-
198Why Parfit did not go far enoughPhilosophical Studies 165 (1): 133-149. 2013.Parfit has argued for the revolutionary thesis that personal identity does not matter in ordinary survival, only the R-relation does. “Reconciliationists,” such as Lewis, have tried to stop this revolution, arguing that both personal identity and the R-relation matter. The disagreement has been between those who hold that only the R-relation matters and those who hold that, in addition, personal identity matters. But there is a third option. I argue that Parfit is right that personal identity do…Read more
-
71Dispositions and functions: Cummins on functional analysis (review)Erkenntnis 23 (3): 243-249. 1985.
-
72
-
17Accidental FunctionsDialogue 25 (2): 291-. 1986.Various philosophical accounts of function attributions have taken the following form:fis a function of a structureXin a systemSif and only ifXdoesfinSandfcausally contributes toG. While sharing this form, these accounts disagree over how “G” is to be specified. Specifications of “G” range from the fairly determinate to the less determinate. Although much of the debate over functions has been concerned with the proper characterization of “G”, it has become apparent that theories which fit this s…Read more
-
100Probabilistic causality and preemptionBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (1): 55-57. 1984.
-
118Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental CausationOxford University Press. 2011.Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.
-
34Causal Processes and Causal InteractionsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986. 1986.Wesley Salmon has developed a theory of causation which makes use of the concepts of a "causal process" and a "causal interaction." Roughly, a causal process is a process which transmits its own structure, and a causal interaction is an intersection of processes which transforms the character of these processes. The cause-effect relation is analyzed as a causal interaction followed by a causal process which terminates in a further causal interaction. In this paper I present a series of problem c…Read more
-
89
-
100
-
108Simultaneous Causation and Causal ChainsAnalysis 45 (2). 1985.A standard objection to the thesis that all causation is simultaneous causation is that this claim rules out temporally extended causal chains. Defenders of universal simultaneous causation have suggested two replies: deny the supposed incompatibility between simultaneous causation and causal chains or deny the existence of causal chains. In this paper, I argue that neither type of defense of universal causation against this objection is plausible
-
59Are Workers Forced to Work?Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4). 1989.G. A. Cohen, in his ‘The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom,’ addresses the classical Marxist claim that workers are forced to sell their labour power under capitalism. This claim has been the object of much debate and controversy. Cohen brings his very considerable analytical skills to bear on this question with the result that he supports, in distinctive but non-conflicting ways, both sides of the controversy. On Cohen’s analysis this claim is ambiguous, i.e., the term ‘proletariat’ has two im…Read more
-
92Motion, causation, and the causal theory of identityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2). 1991.This Article does not have an abstract
-
30The system-property theory of goal-directed processesPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (4): 497-504. 1984.
-
33Causation and causal factualsErkenntnis 25 (1). 1986.Martin bunzl in "causal factuals" ("erkenntnis" 21, 1984) attempts to adapt and improve upon an approach to causation associated with the counterfactual theory of causation. Bunzl proposes to use possible world semantics to analyze causal sentences without reference to counterfactuals. In this paper I argue that bunzl's analysis is subject to problem cases which bear a close resemblance to those which plague counterfactual theory
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Physical Science |