Dale Dorsey

A standard reading of Hume on the nature of practical reasons holds that he is a normative internalist; that, for Hume, legitimate practical reasons must be linked to an agent’s set of desires or motivating passions. Though the internalist reading of Hume is popular, it gives rise to serious puzzles of interpretation. To pick one nearly at random, it appears that, on an internalist reading, Hume has serious difficulties in establishing that the so-called “artificial" virtues of justice and promise-keeping are reason-giving, especially when it comes to characters like the sensible knave. Some, skeptical of the internalist reading, have argued that Hume is in fact a nihilist about practical reasons, and admits no reasons for action at all. Against the internalist and skeptical readings, I argue that there is substantial reason to believe that Hume’s corpus is compatible with a far more robust account of normativity than even internalism allows. If so, I argue, Hume has a genuine response to the sensible knave that establishes the knave’s obligation to justice. As it turns out, Hume’s considered view is unique, underexplored, and merits further philosophical investigation.

At first glance it seems plausible to hold that cultural icons, landmarks, and other items of cultural significance should be protected in the context of war, even at the cost of some human life. But this presents a puzzle: what could explain the normative significance of icons? In this chapter, I critique three forms of reductivism, viz., that cultural icons matter for welfarist, aesthetic, or historical reasons. I argue that icons of cultural significance matter because they matter _to_ the people whose culture it is; proper moral consideration of cultural denizens at least permits prioritizing cultural icons (at least to some degree) in theaters of war.

An important question that a theory of morality must answer concerns morality’s _focus_: what _about_ people matters? What do we take into consideration when we consider a person from the moral point of view? This paper discusses two answers to this question, and proposes a third. The first, and perhaps most obvious, answer is _welfarist_: what matters about people, from the moral point of view, is their well-being, the quality of their lives. But a welfarist account of the focus of interpersonal morality has faced a number of challenges, to which a _preferentist_ account has been thought to adequately respond. However, this paper argues that neither a welfarist nor a preferentist account of the focus of morality is adequate. It proposes an alternative, according to which the focus of morality can and should reflect the special normative circumstances that people inhabit given their normatively significant roles, associations, or commitments.

One reading of Sidgwick’s classic dualism of practical reason holds that it is never irrational, or all-things-considered unjustified, to conform to either one’s moral or prudential obligations in a case of conflict. In this chapter, this view is explored in two guises: a substantive dualism and a structural dualism. A substantive dualism, which accepts the existence of a distinct, all-things-considered ‘ought’, is both very implausible, and relies on at least one very implausible claim about the nature of practical rationality. A structural dualism, which denies the existence of a distinct, all-things-considered ‘ought’, is more compelling. However, contrary to David Copp, a structural dualism is not thereby forced upon us. Whether, in the end, we should accept it depends on the success or failure of a substantive dualism.

Dorsey is interested in constructivist views such as Sharon Street's which understand the truth conditions of normative judgements in terms of their withstanding scrutiny from the standpoint of other normative judgments. But it would be circular and unilluminating to understand the meaning of normative judgements in the way. To resolve the difficulty, Dorsey proposes we “break the link between the meaning of normative judgements and their truth conditions”. In the normative domain, though not across the board, truth should be understood in terms of coherence. That leaves us free to give an account of the meaning of normative judgements is terms of their ascription to actions etc. of normative properties, _right_, _rational_, etc. But constructivists typically take themselves to be opposed to normative realism, and thus committed to denying that normative properties exist, so an error theory seems unavoidable. Not so, according to Dorsey, precisely because we have cut meaning lose from truth-conditions. Normative judgements may refer to normative properties and normative properties may not exist but that doesn't suffice to make normative judgements false. What makes a normative judgement false is rather a failure of coherence. So we combine a realist semantics for normative judgements with an anti-realist understanding of their truth-conditions.

Commonsense consequentialism seeks to embrace the importance of commonsense features of the moral landscape (options and constraints, in particular), while retaining the consequentialist focus on the outcomes of our actions. In focusing on options, this chapter argues that a central presumption for commonsense consequentialist moral theories—in defending both the “commonsense” and the “consequentialist” aspects of such a view—is moral rationalism, or the principle according to which one is normatively required to conform to one’s moral requirements. However, we have reason to believe that moral rationalism is probably false, and hence attempts to “consequentialize” commonsense moral theories face a substantial justificatory challenge.

This chapter investigates a tension between a central commitment of political liberalism—that acceptable theories of political justice cannot to be guided by substantive principles of the good about which reasonable people may disagree—and the rational authority of moral demands. Liberalism comes out, or so this chapter argues, with the short end. Any liberal theory of the sort just described must commit to a principle called “Political Independence,” i.e., that moral and political obligations must, in some cases, diverge. If this is correct, political liberals face a difficult choice between rejecting a central motivating tenet of liberalism, viz., stability for the right reasons, or rejecting the sensible—even platitudinous—claim that individuals have at least all-things-considered _permission_ to conform to moral demands.

This chapter characterizes a recent and penetrating objection to consequentialism on grounds of human cognitive limitations. Standard human agents, or so the objection claims, will rarely, if ever, conform to moral requirements identified by consequentialism: consequentialism will require acts that, though strictly possible for an agent to perform, will not be performed simply given the fact that humans are cognitively limited beings. It is argued that this objection extends to virtually all plausible moral theories, and a solution is proposed: moral theories should restrict their deontic evaluation of acts to those that could be performed _as an agent_.

Many of the most significant goods in human life are fleeting, fragile, and subject to loss. But this aspect of such goods, what I call their preciousness, is undertheorized. Here I provide an account of the nature of precious goods, and argue that this category of goods is significant. I argue that while the preciousness of goods is not a consistent contributor to their intrinsic value, preciousness nevertheless calls for a distinct attitudinal response on the part of rational agents: a focused, joyful attention I refer to as cherishing.

When it comes to philosophical discussions of normativity, manners, etiquette, protocol, and the like seem to play “third fiddle" (at best) behind more significant norms of morality, prudence, and so on. On its face, however, this fact should strike us as surprising. For many parents, the first behavioral lessons provided to children involves what is rude and what is polite. When traveling to a foreign nation, we are concerned to “do what’s done", and not to commit faux pas. When meeting with dignitaries or VIPs, it is essential that we conform to the basic rules of protocol in matters of formal address. But recently, moral philosophers have been reconsidering manners as an important source of normativity. Most significantly, Sarah Buss and Karen Stohr have argued that manners has a crucial moral function; when we behave rudely we behave in ways we have strong moral reasons to avoid. In this paper, I argue this trend is laudable but mistaken. To assimilate concern for manners into moral concern is to make a mess of both manners and morality.

Abuse of power is a concept that appears to have substantial everyday purchase. We impeach politicians for abuse of power, train lawyers not to abuse power over clients, and take steps to make sure professors, doctors, and so on, avoid abusing power. But what is power abuse? And what are its normative contours? In this paper, I offer a conceptual analysis of the abuse of power and, in light of this, an account of its normative significance. I argue that the best understanding of power abuse suggests that it is not (or not necessarily) a morally significant category, but rather an independent source of reasons that applies to individuals in virtue of the practices in which they participate.

Perfectionism, the view according to which the good for an x is constituted by flourishing as an x, is a venerable account of the good, the popularity of which has only grown in recent decades. In this paper, I assess the merits of perfectionism in its traditional form, and argue in favor of a refinement. Specifically, I focus on traditional perfectionism’s account of the Central Axiological Category (CAC)---the kind ("x") that subjects fall into for the purposes of determining their good. I argue that shifting our understanding of the CAC from the traditional human category to the category of valuer is faithful to the most significant perfectionist insights, and does not succumb to the numerous and substantial challenges for the traditional understanding.

In this paper, I attempt to articulate a version of qualitative hedonism, grounded in the value theory of the British Moralists. I argue that this view is novel, presents substantial advantages over alternative hedonisms (including rival approaches to qualitative hedonism and its quantitative cousin), and can avoid classic challenges to qualitative hedonism that emerged in the post‐Mill era. If I succeed, this is a significant result for substantive value theory, given the dismissiveness with which qualitative hedonism is generally treated in the literature on the good.

This paper explores a form of communion between persons that the philosophy of value has a tendency to ignore. In discussions of interpersonal relationships and experiences, focus is almost always directed to the phenomenon of friendship and family: two or more individuals that share a history, have longstanding relationships of mutual care. Friendship is said, among other things, to be of intrinsic value, to directly benefit the friend, to generate special obligations, and to yield advances in a person’s virtue. But friendship constitutes a small fraction of the valuable interactions we have with others. Friendship is compatible with, but is not necessary for, what we might call “fellowship": the experience of being _with_ others (whether or not one has any deeper personal relationship with said others). In this paper, I provide an account of the nature of fellowship, and explore its evaluative merit. I argue that there are good reasons to think that, like friendship is often taken to be, fellowship is of intrinsic value, and should be counted as part of the pantheon of robust human goods.

This paper considers a pair of mutually puzzling first-order intuitions: a case in which it seems both supererogatory for an agent to perform a specified act, and also seems as though were that act not performed, this would have been a failure of moral obligations. I argue that these intuitive reactions are difficult to dislodge and resist accommodation by standard accounts of supererogation. I then argue that this puzzle motivates a new form of supererogatory action: action that, though morally required, is responding to moral circumstances or facts that the ordinary upright agent would typically overlook.

