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Stephen Grossberg

Boston University
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  •  Publications
    66
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    31

 More details
  • Boston University
    Regular Faculty
Homepage
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (66)
  •  87
    Brain metaphors, theories, and facts
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1): 97-98. 1986.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  42
    Neural dynamics of autistic behaviors: Cognitive, emotional, and timing substrates
    with Don Seidman
    Psychological Review 113 (3): 483-525. 2006.
    Cognitive Psychology
  • How do representations of visual form organize our percepts of visual motion?
    with Gregory Francis
    In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 13 to 16, 1994, Georgia Institute of Technology, Erlbaum. pp. 16--330. 1994.
  •  78
    Linking brain to mind in normal behavior and schizophrenia
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 90-90. 2003.
    To understand schizophrenia, a linking hypothesis is needed that shows how brain mechanisms lead to behavioral functions in normals, and also how breakdowns in these mechanisms lead to behavioral symptoms of schizophrenia. Such a linking hypothesis is now available that complements the discussion offered by Phillips & Silverstein (P&S).
    SchizophreniaPhilosophy of Psychology, Misc
  •  104
    The role of learning in sensory-motor control
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1): 155-157. 1985.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  93
    Filling-in the forms
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 758-759. 1998.
    Boundary completion and surface filling-in are computationally complementary processes whose multiple processing stages form processing streams that realize a hierarchical resolution of uncertainty. Such complementarity and uncertainty principles provide a new foundation for philosophical discussions about visual perception, and lead to neural explanations of difficult perceptual data.
    Philosophy of PsychologyThe Nature of Perceptual Experience
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