Pierre-Marie Morel

"The aim of this paper is to inscribe the argument on the Practical Syllogism of De motu animalium, chapter 7, in its immediate context. Now this framework is by no means a logical one. The De motu is a psychological or zoological treatise, whose scope belongs to natural philosophy. Moreover De motu's Practical Syllogism cannot be restricted to practical, i.e. anthropological, cases, like akrasia. It is inserted in a physiological development regarding the biological explanation of animal emotions, reactions and actions. Thus, the necessity of the conclusion – here the action itself – does not mean that the conditions for acting are reducible to propositions or to logical connections: rather it stands for the necessity that governs the agent-patient relation in animal movement."

First collection of essays entirely devoted to the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda. The texts of Diogenes of Oinoanda (2nd century AD) who invited his readers to an Epicurean life is the largest ancient inscription ever discovered. Over 70 new finds have increased the number of known wall blocks and fragments to nearly 300, offering new insights into Diogenes' distinctive presentation of philosophy. This collection of essays discusses the philosophical significance of these discoveries and is the first of this kind entirely devoted to Diogenes of Oinoanda. Particular attention is paid to his philosophical aims and polemical strategies. Diogenes was apparently well aware of still ongoing philosophical debates, engaging in polemics against Presocratic philosophers, Platonics, and especially Stoics. His views about important issues like happiness, fear, old age, and the afterlife are explained on the bases of Epicurean physics and theology, ethics, politics, theory of knowledge, and psychology.

In the last lines of Politics VII, 3, Aristotle states that the happy city acts nobly. This implies that the city has a practical life, and that this life has its end in itself. This claim seems to contradict the famous distinction, which has been made elsewhere by Aristotle, between the practical and theoretical lives. It is argued in this paper that there is, here, neither contradiction nor inconsistency in Aristotle’s conception of human action. Some readings, according to which this passage deals with the role of the philosophers in the happy city, are also ruled out. The proposed solution consists in showing that this text refers to a broader conception of action, one that is beyond the sphere of human practical activities: any genuine praxis has its goal in itself, even when it produces external effects.

Para Aristóteles, a memória não consiste somente em conservar os traços do passado e tomá-los novamente por objetos. O tratado Da memória e da reminiscência examina mais geralmente o papel das imagens no exercício do pensamento. Ele descreve o processo de reminiscência ou rememoração, e trata assim da organização voluntária das representações mentais como de seus encaminhamentos involuntários e patológicos. Correlativamente, ele explica em que sentido o homem pode ser agente de suas próprias representações e o princípio de suas associações. Aristóteles aborda, por conseguinte, a propósito da memória, questões fundamentais para a definição dos estados psíquicos, para a teoria do conhecimento, bem como para a concepção do eu ou da identidade pessoal. A análise da memória e da reminiscência conduz assim a uma reavaliação da concepção aristotélica do caráter, fazendo deste último o substrato e o agente de uma história pessoal que não pode ser abstraída de suas condições psicofísicas.

This paper deals with the aetiological aspect of the Epicurean conception of passions. It is argued that the therapy of the soul relies on an overall explanation of the various emotional states, and that fear is at the core of this framework in so far as it is the root of most psychic troubles. The first part deals with fear in the context of the general theory of passions. The second part shows that this basic emotion is the root of injustice and political excessive ambition, in Lucretius’ De rerum natura. The third part puts the emphasis on the role of anxiety in passionate love, in the same text. Fear, in its various forms, appears to be the main cause of a number of pathological emotions. It may be concluded that the Epicurean therapy of emotions, far from dealing with separate passions from case to case, is based on a holistic approach of psychic states.

This paper deals with the aetiological aspect of the Epicurean conception of passions. It is argued that the therapy of the soul relies on an overall explanation of the various emotional states, and that fear is at the core of this framework in so far as it is the root of most psychic troubles. The first part deals with fear in the context of the general theory of passions. The second part shows that this basic emotion is the root of injustice and political excessive ambition, in Lucretius’De rerum natura. The third part puts the emphasis on the role of anxiety in passionate love, in the same text. Fear, in its various forms, appears to be the main cause of a number of pathological emotions. It may be concluded that the Epicurean therapy of emotions, far from dealing with separate passions from case to case, is based on a holistic approach of psychic states.

