-
347Expressivist embeddings and minimalist truthPhilosophical Studies 83 (1): 29-51. 1996.This paper is about Truth Minimalism, Norm Expressivism, and the relation between them. In particular, it is about whether Truth Minimalism can help to solve a problem thought to plague Norm Expressivism. To start with, let me explain what I mean by 'Truth Minimalism' and 'Norm Expressivism.'
-
418Structures of Normative TheoriesThe Monist 76 (1): 22-40. 1993.Normative theorists like to divide normative theories into classes. One special point of focus has been to place utilitarianism into a larger class of theories which do not necessarily share its view about what is alone of impersonal intrinsic value, namely, individual human well-being, but do share another structural feature, roughly its demand that each person seek to maximize the realization of what is of impersonal intrinsic value. The larger class is distinguished from its complement in two…Read more
-
98Accepting agent centred norms: A problem for non-cognitivists and a suggestion for solving itAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3). 1996.Non-cognitivists claim to be able to represent normative judgment, and especially moral judgment, as an expression of a non-cognitive attitude. There is some reason to worry whether their treatment can incorporate agent centred theories, including much of common sense morality. In this paper I investigate the prospects for a non-cognitivist explanation of what is going on when we subscribe to agent centred theories or norms. The first section frames the issue by focusing on a particularly simple…Read more
-
Philosophical Issues, 12, Realism and Relativism, 2002In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Realism and Relativism, Blackwell. pp. 241. 2002.
-
5Another WorldIn Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, Oxford University Press. pp. 155-171. 2015.The metaethics and metametaethics of Scanlon's "Reasons Fundamentalism".
-
30Meta‐Ethics and The Problem of Creeping MinimalismPhilosophical Perspectives 18 (1): 23-44. 2004.
-
92Disagreeing (about) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3). 2006.Brown University.
-
597Internalism and speaker relativismEthics 101 (1): 6-26. 1990.In this article I set out a reason for believing in a form of metaethical relativism. In rough terms, the reason is this: a widely held thesis, internalism, tells us that to accept (sincerely assert, believe, etc.) a moral judgment logically requires having a motivating reason. Since the connection is logical, or conceptual, it must be explained by a theory of what it is to accept a moral claim. I argue that the internalist feature of moral expressions can best be explained by my version of mora…Read more
-
21The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative JudgmentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 136-143. 2002.“States of mind are natural states. They are extremely hard to define.”1.
-
57Disagreeing (about) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard's Norm-ExpressivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 714-721. 2006.Brown University.
-
241Rational preference: Decision theory as a theory of practical rationalityTheory and Decision 40 (3): 249-276. 1996.In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, ‘utility’ and ‘preference’ do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in pur…Read more
-
4Mackie's RealismIn Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchen (eds.), A World Without Values, Springer. 2010.The chapter argues that we should draw the line between realist and antirealist metaethics according to whether a theory locates the explanation for the special, puzzling features of moral terms and concepts out in the world, with the content of moral thoughts, or inside the head. This taxonomy places Mackie's error theory in the realist category, contrary to the usual scheme. The paper suggests that in looking for the “queerness” of objective value in the metaphysics of moral properties, Mackie…Read more
-
88Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for their SolutionOxford Studies in Metaethics 1 217-233. 2006.
-
79Critical study: Timmons, Mark; Morality without foundations: A defense of moral contextualism (review)Noûs 36 (1). 2002.
-
51Pettit on Preference for Prospects and Properties – DiscussionPhilosophical Studies 124 (2): 199-219. 2005.
-
Charles Leslie StevensonIn David Sosa & A. P. Martinich (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.
-
34The Authority of Reason, Jean Hampton. Cambridge University Press, 1998, vi + 310 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 15 (2): 311. 1999.
-
333In Defense of ConsequentializingIn Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1, Oxford University Press. 2011.
-
450The supervenience argument against moral realismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 13-38. 1992.In 1971, Simon Blackburn worked out an argument against moral realism appealing to the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm.1 He has since revised the argument, in part to take account of objections,2 but the basic structure remains intact. While commentators3 seem to agree that the argument is not successful, they have not agreed upon what goes wrong. I believe this is because no attempt has been made to see what happens when Blackburn's argument is addressed to particular vari…Read more