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Douglas Ehring

Southern Methodist University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    71
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    42

 More details
  • Southern Methodist University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Physical Science
  • All publications (71)
  •  86
    Preemption and probabilistic counterfactual theory
    Philosophical Studies 56 (3). 1989.
    Theories of CausationVarieties of CausationCounterfactual Theories of Causation
  •  156
    Manipulability Theory and Event Types
    Analysis 42 (3). 1982.
    Philosophy of LinguisticsManipulability Theories of Causation
  •  194
    The 'Only T1 through T2' Principle
    Analysis 49 (4). 1989.
  •  276
    Distinguishing universals from particulars
    Analysis 64 (4): 326-332. 2004.
    Universals
  •  237
    Simultaneous Causation and Causal Chains
    Analysis 45 (2). 1985.
    A standard objection to the thesis that all causation is simultaneous causation is that this claim rules out temporally extended causal chains. Defenders of universal simultaneous causation have suggested two replies: deny the supposed incompatibility between simultaneous causation and causal chains or deny the existence of causal chains. In this paper, I argue that neither type of defense of universal causation against this objection is plausible
    Varieties of Causation
  •  178
    Closed Causal Loops, Single Causes, and Asymmetry
    Analysis 46 (1). 1986.
    Aspects of TimeTime Travel
  •  147
    Preemption, direct causation, and identity
    Synthese 85 (1). 1990.
    Theories of CausationCounterfactual Theories of Causation
  •  124
    Are Workers Forced to Work?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4). 1989.
    G. A. Cohen, in his ‘The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom,’ addresses the classical Marxist claim that workers are forced to sell their labour power under capitalism. This claim has been the object of much debate and controversy. Cohen brings his very considerable analytical skills to bear on this question with the result that he supports, in distinctive but non-conflicting ways, both sides of the controversy. On Cohen’s analysis this claim is ambiguous, i.e., the term ‘proletariat’ has two im…Read more
    G. A. Cohen, in his ‘The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom,’ addresses the classical Marxist claim that workers are forced to sell their labour power under capitalism. This claim has been the object of much debate and controversy. Cohen brings his very considerable analytical skills to bear on this question with the result that he supports, in distinctive but non-conflicting ways, both sides of the controversy. On Cohen’s analysis this claim is ambiguous, i.e., the term ‘proletariat’ has two importantly different senses. In the distributive sense, workers need not be coerced, but in the collective sense, they are coerced, i.e., each individual worker is free to leave the working class, but the class of workers' as a whole does not possess a similar freedom. In this paper, I will argue that Cohen’s argument does not establish that the proletariat qua individuals are not forced to sell their labour power. It will also be argued that, in fac;t, there is no definite answer to the question of whether or not workers are forced to sell their labour power. Freedom and coercion are matters of degree, for the relevant range of cases, and, hence, it is not appropriate to ask whether or not the workers are coerced. I will, however, attempt to show that, contrary to the spirit of Cohen’s thesis, proletariat as individuals suffer from a diminished degree of freedom in the sale of their labour power.
    Social and Political PhilosophyExploitation
  •  105
    "Normal" intentional action
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1): 155-157. 1985.
    Intentional Action
  •  153
    Motion, causation, and the causal theory of identity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2). 1991.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    PersistenceTheories of Causation, MiscIdentityMaterial Objects
  •  70
    The system-property theory of goal-directed processes
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (4): 497-504. 1984.
    Philosophy of Social Science, MiscellaneousTeleology
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