Douglas Ehring

A well-known ``overdetermination''argument aims to show that the possibility of mental causes of physical events in a causally closed physical world and the possibility of causally relevant mental properties are both problematic. In the first part of this paper, I extend an identity reply that has been given to the first problem to a property-instance account of causal relata. In the second, I argue that mental types are composed of physical types and, as a consequence, both mental and physical types may be causally relevant with respect to the same physical effect, contrary to the overdetermination argument. In further sections, I argue that mental types have causal powers, consider some objections and reject an alternative version of part-whole physicalism. Throughout I assume that causal relata are tropes and property types are classes of tropes.

This thesis addresses the problem of causal asymmetry. This problem may be characterized as follows: what is the relation R such that if an event c causes an event e c bears relation R to e but e does not bear relation R to e. The traditional Humean account of causal asymmetry is that "R" may be replaced by "temporally prior." Difficulties with this account based on consideration of cases of simultaneous causation and backward causation have given rise to non-Humean accounts of causal asymmetry. This dissertation analyzes some of these difficulties along with various non-Humean approaches. I offer a new theory of causal asymmetry which does not depend upon the temporal priority of causes to their effects and which differs from any of the other theories available. ;In chapter one the problem of causal asymmetry is clarified. This problem is distinguished from related issues. At the same time, I articulate the various philosophical considerations which bear on the scope and importance of this problem. I also state what I take to be the conditions an adequate account of causal asymmetry must satisfy. In the second chapter I discuss the classical Humean analysis of causal priority in terms of temporal priority. It is argued that arguments which have been put forward to show that backwards causation is logically impossible are unconvincing and that there are cases of simultaneous causation. In the third chapter the manipulability theory of causation is treated. Various formulations of this theory, from the most anthropomorphic to the least anthropomorphic are treated as they bear on the problem of causal asymmetry. Manipulability theory is found to be inadequate. ;In chapter four counterfactual theories of causation are considered. A number of counterexamples to these theories are presented and developed. In chapter five, two views which are grouped under "regularity theory" are analyzed and criticized: those of Bromberger and Berofsky. Mackie's earlier and later accounts of causal asymmetry along with Sanford's view are discussed in chapter six. In chapter seven, Erik Brown's recent view is considered alongside "transference theory." In the final chapter I develop a new theory of causal priority which utilizes the "circumstantial" character of the causal relation in accounting for causal asymmetry