The aim of this paper is to inscribe the argument on the Practical Syllogism of De motu animalium, chapter 7, in its immediate context. Now this framework is by no means a logical one. The De motu is a psychological or zoological treatise, whose scope belongs to natural philosophy. Moreover De motu’s Practical Syllogism cannot be restricted to practical, i.e. anthropological, cases, like akrasia. It is inserted in a physiological development regarding the biological explanation of animal emotions, reactions and actions. Thus, the necessity of the conclusion – here the action itself – does not mean that the conditions for acting are reducible to propositions or to logical connections: rather it stands for the necessity that governs the agent-patient relation in animal movement.

The aim of this paper is to inscribe the argument on the Practical Syllogism of De motu animalium, chapter 7, in its immediate context. Now this framework is by no means a logical one. The De motu is a psychological or zoological treatise, whose scope belongs to natural philosophy. Moreover De motu’s Practical Syllogism cannot be restricted to practical, i.e. anthropological, cases, like akrasia. It is inserted in a physiological development regarding the biological explanation of animal emotions, reactions and actions. Thus, the necessity of the conclusion – here the action itself – does not mean that the conditions for acting are reducible to propositions or to logical connections: rather it stands for the necessity that governs the agent-patient relation in animal movement

Aristote elabore une conception originale et subtile de l'unite de l'ame et du corps. L'ame du vivant est a son corps ce qu'est la forme a la matiere: elle en est le principe ou le programme interne d'organisation et de developpement. Leur unite est donc substantielle sans pour autant qu'ils se confondent. Aristote ouvre ainsi une voie singuliere pour depasser l'alternative du dualisme et du monisme. L'unite du compose d'ame et de corps est selon lui un fait indiscutable et qui, en tant que tel, n'appelle pas de justification; mais comment concevoir l'unite du vivant s'il est fait de deux principes, l'un corporel, l'autre incorporel? La solution du paradoxe consiste a refuser une representation statique ou purement morphologique de l'etre anime selon laquelle la vie serait la superposition ou l'addition inexplicable de deux entites distinctes. Depuis les mouvements organiques les plus simples jusqu'aux activites les plus elaborees, comme les actions morales, la vie consiste toujours en une synthese de mouvements tout a la fois psychiques et corporels. L'unite du vivant resulte de la coherence de ses activites. Pour le comprendre, il convient d'analyser la contribution essentielle, mais souvent negligee, que les Petits traites d'histoire naturelle et le traite Du mouvement des animaux apportent a la problematique du traite De l'ame. C'est ce que ce livre entreprend de faire en tissant le lien qui rattache la matiere a l'action et, au-dela, la philosophie du vivant a la philosophie pratique.

Les atomistes de l'Antiquité doivent résoudre le problème suivant : comment expliquer la formation des mondes et des corps composés à partir de corps élémentaires - les atomes - qui n'ont en eux-mêmes aucune propriété cosmogonique ? La solution d'Épicure, selon la Lettre à Hérodote, § 45, consiste à adopter une conception subtile de la causalité atomique : les atomes ne sont pas seulement des composants, ou des causes matérielles, mais aussi, par l'intermédiaire d'un processus de sélection spontanée, les véritables agents de la production des mondes et des composés. Ancient atomists face the following difficulty : how can the becoming of worlds and compounds be explained by the elementary bodies, when these - the atoms - do not possess any cosmogonie property ? Epicurus' answer, according to Letter to Herodotus, § 45, is a subtle account of atomic causality : atoms are not only components or material causes, but also, through a spontaneous process of selection, the real agents of the production of worlds and compounds

On décèle une tension entre deux tendances dans la philosophie aristotélicienne de la praxis : d’une part; une insistance claire sur la spécificité de l’action humaine par rapport à la conduite animale ; d’autre part; la volonté de définir un genre commun pour les différents types d’activités; humaines et animales. Si cette tension peut être surmontée; c’est sans doute en distinguant les différents registres (axiologique; psychologique; éthologique) du discours aristotélicien. C’est aussi en précisant le type de ressemblance qui; à la fois; rapproche et distingue l’homme de l’animal : si la conduite humaine et la conduite animale appartiennent à un genre commun; elles demeurent distinguées par un rapport d’analogie; c’est-à-dire par une différence irréductible. L’analyse éthologique d’Aristote; loin de conduire à une naturalisation du comportement humain; conduit à sa spécification