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Stephen Grossberg

Boston University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    66
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    31

 More details
  • Boston University
    Regular Faculty
Homepage
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (66)
  •  66
    The Art of Seeing and Painting
    Technical Report. 2006.
    The human urge to represent the three-dimensional world using two-dimensional pictorial representations dates back at least to Paleolithic times. Artists from ancient to modern times have struggled to understand how a few contours or color patches on a flat surface can induce mental representations of a three-dimensional scene. This article summarizes some of the recent breakthroughs in scientifically understanding how the brain sees that shed light on these struggles. These breakthroughs i…Read more
    The human urge to represent the three-dimensional world using two-dimensional pictorial representations dates back at least to Paleolithic times. Artists from ancient to modern times have struggled to understand how a few contours or color patches on a flat surface can induce mental representations of a three-dimensional scene. This article summarizes some of the recent breakthroughs in scientifically understanding how the brain sees that shed light on these struggles. These breakthroughs illustrate how various artists have intuitively understand paradoxical properties about how the brain sees, and have used that understanding to create great art. These paradoxical properties arise from how the brain forms the units of conscious visual perception; namely, representations of threedimensional boundaries and surfaces. Boundaries and surfaces are computed in parallel cortical processing streams that obey computationally complementary properties. These streams interact at multiple levels to overcome their complementary weaknesses and to transform their complementary properties into consistent percepts. The article describes how properties of complementary consistency have guided the creation of many great works of art.
    NeuroscienceDepictionPainting and DrawingAesthetic Perception
  •  79
    Binocular fusion and invariant category learning due to predictive remapping during scanning of a depthful scene with eye movements
    with Karthik Srinivasan and Arash Yazdanbakhsh
    Frontiers in Psychology 5. 2014.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  61
    Processing of expected and unexpected events during conditioning and attention: A psychophysiological theory
    Psychological Review 89 (5): 529-572. 1982.
    Philosophy of Psychology
  •  1685
    Depth perception from pairs of overlapping cues in pictorial displays
    with Birgitta Dresp and Severine Durand
    Spatial Vision 15 255-276. 2002.
    The experiments reported herein probe the visual cortical mechanisms that control near–far percepts in response to two-dimensional stimuli. Figural contrast is found to be a principal factor for the emergence of percepts of near versus far in pictorial stimuli, especially when stimulus duration is brief. Pictorial factors such as interposition (Experiment 1) and partial occlusion Experiments 2 and 3) may cooperate, as generally predicted by cue combination models, or compete with contrast factor…Read more
    The experiments reported herein probe the visual cortical mechanisms that control near–far percepts in response to two-dimensional stimuli. Figural contrast is found to be a principal factor for the emergence of percepts of near versus far in pictorial stimuli, especially when stimulus duration is brief. Pictorial factors such as interposition (Experiment 1) and partial occlusion Experiments 2 and 3) may cooperate, as generally predicted by cue combination models, or compete with contrast factors in the manner predicted by the FACADE model. In particular, if the geometrical conŽ guration of an image favors activation of cortical bipole grouping cells, as at the top of a T-junction, then this advantage can cooperate with the contrast of the conŽ guration to facilitate a near–far percept at a lower contrast than at an X-junction. Varying the exposure duration of the stimuli shows that the more balanced bipole competition in the X-junction case takes longer exposure times to resolve than the bipole competition in the T-junction case (Experiment 3).
    Psychology
  •  47
    Neural dynamics of word recognition and recall: Attentional priming, learning, and resonance
    with Gregory Stone
    Psychological Review 93 (1): 46-74. 1986.
    Unconscious and Conscious Processes
  •  148
    Localist but distributed representations
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4): 478-479. 2000.
    A number of examples are given of how localist models may incorporate distributed representations, without the types of nonlocal interactions that often render distributed models implausible. The need to analyze the information that is encoded by these representations is also emphasized as a metatheoretical constraint on model plausibility.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceNeural Networks and Connectionism
  •  53
    The resonant dynamics of speech perception: Interword integration and duration-dependent backward effects
    with Christopher W. Myers
    Psychological Review 107 (4): 735-767. 2000.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  139
    Four frames do not suffice
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (2): 294-295. 1985.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  54
    Cortical dynamics of visual motion perception: Short-range and long-range apparent motion
    with Michael E. Rudd
    Psychological Review 99 (1): 78-121. 1992.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  88
    Self-organizing features and categories through attentive resonance
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1): 27-28. 1998.
    Because “people create features to subserve the representation and categorization of objects” (abstract) Schyns et al. “provide an account of feature learning in which the components of a representation have close ties to the categorization history of the organism” (sect. 1.1). This commentary surveys self-organizing neural models that clarify this process. These models suggest how “top-down information should constrain the search for relevant dimensions/features of categorization” (sect. 3.4.2)…Read more
    Because “people create features to subserve the representation and categorization of objects” (abstract) Schyns et al. “provide an account of feature learning in which the components of a representation have close ties to the categorization history of the organism” (sect. 1.1). This commentary surveys self-organizing neural models that clarify this process. These models suggest how “top-down information should constrain the search for relevant dimensions/features of categorization” (sect. 3.4.2).
