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Stephen Grossberg

Boston University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    66
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    31

 More details
  • Boston University
    Regular Faculty
Homepage
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (66)
  •  56
    How does a brain build a cognitive code?
    Psychological Review 87 (1): 1-51. 1980.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  120
    Unattended exposure to components of speech sounds yields same benefits as explicit auditory training
    with Aaron R. Seitz, Athanassios Protopapas, Yoshiaki Tsushima, Eleni L. Vlahou, Simone Gori, and Takeo Watanabe
    Cognition 115 (3): 435-443. 2010.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceHearingSound
  •  99
    Cognitive self-organization and neural modularity
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1): 18-19. 1985.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceModularity in Cognitive Science
  •  68
    The complementary brain: From brain dynamics to conscious experiences
    In Christian Kaernbach, Erich Schröger & Hermann Müller (eds.), Psychophysics Beyond Sensation: Laws and Invariants of Human Cognition, Psychology Press. pp. 417-449. 2004.
    Neurobiological Theories and Models of Consciousness
  •  79
    Realistic constraints on brain color perception and category learning
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4): 495-496. 2005.
    Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) ask how autonomous agents can derive perceptually grounded categories for successful communication, using color categorization as an example. Their comparison of nativism, empiricism, and culturalism, although interesting, does not include key biological and technological constraints for seeing color or learning color categories in realistic environments. Other neural models have successfully included these constraints.
    Autonomy and Moral PsychologyPhilosophy of Cognitive ScienceColor
  •  85
    Brain metaphors, theories, and facts
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1): 97-98. 1986.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  42
    Neural dynamics of autistic behaviors: Cognitive, emotional, and timing substrates
    with Don Seidman
    Psychological Review 113 (3): 483-525. 2006.
    Cognitive Psychology
  • How do representations of visual form organize our percepts of visual motion?
    with Gregory Francis
    In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 13 to 16, 1994, Georgia Institute of Technology, Erlbaum. pp. 16--330. 1994.
  •  78
    Linking brain to mind in normal behavior and schizophrenia
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 90-90. 2003.
    To understand schizophrenia, a linking hypothesis is needed that shows how brain mechanisms lead to behavioral functions in normals, and also how breakdowns in these mechanisms lead to behavioral symptoms of schizophrenia. Such a linking hypothesis is now available that complements the discussion offered by Phillips & Silverstein (P&S).
    SchizophreniaPhilosophy of Psychology, Misc
  •  89
    Filling-in the forms
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 758-759. 1998.
    Boundary completion and surface filling-in are computationally complementary processes whose multiple processing stages form processing streams that realize a hierarchical resolution of uncertainty. Such complementarity and uncertainty principles provide a new foundation for philosophical discussions about visual perception, and lead to neural explanations of difficult perceptual data.
    Philosophy of PsychologyThe Nature of Perceptual Experience
  •  104
    The role of learning in sensory-motor control
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1): 155-157. 1985.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  74
    Self-organizing neural models of categorization, inference and synchrony
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3): 460-461. 1993.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of ConsciousnessNeural Synchrony and Binding
  •  40
    Cortical dynamics of three-dimensional figure–ground perception of two-dimensional pictures
    Psychological Review 104 (3): 618-658. 1997.
  •  208
    Neural substrates of visual percepts, imagery, and hallucinations
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2): 194-195. 2002.
    Recent neural models clarify many properties of mental imagery as part of the process whereby bottom-up visual information is influenced by top-down expectations, and how these expectations control visual attention. Volitional signals can transform modulatory top-down signals into supra-threshold imagery. Visual hallucinations can occur when the normal control of these volitional signals is lost.
    Illusion and HallucinationVisual Imagery and Imagination
  •  72
    Bring ART into the ACT
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5): 610-611. 2003.
    ACT is compared with a particular type of connectionist model that cannot handle symbols and use nonbiological operations which do not learn in real time. This focus continues an unfortunate trend of straw man debates in cognitive science. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART-neural models of cognition can handle both symbols and subsymbolic representations, and meet the Newell criteria at least as well as connectionist models.
    Neural Networks and Connectionism
  •  57
    Neural dynamics of form perception: Boundary completion, illusory figures, and neon color spreading
    with Ennio Mingolla
    Psychological Review 92 (2): 173-211. 1985.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  57
    How the venetian blind percept emerges from the laminar cortical dynamics of 3D vision
    with Yongqiang Cao
    Frontiers in Psychology 5. 2014.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  72
    Hippocampal modulation of recognition, conditioning, timing, and space: Why so many functions?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3): 479-480. 1994.
  •  41
    Do all neural models really look alike? A comment on Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, and Jones
    Psychological Review 85 (6): 592-596. 1978.
  •  64
    The microscopic analysis of behavior: Toward a synthesis of instrumental, perceptual, and cognitive ideas
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4): 594-595. 1984.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
  •  102
    Representations need self-organizing top-down expectations to fit a changing world
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4): 473-474. 1998.
    “Chorus embodies an attempt to find out how far a mostly bottom-up approach to representation can be taken.” Models that embody both bottom-up and top-down learning have stronger computational properties and explain more data about representation than feedforward models do.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  67
    Classical conditioning: The role of interdisciplinary theory
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1): 144-145. 1989.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceConscious and Unconscious Learning
  •  77
    Neural Facades: Visual Representations of Static and Moving Form‐And‐Color‐And‐Depth
    Mind and Language 5 (4): 411-456. 1990.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  69
    Attention and recognition learning by adaptive resonance
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (2): 241-242. 1990.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of PsychologyUnconscious and Conscious Processes
  •  59
    Laminar cortical dynamics of cognitive and motor working memory, sequence learning and performance: Toward a unified theory of how the cerebral cortex works
    with Lance R. Pearson
    Psychological Review 115 (3): 677-732. 2008.
    Cognitive Psychology
  •  100
    From working memory to long-term memory and back: Linked but distinct
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6): 737-738. 2003.
    Neural models have proposed how short-term memory (STM) storage in working memory and long-term memory (LTM) storage and recall are linked and interact, but are realized by different mechanisms that obey different laws. The authors' data can be understood in the light of these models, which suggest that the authors may have gone too far in obscuring the differences between these processes.
    Conscious and Unconscious MemoryMemory and Cognitive Science
  •  23
    Binding of object representations by synchronous cortical dynamics explains temporal order and spatial pooling data
    with Alexander Grunewald
    In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 13 to 16, 1994, Georgia Institute of Technology, Erlbaum. pp. 387--391. 1994.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessAspects of Consciousness
  •  65
    Stable self-organization of sensory recognition codes: Is chaos necessary?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2): 179-180. 1987.
  • Conscious Experiences
    In Christian Kaernbach, Erich Schröger & Hermann Müller (eds.), Psychophysics Beyond Sensation: Laws and Invariants of Human Cognition, Psychology Press. pp. 417. 2004.
  •  98
    Principles of cortical synchronization
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4): 689-690. 1997.
    Functional roles for cortical synchronization in self-organizing neural networks are described. These properties are best understood by models that link brain to behavior. Synchrony can express itself differently in cortical circuits that perform different behavioral tasks. Cortical temporal properties that seem inexplicable by synchrony are also mentioned.
    Consciousness and Neuroscience
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