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Douglas Ehring

Southern Methodist University
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  •  Publications
    71
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 More details
  • Southern Methodist University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Physical Science
  • All publications (71)
  •  244
    Papineau on causal asymmetry
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1): 81-87. 1987.
    The Direction of CausationThe Direction of Time
  •  118
    Causation and causal factuals
    Erkenntnis 25 (1). 1986.
    Martin bunzl in "causal factuals" ("erkenntnis" 21, 1984) attempts to adapt and improve upon an approach to causation associated with the counterfactual theory of causation. Bunzl proposes to use possible world semantics to analyze causal sentences without reference to counterfactuals. In this paper I argue that bunzl's analysis is subject to problem cases which bear a close resemblance to those which plague counterfactual theory
    Counterfactual Theories of CausationPossible World Semantics
  •  160
    Review: Physical causation (review)
    Mind 112 (447): 529-533. 2003.
    Process Theories of CausationPhilosophy of Physics, Misc
  •  140
    Nonbranching and Nontransitivity
    Analysis 50 (4). 1990.
  •  145
    Trope persistence and temporary external relations
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3). 1998.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Relations
  •  50
    Enç On Functions
    Philosophical Inquiry 7 (2): 74-81. 1985.
  •  151
    Spatial relations between universals
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1). 2002.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Universals
  •  68
    Cohen, Exploitation, and Theft
    Dialogue 26 (2): 299-. 1987.
    G. A. Cohen in “More on Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value” defends the thesis that the Marxist charge of exploitation against the capitalist cannot be supported by way of the labour theory of value. He suggests an alternative, non-labour-theoretic argument for this charge which depends on premises he takes to be more obvious than the labour theory of value. Cohen claims that his argument is the only way a Marxist couldjustify attributions of “exploitation” to the capitalist, if any suc…Read more
    G. A. Cohen in “More on Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value” defends the thesis that the Marxist charge of exploitation against the capitalist cannot be supported by way of the labour theory of value. He suggests an alternative, non-labour-theoretic argument for this charge which depends on premises he takes to be more obvious than the labour theory of value. Cohen claims that his argument is the only way a Marxist couldjustify attributions of “exploitation” to the capitalist, if any such justification is possible. In this paper, I will argue that, given Cohen's objections to the labour-theoretic argument, his “Plain Argument” itself retains too great a similarity to that argument. A new interpretation of the basis of the charge of exploitation is offered which requires neither the labour theory nor that which is dubious in Cohen's formulation.
    Exploitation
  •  199
    Personal identity and the r-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3): 337-346. 1995.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Fission and Split BrainsWhat Matters in Survival
  •  150
    Bunzl on causal overdetermination
    Philosophical Studies 39 (2). 1981.
  •  171
    On Mackie’s New Account of Causal Priority
    Analysis 41 (2). 1980.
    The Direction of Causation
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