•  84
    Reading Wittgenstein (on) Reading An Introduction
    In David G. Stern & Béla Szabados (eds.), Wittgenstein Reads Weininger, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1. 2004.
  •  3
    Lloyd H. Steffen, Self-Deception and the Common Life (review)
    Philosophy in Review 7 (5): 216-218. 1987.
  •  75
    Wittgenstein on belief
    Philosophical Papers 10 (1): 24-34. 1981.
  •  28
    Jealousy and Self-Knowledge
    Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 3 477-481. 1988.
  •  138
    Embarrassment and Self-Esteem
    Journal of Philosophical Research 15 341-349. 1990.
    Emotions are in as a philosophical topic. Yet the recent literature is bent on grand theorizing rather than attempting to explore particular emotions and their roles in our lives. In this paper, I aim to remedy this situation a little by exploring the emotion of embarrassment. First, I critically examine R.C. Solomon’s conceptual sketch and try to distinguish “embarrassment” from “shame”, “humiliation” and “being amused”. Secondly, I argue that “private embarrassment” is a coherent and useful id…Read more
  •  38
    Wittgenstein at the Movies: Cinematic Investigations (edited book)
    with Christina Stojanova
    Lexington Books. 2011.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein loved movies, and based on his remarks on watching them, there is a strong connection between his experience of watching films and his thoughts on aesthetics. Furthermore, however, Wittgenstein himself has been invoked in recent cinema. _Wittgenstein at the Movies_ is centered on in-depth explorations of two intriguing experimental films on Wittgenstein: Derek Jarman's _Wittgenstein_ and Péter Forgács' _Wittgenstein Tractatus_. The featured essays look at cinematic interpreta…Read more
  •  80
    Rorty on belief and self‐deception
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4): 464-473. 1974.
    In this note I argue that although Rorty's programme (Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 4) to bring into focus the role that belief plays in self‐deception is a salutary one, her actual claims obscure that role. It is also contended that Rorty fails to de‐mythologize self‐deception, since her account is either paradox‐ridden or else describes a concept recognizably distinct from the concept of self‐deception.
  •  1
    Terence Penelhum, Reason and Religious Faith (review)
    with Kenneth Mcgovern
    Philosophy in Review 16 197-201. 1996.
  • Mike W. Martin, Self-Deception and Morality (review)
    Philosophy in Review 7 (5): 207-209. 1987.
  •  155
    Hypocrisy
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2). 1979.
    What is it to be a hypocrite? Gilbert Ryle's answer is the by now commonly held one: to be hypocritical is to “try to appear activated by a motive other than one's real motive”; again, it is “deliberately to refrain from saying what comes to one's lips, while pretending to say frankly things one does not mean.” Can this be the right answer? My aim is to show that it cannot. In doing this I hope to gesture towards a richer understanding of our notion of hypocrisy.
  •  350
    Wishful thinking and self-deception
    Analysis 33 (June): 201-205. 1973.