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Stephen Grossberg

Boston University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    66
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    31

 More details
  • Boston University
    Regular Faculty
Homepage
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (66)
  •  89
    Filling-in the forms
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 758-759. 1998.
    Boundary completion and surface filling-in are computationally complementary processes whose multiple processing stages form processing streams that realize a hierarchical resolution of uncertainty. Such complementarity and uncertainty principles provide a new foundation for philosophical discussions about visual perception, and lead to neural explanations of difficult perceptual data.
    Philosophy of PsychologyThe Nature of Perceptual Experience
  •  104
    The role of learning in sensory-motor control
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1): 155-157. 1985.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  74
    Self-organizing neural models of categorization, inference and synchrony
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3): 460-461. 1993.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of ConsciousnessNeural Synchrony and Binding
  •  40
    Cortical dynamics of three-dimensional figure–ground perception of two-dimensional pictures
    Psychological Review 104 (3): 618-658. 1997.
  •  208
    Neural substrates of visual percepts, imagery, and hallucinations
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2): 194-195. 2002.
    Recent neural models clarify many properties of mental imagery as part of the process whereby bottom-up visual information is influenced by top-down expectations, and how these expectations control visual attention. Volitional signals can transform modulatory top-down signals into supra-threshold imagery. Visual hallucinations can occur when the normal control of these volitional signals is lost.
    Illusion and HallucinationVisual Imagery and Imagination
  •  72
    Bring ART into the ACT
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5): 610-611. 2003.
    ACT is compared with a particular type of connectionist model that cannot handle symbols and use nonbiological operations which do not learn in real time. This focus continues an unfortunate trend of straw man debates in cognitive science. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART-neural models of cognition can handle both symbols and subsymbolic representations, and meet the Newell criteria at least as well as connectionist models.
    Neural Networks and Connectionism
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