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Stephen Grossberg

Boston University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    66
    • Most Recent
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    31

 More details
  • Boston University
    Regular Faculty
Homepage
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (66)
  •  41
    Do all neural models really look alike? A comment on Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, and Jones
    Psychological Review 85 (6): 592-596. 1978.
  •  64
    The microscopic analysis of behavior: Toward a synthesis of instrumental, perceptual, and cognitive ideas
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4): 594-595. 1984.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
  •  102
    Representations need self-organizing top-down expectations to fit a changing world
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4): 473-474. 1998.
    “Chorus embodies an attempt to find out how far a mostly bottom-up approach to representation can be taken.” Models that embody both bottom-up and top-down learning have stronger computational properties and explain more data about representation than feedforward models do.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  67
    Classical conditioning: The role of interdisciplinary theory
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1): 144-145. 1989.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceConscious and Unconscious Learning
  •  79
    Neural Facades: Visual Representations of Static and Moving Form‐And‐Color‐And‐Depth
    Mind and Language 5 (4): 411-456. 1990.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  69
    Attention and recognition learning by adaptive resonance
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (2): 241-242. 1990.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of PsychologyUnconscious and Conscious Processes
  •  59
    Laminar cortical dynamics of cognitive and motor working memory, sequence learning and performance: Toward a unified theory of how the cerebral cortex works
    with Lance R. Pearson
    Psychological Review 115 (3): 677-732. 2008.
    Cognitive Psychology
  •  100
    From working memory to long-term memory and back: Linked but distinct
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6): 737-738. 2003.
    Neural models have proposed how short-term memory (STM) storage in working memory and long-term memory (LTM) storage and recall are linked and interact, but are realized by different mechanisms that obey different laws. The authors' data can be understood in the light of these models, which suggest that the authors may have gone too far in obscuring the differences between these processes.
    Conscious and Unconscious MemoryMemory and Cognitive Science
  •  23
    Binding of object representations by synchronous cortical dynamics explains temporal order and spatial pooling data
    with Alexander Grunewald
    In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 13 to 16, 1994, Georgia Institute of Technology, Erlbaum. pp. 387--391. 1994.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessAspects of Consciousness
  • Conscious Experiences
    In Christian Kaernbach, Erich Schröger & Hermann Müller (eds.), Psychophysics Beyond Sensation: Laws and Invariants of Human Cognition, Psychology Press. pp. 417. 2004.
  •  65
    Stable self-organization of sensory recognition codes: Is chaos necessary?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2): 179-180. 1987.
  •  98
    Principles of cortical synchronization
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4): 689-690. 1997.
    Functional roles for cortical synchronization in self-organizing neural networks are described. These properties are best understood by models that link brain to behavior. Synchrony can express itself differently in cortical circuits that perform different behavioral tasks. Cortical temporal properties that seem inexplicable by synchrony are also mentioned.
    Consciousness and Neuroscience
  •  108
    Brain feedback and adaptive resonance in speech perception
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (3): 332-333. 2000.
    The brain contains ubiquitous reciprocal bottom-up and top-down intercortical and thalamocortical pathways. These resonating feedback pathways may be essential for stable learning of speech and language codes and for context-sensitive selection and completion of noisy speech sounds and word groupings. Context-sensitive speech data, notably interword backward effects in time, have been quantitatively modeled using these concepts but not with purely feedforward models.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  62
    Neural dynamics of decision making under risk: Affective balance and cognitive-emotional interactions
    with William E. Gutowski
    Psychological Review 94 (3): 300-318. 1987.
    Decision
  • Adaptative Resonance Theory
    with Gail Carpenter
    In Michael A. Arbib (ed.), The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks, Second Edition, Mit Press. pp. 87. 2002.
  •  67
    Interdisciplinary aspects of perceptual dynamics
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (4): 676-692. 1983.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePerceptionPerception and the Mind
  •  76
    Direct perception or adaptive resonance?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 385-386. 1980.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceDirect and Indirect Perception
  •  112
    The quantized geometry of visual space: The coherent computation of depth, form, and lightness
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (4): 625-657. 1983.
    A theory is presented of how global visual interactions between depth, length, lightness, and form percepts can occur. The theory suggests how quantized activity patterns which reflect these visual properties can coherently fill-in, or complete, visually ambiguous regions starting with visually informative data features. Phenomena such as the Cornsweet and Craik–O'Brien effects, phantoms and subjective contours, binocular brightness summation, the equidistance tendency, Emmert's law, allelotropi…Read more
    A theory is presented of how global visual interactions between depth, length, lightness, and form percepts can occur. The theory suggests how quantized activity patterns which reflect these visual properties can coherently fill-in, or complete, visually ambiguous regions starting with visually informative data features. Phenomena such as the Cornsweet and Craik–O'Brien effects, phantoms and subjective contours, binocular brightness summation, the equidistance tendency, Emmert's law, allelotropia, multiple spatial frequency scaling and edge detection, figure-ground completion, coexistence of depth and binocular rivalry, reflectance rivalry, Fechner's paradox, decrease of threshold contrast with increased number of cycles in a grating pattern, hysteresis, adaptation level tuning, Weber law modulation, shift of sensitivity with background luminance, and the finite capacity of visual short term memory are discussed in terms of a small set of concepts and mechanisms. Limitations of alternative visual theories which depend upon Fourier analysis, Laplacians, zero-crossings, and cooperative depth planes are described. Relationships between monocular and binocular processing of the same visual patterns are noted, and a shift in emphasis from edge and disparity computations toward the characterization of resonant activity-scaling correlations across multiple spatial scales is recommended. This recommendation follows from the theory's distinction between the concept of a structural spatial scale, which is determined by local receptive field properties, and a functional spatial scale, which is defined by the interaction between global properties of a visual scene and the network as a whole. Functional spatial scales, but not structural spatial scales, embody the quantization of network activity that reflects a scene's global visual representation. A functional scale is generated by a filling-in resonant exchange, or FIRE, which can be ignited by an exchange of feedback signals among the binocular cells where monocular patterns are binocularly matched.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceScience of Perception
  •  224
    STaRT: A bridge between emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic system modeling
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2): 207-208. 2005.
