•  343
    Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality
    In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 81-100. 1997.
  •  1
    When Do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 5--153. 2010.
  •  502
    Dispositions and fetishes: Externalist models of moral motivation
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3): 619-638. 2000.
    Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute a kind of …Read more
  •  371
    Transforming expressivism
    Noûs 33 (4): 558-572. 1999.
    In chapter five of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Allan Gibbard develops what he calls a ‘normative logic’ intended to solve some problems that face an expressivist theory of norms like his. The first is “the problem of embedding: The analysis applies to simple contexts, in which it is simply asserted or denied that such-and-such is rational. It says nothing about more complex normative assertions.”1 That is the problem with which I will be concerned. Though he doesn’t list it as one of the problems…Read more
  •  18
    Books in Review
    Political Theory 19 (1): 129-133. 1991.
  •  237
    Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence
    Analytic Philosophy 53 (3): 269-287. 2012.
  •  153
    Lockean and logical truth conditions
    Analysis 64 (1): 84-91. 2004.
    1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expre…Read more
  •  36
    Disagreeing (about) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 714-721. 2006.
    Brown University.
  •  36
    The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 13-38. 1992.
  •  121
    Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2006.
    _Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory _features pairs of newly commissioned essays by some of the leading theorists working in the field today. Brings together fresh debates on the most controversial issues in moral theory Questions include: Are moral requirements derived from reason? How demanding is morality? Are virtues the proper starting point for moral theorizing? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduc…Read more
  •  27
    Skepticism in Ethics, by Panayot Butchvarov (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 934-938. 1991.
  •  405
    Practical conditionals
    In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. pp. 116--133. 2009.