natural class trope nominalism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3). 2004.
    'Natural class' trope nominalism makes a trope's being of a certain sort--its nature--a matter of its membership in a certain natural class of actual tropes. It has been objected that on this theory had even a single member of the class of red tropes not existed, for example, then the type 'being red' would not have been instantiated and nothing would have been red. I argue that natural class trope nominalism can avoid this implication by way of counterpart theory as applied to properties.
    TropesObjects and Properties, Misc
  •  150
    Abstracting Away from Preemption
    The Monist 92 (1): 41-71. 2009.
    Theories of CausationCounterfactual Theories of Causation
  •  130
    Non-Simultaneous Causation
    Analysis 47 (1). 1987.
    Varieties of Causation
  •  240
    Fission, Fusion and the Parfit Revolution
    Philosophical Studies 94 (3): 329-332. 1999.
    Fission and Split BrainsWhat Matters in SurvivalPersonal Identity, Misc
  •  190
    Temporal parts and bundle theory
    Philosophical Studies 104 (2). 2001.
    In this paper, I try to make a bundle theory of objects consistentwith a temporal parts theory of object persistence. To that end,I propose that such bundles are made up of tropes includingthe co-instantiation relation.
    Bundle TheoriesThree- and Four-Dimensionalism
  •  171
    Compound Emphasis and Causal Relata
    Analysis 47 (4). 1987.
    Causal Relata
  •  110
    Teleology and impossible goals
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1): 127-131. 1986.
    Teleology
  •  317
    Personal identity and time travel
    Philosophical Studies 52 (3). 1987.
    Memory theories of personal identity are subject to the difficulty that distinct simultaneous person stages may both stand in the memory relation to an earlier person stage. Apparently, Such theories entail that these two duplicate person stages are stages of the same person, A claim argued to be "obviously false". In this paper, I argue that the characteristics of these duplication cases usually cited to support this claim do not provide adequate evidence to make it cogent
    Time TravelFission and Split Brains
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