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75Shallow, Deeper, Deep: A Few Thoughts on a Small Piece of Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong's Moral Skepticisms (review)Philosophical Books 49 (3): 197-206. 2008.No Abstract
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57Disagreeing (about) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard's Norm-ExpressivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 714-721. 2006.Brown University.
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47Pettit on Preference for Prospects and Properties – DiscussionPhilosophical Studies 124 (2): 199-219. 2005.
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46Explaining the Quasi-RealOxford Studies in Metaethics 10. 2015.This chapter discusses whether Quasi-Realism gains any advantage over Robust Realism with respect to the problem of explaining supervenience. The chapter starts with a summary of what the supervenience problem is and recounts the history of expressivist thinking about supervenience: the supervenience problem was a challenge raised by expressivist Robust Realists, with the idea that expressivism had an excellent explanation of the phenomenon and realism had none. The chapter then contrasts Quasi-…Read more
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39Review of Gerald F. Gaus: Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory (review)Ethics 102 (1): 164-166. 1991.
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36Disagreeing (about) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-ExpressivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 714-721. 2006.Brown University.
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35Do de re necessities express semantic rules?Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Amie Thomasson's Norms and Necessity offers a non-factualist theory of the language of metaphysical necessity, centering on the idea that statements of necessity express semantic norms. This article identifies a potential problem for the view by distinguishing two kinds of conditional necessity, investigates a solution derived from a well-known parallel pair of conditional necessities in deontic logic, but finds it is not up to the job. The last part of the paper suggests a different route, larg…Read more
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35The Supervenience Argument Against Moral RealismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 13-38. 1992.
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34The Authority of Reason, Jean Hampton. Cambridge University Press, 1998, vi + 310 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 15 (2): 311. 1999.
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33Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral MotivationPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (3): 619-638. 2000.Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith's The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute a kind of …Read more
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28Meta‐Ethics and The Problem of Creeping MinimalismPhilosophical Perspectives 18 (1): 23-44. 2004.
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27Skepticism in Ethics, by Panayot Butchvarov (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 934-938. 1991.
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21The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative JudgmentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 136-143. 2002.“States of mind are natural states. They are extremely hard to define.”1.
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19Was Moore a Moorean?In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore, Oxford University Press. pp. 191. 2006.
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15Moral Relativism and Moral NihilismIn David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford University Press Usa. 2006.
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11Skepticism in Ethics, by Panayot Butchvarov (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 934-938. 1991.
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11C. L. Stevenson (1908–1979)In A. P. Martinich & David Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.This chapter contains sections titled: Stevenson's major contribution to philosophy was his development of emotivism, a theory of ethical language according to which moral judgments do not state any sort of fact, but rather express the moral emotions of the speaker and attempt to influence others. Stevenson's emotive theory of ethical language Some advantages of emotivism Some difficulties for emotivism Some related theories.
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7Review of Gerald F. Gaus: Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory (review)Ethics 102 (1): 164-166. 1991.
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6Can reasons fundamentalism answer the normative question?In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism, Oxford University Press. 2015.
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5Another WorldIn Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, Oxford University Press. pp. 155-171. 2015.The metaethics and metametaethics of Scanlon's "Reasons Fundamentalism".
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5Why ethical satisficing makes sense and rational satisficing doesn'tIn Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing, Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-154. 2004.
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4Mackie's RealismIn Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchen (eds.), A World Without Values, Springer. 2010.The chapter argues that we should draw the line between realist and antirealist metaethics according to whether a theory locates the explanation for the special, puzzling features of moral terms and concepts out in the world, with the content of moral thoughts, or inside the head. This taxonomy places Mackie's error theory in the realist category, contrary to the usual scheme. The paper suggests that in looking for the “queerness” of objective value in the metaphysics of moral properties, Mackie…Read more