Cor Van Der Weele

Transhumanism, metaphors and ethics. Moral debates on transhumanism are taking shape through various metaphors, but their metaphorical character is mostly hidden. The paper identifies two such metaphors. The first sees the development of humanity as the development of a human being. According to the second one, society is a game and transhumanism is seen as part of that game. Metaphors can play roles that are far more constructive when they are made explicit their limitations as well as their possibilities can then be explored and compared systematically. The paper argues that dealing with a plurality of metaphors is an important moral skill and suggests that looking for the overall best one is not the most promising strategy.

New technology has a prominent place in the theory and practice of innovation, but the association between high tech and innovation is not inevitable. In this paper, we discuss six metaphorical heroes of agricultural innovation, starting with the dominant hero of frontier science and technology. At first sight, our six heroes can be divided in those who are pro- and those who are anti-technology. Yet in the end technology, and more specifically GM technology, does not emerge as the main issue. Empowering the poor, finding solutions for urgent climate problems, and enhancing the quality of our daily relations to food and the environment – these are the issues the heroes are fighting for. Relations between innovation and technology are better seen as a matter of pragmatic consideration, we will argue.

Frans de Waal’s view that empathy is at the basis of morality directly seems to build on Darwin, who considered sympathy as the crucial instinct. Yet when we look closer, their understanding of the central social instinct differs considerably. De Waal sees our deeply ingrained tendency to sympathize (or rather: empathize) with others as the good side of our morally dualistic nature. For Darwin, sympathizing was not the whole story of the workings of sympathy ; the (selfish) need to receive sympathy played just as central a role in the complex roads from sympathy to morality. Darwin’s understanding of sympathy stems from Adam Smith, who argued that the presence of morally impure motives should not be a reason for cynicism about morality. I suggest that De Waal’s approach could benefit from a more thorough alignment with the analysis of the workings of sympathy in the work of Darwin and Adam Smith