    Lewis proposes a “reconceptualization” of how to link the psychology and neurobiology of emotion and cognitive-emotional interactions. His main proposed themes have actually been actively and quantitatively developed in the neural modeling literature for more than 30 years. This commentary summarizes some of these themes and points to areas of particularly active research in this area.
    Emotion and Consciousness in PsychologyPhilosophy of Neuroscience, Misc
  •  73
    Cortical Dynamics of Figure-Ground Separation in Response to 2D Pictures and 3D Scenes: How V2 Combines Border Ownership, Stereoscopic Cues, and Gestalt Grouping Rules (review)
    Frontiers in Psychology 6. 2015.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  115
    Neural models of reaching
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2): 310-310. 1997.
    Plamondon & Alimi (P&A) have unified much data on speed/accuracy trade-offs during reaching movements using a delta-lognormal form factor that describes notably neuromuscular systems. Their approach raises questions about whether a large number of systems is needed, whether they are linear, and whether the results disclose the neural design principles that control reaching behaviors. The authors admit that (sect. 6, para. 4)
    Philosophy of Neuroscience, Misc
  •  48
    A neural theory of attentive visual search: Interactions of boundary, surface, spatial, and object representations
    with Ennio Mingolla and William D. Ross
    Psychological Review 101 (3): 470-489. 1994.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  122
    Linking visual cortex to visual perception: An alternative to the gestalt bubble
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4): 412-413. 2003.
    Lehar's lively discussion builds on a critique of neural models of vision that is incorrect in its general and specific claims. He espouses a Gestalt perceptual approach rather than one consistent with the “objective neurophysiological state of the visual system” (target article, Abstract). Contemporary vision models realize his perceptual goals and also quantitatively explain neurophysiological and anatomical data.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAesthetic PerceptionScience of Perception
  •  68
    Human and computer rules and representations are not equivalent
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 136-138. 1980.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Artificial Intelligence
  •  64
    Cortical dynamics of contextually cued attentive visual learning and search: Spatial and object evidence accumulation
    with Tsung-Ren Huang
    Psychological Review 117 (4): 1080-1112. 2010.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  105
    Competitive Learning: From Interactive Activation to Adaptive Resonance
    Cognitive Science 11 (1): 23-63. 1987.
  •  66
    The Art of Seeing and Painting
    Technical Report. 2006.
    The human urge to represent the three-dimensional world using two-dimensional pictorial representations dates back at least to Paleolithic times. Artists from ancient to modern times have struggled to understand how a few contours or color patches on a flat surface can induce mental representations of a three-dimensional scene. This article summarizes some of the recent breakthroughs in scientifically understanding how the brain sees that shed light on these struggles. These breakthroughs i…Read more
    The human urge to represent the three-dimensional world using two-dimensional pictorial representations dates back at least to Paleolithic times. Artists from ancient to modern times have struggled to understand how a few contours or color patches on a flat surface can induce mental representations of a three-dimensional scene. This article summarizes some of the recent breakthroughs in scientifically understanding how the brain sees that shed light on these struggles. These breakthroughs illustrate how various artists have intuitively understand paradoxical properties about how the brain sees, and have used that understanding to create great art. These paradoxical properties arise from how the brain forms the units of conscious visual perception; namely, representations of threedimensional boundaries and surfaces. Boundaries and surfaces are computed in parallel cortical processing streams that obey computationally complementary properties. These streams interact at multiple levels to overcome their complementary weaknesses and to transform their complementary properties into consistent percepts. The article describes how properties of complementary consistency have guided the creation of many great works of art.
    NeuroscienceDepictionPainting and DrawingAesthetic Perception
  •  61
    Processing of expected and unexpected events during conditioning and attention: A psychophysiological theory
    Psychological Review 89 (5): 529-572. 1982.
    Philosophy of Psychology
  •  80
    Binocular fusion and invariant category learning due to predictive remapping during scanning of a depthful scene with eye movements
    with Karthik Srinivasan and Arash Yazdanbakhsh
    Frontiers in Psychology 5. 2014.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  47
    Neural dynamics of word recognition and recall: Attentional priming, learning, and resonance
    with Gregory Stone
    Psychological Review 93 (1): 46-74. 1986.
    Unconscious and Conscious Processes
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