Ian Verstegen

This article attempts to utilize the conceptual clarity typical of the work of Lucia Pizzo Russo to address the muddled question of the objectivity of perspective. By separating out the distinct problems of the objectivity of optical geometry, simple sight, and object recognition, we can clarify what we are not discussing when talking about linear perspective. These forms of objectivity are secured. But the claim is still made that linear perspective in pictorial perception is relative, because its results are not consistent and often not relevant to making pictures. In its place, I nominate another objective method, the so-called Egyptian method, outlined by Rudolf Arnheim in his Art and Visual Perception. Therefore, my position is not purely relativist because the dismantling of linear perspective does not suggest that all is conventional.

Abstract This paper is a classic critique of speculative philosophies of history based on Maurice Mandelbaum's work. Unlike the more famous invective by Karl Popper, I argue that Mandelbaum's is a richer and more interesting approach, which reveals through exposition a deeper unity to Mandelbaum's work than is normally evident. Because Popper's nominalism is suspicious of all metaphysics, it loses credibility whereas Mandelbaum placed reflection on the nature of society and causality at the center of his interests. Mandelbaum's critique then is an invitation to investigate metaphysics on realist principles and he requires that we have a robust theory of historical ontology and truth with which to judge what goes beyond the proper representation of history and becomes speculative

Many have wondered about the similarity in name of American critical realism and the movement of the same name begun by Roy Bhaskar. The figure of Maurice Mandelbaum complicates the relationship, not only due to his career bridging the two movements but also Mandelbaum's concern not only with traditional concerns of American critical realism (epistemology and philosophy of science) but the nature of society, the nature of social explanation, and naturalism. This volume reflects both on Mandelbaum's own career and the relation of his thought to Bhaskar's critical realism. By examining Mandelbaum's commitments to phenomenology within critical realism, as well as his goal to enlighten social scientific and above all historiographical categories, it is possible to see how Mandelbaum went beyond the scientific realism of his predecessors. At the same time, a fruitful comparison with Bhaskar's and others' thought is undertaken by examining mandelbaum's solutions to the problems of the ontology of sociology and social laws, the dynamics of cultural change and the overriding master narratives that govern late capitalism. By explaining Mandelbaum's scrupulous attempt to address the horrors of the twentieth century, it is possible to appreciate his significance for the twenty-first. A timely and important book, Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism is essential reading for all serious students of critical realism and twentieth century philosophy.

The two most common names to invoke for a perceptualist aesthetics are Rudolf Arnheim and E. H. Gombrich. But the similaritied and differences between them have never been explicitly drawn. This paper undertakes such an analysis based on the three categories of representation, expression and historical objectivity. Arnheim's less stringent solutions to the problems of representation and expression are applauded but Gombrich's unique attempt to ground both of these categories in a form amenable to non-historicist approach to history are also praised. Gombrich's anti-historicism derives from Karl Popper and Arnheim is fleshed out with the theories of Maurice Mandelbaum. The parallel comparison of Popper-Mandelbaum helps to underscore differences and show an alternative to Gombrich and Popper's nominalism