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51Pettit on Preference for Prospects and Properties – DiscussionPhilosophical Studies 124 (2): 199-219. 2005.
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Charles Leslie StevensonIn David Sosa & A. P. Martinich (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.
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34The Authority of Reason, Jean Hampton. Cambridge University Press, 1998, vi + 310 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 15 (2): 311. 1999.
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334In Defense of ConsequentializingIn Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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451The supervenience argument against moral realismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 13-38. 1992.In 1971, Simon Blackburn worked out an argument against moral realism appealing to the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm.1 He has since revised the argument, in part to take account of objections,2 but the basic structure remains intact. While commentators3 seem to agree that the argument is not successful, they have not agreed upon what goes wrong. I believe this is because no attempt has been made to see what happens when Blackburn's argument is addressed to particular vari…Read more
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1When Do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 5--153. 2010.
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344Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of MoralityIn Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 81-100. 1997.
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372Transforming expressivismNoûs 33 (4): 558-572. 1999.In chapter five of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Allan Gibbard develops what he calls a ‘normative logic’ intended to solve some problems that face an expressivist theory of norms like his. The first is “the problem of embedding: The analysis applies to simple contexts, in which it is simply asserted or denied that such-and-such is rational. It says nothing about more complex normative assertions.”1 That is the problem with which I will be concerned. Though he doesn’t list it as one of the problems…Read more
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505Dispositions and fetishes: Externalist models of moral motivationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3): 619-638. 2000.Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute a kind of …Read more
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238Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained CoincidenceAnalytic Philosophy 53 (3): 269-287. 2012.
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6Can reasons fundamentalism answer the normative question?In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism, Oxford University Press. 2015.
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15Moral Relativism and Moral NihilismIn David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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155Lockean and logical truth conditionsAnalysis 64 (1): 84-91. 2004.1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expre…Read more
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37The Supervenience Argument Against Moral RealismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 13-38. 1992.
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37Disagreeing (about) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-ExpressivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 714-721. 2006.Brown University.
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27Skepticism in Ethics, by Panayot Butchvarov (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 934-938. 1991.
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122Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2006._Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory _features pairs of newly commissioned essays by some of the leading theorists working in the field today. Brings together fresh debates on the most controversial issues in moral theory Questions include: Are moral requirements derived from reason? How demanding is morality? Are virtues the proper starting point for moral theorizing? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduc…Read more
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5Why ethical satisficing makes sense and rational satisficing doesn'tIn Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing, Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-154. 2004.
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405Practical conditionalsIn David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. pp. 116--133. 2009.
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981Meta‐ethics and the problem of creeping minimalismPhilosophical Perspectives 18 (1). 2004.This is a paper about the problem of realism in meta-ethics (and, I hope, also in other areas, but that hope is so far pretty speculative). But it is not about the problem of whether realism is true. It is about the problem of what realism is. More specifically, it is about the question of what divides meta-ethical realists from irrealists. I start with a potted history of the Good Old Days.
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19Was Moore a Moorean?In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore, Oxford University Press. pp. 191. 2006.
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227Humean Doubts about Categorical ImperativesIn Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Mit Press. pp. 27--48. 2001.