• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Stephen Grossberg

Boston University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    66
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    31

 More details
  • Boston University
    Regular Faculty
Homepage
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (66)
  •  47
    Neural dynamics of word recognition and recall: Attentional priming, learning, and resonance
    with Gregory Stone
    Psychological Review 93 (1): 46-74. 1986.
    Unconscious and Conscious Processes
  •  148
    Localist but distributed representations
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4): 478-479. 2000.
    A number of examples are given of how localist models may incorporate distributed representations, without the types of nonlocal interactions that often render distributed models implausible. The need to analyze the information that is encoded by these representations is also emphasized as a metatheoretical constraint on model plausibility.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceNeural Networks and Connectionism
  •  53
    The resonant dynamics of speech perception: Interword integration and duration-dependent backward effects
    with Christopher W. Myers
    Psychological Review 107 (4): 735-767. 2000.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  139
    Four frames do not suffice
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (2): 294-295. 1985.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  54
    Cortical dynamics of visual motion perception: Short-range and long-range apparent motion
    with Michael E. Rudd
    Psychological Review 99 (1): 78-121. 1992.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  88
    Self-organizing features and categories through attentive resonance
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1): 27-28. 1998.
    Because “people create features to subserve the representation and categorization of objects” (abstract) Schyns et al. “provide an account of feature learning in which the components of a representation have close ties to the categorization history of the organism” (sect. 1.1). This commentary surveys self-organizing neural models that clarify this process. These models suggest how “top-down information should constrain the search for relevant dimensions/features of categorization” (sect. 3.4.2)…Read more
    Because “people create features to subserve the representation and categorization of objects” (abstract) Schyns et al. “provide an account of feature learning in which the components of a representation have close ties to the categorization history of the organism” (sect. 1.1). This commentary surveys self-organizing neural models that clarify this process. These models suggest how “top-down information should constrain the search for relevant dimensions/features of categorization” (sect. 3.4.2).
    Science of Perception
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback