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Charles Leslie StevensonIn David Sosa & A. P. Martinich (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.
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334In Defense of ConsequentializingIn Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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34The Authority of Reason, Jean Hampton. Cambridge University Press, 1998, vi + 310 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 15 (2): 311. 1999.
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451The supervenience argument against moral realismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 13-38. 1992.In 1971, Simon Blackburn worked out an argument against moral realism appealing to the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm.1 He has since revised the argument, in part to take account of objections,2 but the basic structure remains intact. While commentators3 seem to agree that the argument is not successful, they have not agreed upon what goes wrong. I believe this is because no attempt has been made to see what happens when Blackburn's argument is addressed to particular vari…Read more
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344Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of MoralityIn Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 81-100. 1997.
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1When Do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 5--153. 2010.
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504Dispositions and fetishes: Externalist models of moral motivationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3): 619-638. 2000.Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute a kind of …Read more
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372Transforming expressivismNoûs 33 (4): 558-572. 1999.In chapter five of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Allan Gibbard develops what he calls a ‘normative logic’ intended to solve some problems that face an expressivist theory of norms like his. The first is “the problem of embedding: The analysis applies to simple contexts, in which it is simply asserted or denied that such-and-such is rational. It says nothing about more complex normative assertions.”1 That is the problem with which I will be concerned. Though he doesn’t list it as one of the problems…Read more