    Science of Perception
  •  189
    Adaptive timing, attention, and movement control
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4): 619-619. 1997.
    Examples of how LTP and LTD can control adaptively-timed learning that modulates attention and motor control are given. It is also suggested that LTP/LTD can play a role in storing memories. The distinction between match-based and mismatch-based learning may help to clarify the difference.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Psychology
  •  119
    Neural models of development and learning
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4): 566-566. 1997.
    I agree with Quartz & Sejnowski's points, which are familiar to many scientists. A number of models with the sought-after properties, however, are overlooked, while models without them are highlighted. I will review nonstationary learning, links between development and learning, locality, stability, learning throughout life, hypothesis testing that models the learner's problem domain, and active dendritic processes
    Unconscious and Conscious Processes
  •  43
    Neural dynamics of planned arm movements: Emergent invariants and speed-accuracy properties during trajectory formation
    with Daniel Bullock
    Psychological Review 95 (1): 49-90. 1988.
    Psychology
  •  52
    Neuroethology and theoretical neurobiology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (3): 388-390. 1984.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Neuroscience
  •  120
    Unattended exposure to components of speech sounds yields same benefits as explicit auditory training
    with Aaron R. Seitz, Athanassios Protopapas, Yoshiaki Tsushima, Eleni L. Vlahou, Simone Gori, and Takeo Watanabe
    Cognition 115 (3): 435-443. 2010.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceHearingSound
  •  57
    How does a brain build a cognitive code?
    Psychological Review 87 (1): 1-51. 1980.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  99
    Cognitive self-organization and neural modularity
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1): 18-19. 1985.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceModularity in Cognitive Science
  •  68
    The complementary brain: From brain dynamics to conscious experiences
    In Christian Kaernbach, Erich Schröger & Hermann Müller (eds.), Psychophysics Beyond Sensation: Laws and Invariants of Human Cognition, Psychology Press. pp. 417-449. 2004.
    Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness
  •  86
    Brain metaphors, theories, and facts
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1): 97-98. 1986.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  79
    Realistic constraints on brain color perception and category learning
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4): 495-496. 2005.
    Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) ask how autonomous agents can derive perceptually grounded categories for successful communication, using color categorization as an example. Their comparison of nativism, empiricism, and culturalism, although interesting, does not include key biological and technological constraints for seeing color or learning color categories in realistic environments. Other neural models have successfully included these constraints.
    Autonomy and Moral PsychologyPhilosophy of Cognitive ScienceColor
  • How do representations of visual form organize our percepts of visual motion?
    with Gregory Francis
    In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 13 to 16, 1994, Georgia Institute of Technology, Erlbaum. pp. 16--330. 1994.
  •  42
    Neural dynamics of autistic behaviors: Cognitive, emotional, and timing substrates
    with Don Seidman
    Psychological Review 113 (3): 483-525. 2006.
    Cognitive Psychology
  •  78
    Linking brain to mind in normal behavior and schizophrenia
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 90-90. 2003.
    To understand schizophrenia, a linking hypothesis is needed that shows how brain mechanisms lead to behavioral functions in normals, and also how breakdowns in these mechanisms lead to behavioral symptoms of schizophrenia. Such a linking hypothesis is now available that complements the discussion offered by Phillips & Silverstein (P&S).
    SchizophreniaPhilosophy of Psychology, Misc
  •  104
    The role of learning in sensory-motor control
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1): 155-157. 1985.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  89
    Filling-in the forms
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 758-759. 1998.
    Boundary completion and surface filling-in are computationally complementary processes whose multiple processing stages form processing streams that realize a hierarchical resolution of uncertainty. Such complementarity and uncertainty principles provide a new foundation for philosophical discussions about visual perception, and lead to neural explanations of difficult perceptual data.
    Philosophy of PsychologyThe Nature of Perceptual Experience
  •  40
    Cortical dynamics of three-dimensional figure–ground perception of two-dimensional pictures
    Psychological Review 104 (3): 618-658. 1997.
  •  74
    Self-organizing neural models of categorization, inference and synchrony
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3): 460-461. 1993.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of ConsciousnessNeural Synchrony and Binding
  •  72
    Bring ART into the ACT
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5): 610-611. 2003.
    ACT is compared with a particular type of connectionist model that cannot handle symbols and use nonbiological operations which do not learn in real time. This focus continues an unfortunate trend of straw man debates in cognitive science. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART-neural models of cognition can handle both symbols and subsymbolic representations, and meet the Newell criteria at least as well as connectionist models.
    Neural Networks and Connectionism
  •  208
    Neural substrates of visual percepts, imagery, and hallucinations
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2): 194-195. 2002.
    Recent neural models clarify many properties of mental imagery as part of the process whereby bottom-up visual information is influenced by top-down expectations, and how these expectations control visual attention. Volitional signals can transform modulatory top-down signals into supra-threshold imagery. Visual hallucinations can occur when the normal control of these volitional signals is lost.
    Illusion and HallucinationVisual Imagery and Imagination
  •  57
    How the venetian blind percept emerges from the laminar cortical dynamics of 3D vision
    with Yongqiang Cao
    Frontiers in Psychology 5. 2014.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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