Whatever the finer details, Francis Hutcheson is clearly some form of proto-, quasi-, pseudo-utilitarian. But for any utilitarian, the full picture of their moral theory will only emerge once we understand their theory of the good. What, according to said utilitarian, is the nature of happiness? How do we aggregate happiness across persons? In this paper, I discuss two important aspects of Hutcheson's utilitarian axiology each with their own puzzles of interpretation. The first involves Hutcheson's theory of happiness or the ‘natural good’. Hutcheson appears to vacillate between a quantitative hedonism (according to which the value of a pleasure just concerns its intrinsic pleasurableness; its intensity and duration) and a qualitative hedonism (according to which pleasures are not simply judged given their intensity and duration, but also a further qualitative operator). The second concerns Hutcheson's aggregative axiology. Hutcheson appears to offer three inconsistent approaches to understanding the overall good. Bringing these puzzles to light, I think, brings forward a number of challenges in understanding the normative ethics of a key figure in the development of utilitarian moral thought.

The wishes of the dead seem to have normative significance. We not only respect last wills and testaments, but we take seriously what the dead loved, what they valued, even after they have long escaped this mortal coil. But this presents a philosophical puzzle. Is this a normatively justified practice? Why should the fact that some dead person preferred state of affairs x to state of affairs y be a reason to bring about x rather than y—especially if there is otherwise reason to promote y rather than x? In this paper, I argue that extant solutions to this problem are inadequate and propose an alternative. I argue that the normative significance of the wishes of the dead is to be found not in the dead's well-being or interests, but instead in the relations of friendship we bear to the dead.

Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is the phrase “under the proper conditions”: Should the proper conditions of valuing be actual or idealized? What sort of idealization is appropriate? And so forth. Though these concerns are of the first importance, this essay focuses on a second source of dispute. As stated, subjectivists must account for what it means for an individual x to value ϕ under any conditions. Though there has been some disagreement, most subjectivists hold that x values ϕ if and only if x desires ϕ. This essay argues that subjectivists have erred in accepting a desiderative theory of valuing. Instead, it argues that subjectivists should hold that x values ϕ to the extent that x judges or believes that ϕ is good for x. The resulting “judgment subjectivism” is intuitively superior to, and maintains important structural advantages over, its desiderative rival.

Much of knowing what to do is knowing what to do for ourselves, but knowing how to act in our best interest is complex---we must know what benefits us, what burdens us, and how these facts present and constitute considerations in favor of action. Additionally, we must know how we should weigh our interests at different times---past, present, and future. Dale Dorsey argues that a theory of prudence is needed: a theory of how we ought to act when we are acting for ourselves. A Theory of Prudence provides a comprehensive account of prudence, including the metaethics of prudential value, the nature of the personal good, the reasons of prudence, and the structure of prudential normativity over time.

In this paper, I present and explore an alternative to a standard prioritarian axiology. Equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the value of welfare increases should be balanced against the value of equality. However, given that, under prioritarianism, the value of marginal welfare benefits decreases as the welfare of beneficiaries increases, equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the intrinsic value of equality will be sufficient to alter a prioritarian verdict only in cases in which welfare benefits are granted to the very well-off. I argue that this view, suitably refined, solves a persistent problem for prioritarianism, and is superior to alternatives.

A number of recent (and not so recent) works in the metaethics of practical rationality have suggested that features of a person’s character, commitments, projects, practical identities and social roles have important normative consequences. For instance, I might commit to caring for a loved one, or I might become an artist, or take on the role of father to a child. In each case, it seems right to say that the normative landscape I face has been altered by this new fact—to put them under one general heading, the new fact about my self. In this paper, I explore the normative significance of self and how best it is to be understood. Typically, views that posit the normative significance of self hold that the content of one’s self can create practical reasons to behave in particular ways. For instance, if I become a father, this means that there are additional reasons to care for my child than there were prior to this fact of self. I argue, however, that this suggestion cannot be plausibly sustained—facts of self do not give rise to practical reasons. I show that, while there are two ways that facts of self might give rise to or create new practical reasons, both succumb to very serious problems. However, or so I also argue, we can salvage the normative significance of self via an alternative mechanism. Facts of self, such as the fact that one is an artist or a father, do not create new reasons. Rather, they strengthen certain pre-existing reasons, viz., those reasons to which I am especially susceptible given this fact of self.

Preference-based theories of prudential value seem to generate an absurd result when combined with commonplace platitudes about prudential rationality: it would seem that if the satisfaction of our preferences is the source (or even a source) of prudential value, then prudential rationality must be neutral (in, at least, a troubling range of cases) between taking steps to achieve the objects of one's preferences and merely engineering one's preferences to take as their object(s) that which obtains. Either way, one seems to conform to the prudential demand to promote one's well-being. But this is widely held to be counterintuitive. In this article, I argue that this verdict arises only given eminently controvertible interpretations of a preference-based axiology and of the constitution of prudential reasons.