Pierre-Marie Morel

La référence à la nature, qu'elle soit normative ou descriptive, croise les thèmes essentiels de l'éthique d'Aristote : la fin ultime, l'acquisition des vertus, le plaisir et les émotions, les liens relationnels, la justice et la vie en cité, la responsabilité. L'éthique aristotélicienne n'est pas pour autant "naturaliste" au sens où le bien humain dériverait de tendances et de prédispositions naturelles. Cet ouvrage, en procédant à une étude systématique de la référence à la nature dans l'éthique aristotélicienne, défend une nouvelle interprétation du naturalisme pratique d'Aristote : un naturalisme critique, le plus souvent dialectique, qui s'interroge sur les conditions de base du bien humain ; non pas un naturalisme scientifique, en vertu duquel la biologie serait source de prescriptions morales, mais un naturalisme problématique qui délimite des possibilités d'agir. L'une des tâches primordiales du théoricien de l'éthique, comme celle du politique actif, est précisément d'évaluer dans quelle mesure le bien humain dépend de la nature ou s'en affranchit."--Page 4 of cover.

The aim of this article is to show that love and politics are closely connected in Lucretius’ poem De rerum natura. On the one hand, passionate love (Book IV) is similar to the vain desire for political power; on the other hand, sexual desire of primitive human beings (in Book V) is implicitely opposed to the ‘common good’ which governs human societies and cities. Moreover, the description, in Book IV, of non passionate sexuality, or free love, which is characterized by mutual desire and shared pleasure, is a sort of counter-model, or an alternative paradigm, in opposition to political and social alienation and violence. In other words, it is argued, Lucretius’ global attitude to love, sex and politics is an important feature of the therapy of the soul. Accordingly, it reveals a deep suspicion in face of social life and political activities.

From an analysis of the famous principle ‘‘Nature does nothing in vain’’ in Aristotle’s Locomotion of animals, this paper addresses the question of the meaning and boundaries of finalism in zoology, as well as the related idea of conformity with nature. It is argued that, although ‘‘Nature does nothing in vain’’ seems to allude, at first glance, to cosmic or global teleology, the treatise On the Locomotion of Animals gives a different meaning to the formula : the teleological account, in this context, depends on a local and relative finalism, which is defined in accordance with the specific and generic properties of animals, and not by reference to any alleged cosmic axiology or global causal chain. However, this principle should not be reduced to organic teleology strictly speaking, in so far as it involves also external and necessary conditions, which are common rules governing the locomotion of animals.

In the Posterior Analytics, deiknunai is often synonymous with apodeiknunai. This is the case when it means ‘demonstrate’ in the strict sense of a syllogistic deduction. However, in other occurrences, it seems to designate something different, like a ‘proof’ in general or a particular kind of proof. Does this mean that deiknunai is an imprecise term, belonging to a weak level of technical terminology and falling outside the semantic core of Aristotle’s theory of science? Conversely, it could be that certain uses of deiknunai, despite their relative lack of technicality, reveals something deeper and more significant, regarding Aristotle’s conceptions of proof and demonstration. The purpose of this survey is to evaluate the latter hypothesis.It is argued that Aristotle uses deiknunai (and other terms of the same family) so as to preserve apodeiknunai for the technical sense of ‘demonstrate’ (and preserve apodeixis for ‘demonstration’) in the strict meaning of the term, in particular within the expression apodeiknunai haplôs.

"The aim of this paper is to inscribe the argument on the Practical Syllogism of De motu animalium, chapter 7, in its immediate context. Now this framework is by no means a logical one. The De motu is a psychological or zoological treatise, whose scope belongs to natural philosophy. Moreover De motu's Practical Syllogism cannot be restricted to practical, i.e. anthropological, cases, like akrasia. It is inserted in a physiological development regarding the biological explanation of animal emotions, reactions and actions. Thus, the necessity of the conclusion – here the action itself – does not mean that the conditions for acting are reducible to propositions or to logical connections: rather it stands for the necessity that governs the agent-patient relation in animal movement."

First collection of essays entirely devoted to the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda. The texts of Diogenes of Oinoanda (2nd century AD) who invited his readers to an Epicurean life is the largest ancient inscription ever discovered. Over 70 new finds have increased the number of known wall blocks and fragments to nearly 300, offering new insights into Diogenes' distinctive presentation of philosophy. This collection of essays discusses the philosophical significance of these discoveries and is the first of this kind entirely devoted to Diogenes of Oinoanda. Particular attention is paid to his philosophical aims and polemical strategies. Diogenes was apparently well aware of still ongoing philosophical debates, engaging in polemics against Presocratic philosophers, Platonics, and especially Stoics. His views about important issues like happiness, fear, old age, and the afterlife are explained on the bases of Epicurean physics and theology, ethics, politics, theory of knowledge, and psychology.

On décèle une tension entre deux tendances dans la philosophie aristotélicienne de la praxis : d’une part; une insistance claire sur la spécificité de l’action humaine par rapport à la conduite animale ; d’autre part; la volonté de définir un genre commun pour les différents types d’activités; humaines et animales. Si cette tension peut être surmontée; c’est sans doute en distinguant les différents registres (axiologique; psychologique; éthologique) du discours aristotélicien. C’est aussi en précisant le type de ressemblance qui; à la fois; rapproche et distingue l’homme de l’animal : si la conduite humaine et la conduite animale appartiennent à un genre commun; elles demeurent distinguées par un rapport d’analogie; c’est-à-dire par une différence irréductible. L’analyse éthologique d’Aristote; loin de conduire à une naturalisation du comportement humain; conduit à sa spécification

In the last lines of Politics VII, 3, Aristotle states that the happy city acts nobly. This implies that the city has a practical life, and that this life has its end in itself. This claim seems to contradict the famous distinction, which has been made elsewhere by Aristotle, between the practical and theoretical lives. It is argued in this paper that there is, here, neither contradiction nor inconsistency in Aristotle’s conception of human action. Some readings, according to which this passage deals with the role of the philosophers in the happy city, are also ruled out. The proposed solution consists in showing that this text refers to a broader conception of action, one that is beyond the sphere of human practical activities: any genuine praxis has its goal in itself, even when it produces external effects.

Para Aristóteles, a memória não consiste somente em conservar os traços do passado e tomá-los novamente por objetos. O tratado Da memória e da reminiscência examina mais geralmente o papel das imagens no exercício do pensamento. Ele descreve o processo de reminiscência ou rememoração, e trata assim da organização voluntária das representações mentais como de seus encaminhamentos involuntários e patológicos. Correlativamente, ele explica em que sentido o homem pode ser agente de suas próprias representações e o princípio de suas associações. Aristóteles aborda, por conseguinte, a propósito da memória, questões fundamentais para a definição dos estados psíquicos, para a teoria do conhecimento, bem como para a concepção do eu ou da identidade pessoal. A análise da memória e da reminiscência conduz assim a uma reavaliação da concepção aristotélica do caráter, fazendo deste último o substrato e o agente de uma história pessoal que não pode ser abstraída de suas condições psicofísicas.

This paper deals with the aetiological aspect of the Epicurean conception of passions. It is argued that the therapy of the soul relies on an overall explanation of the various emotional states, and that fear is at the core of this framework in so far as it is the root of most psychic troubles. The first part deals with fear in the context of the general theory of passions. The second part shows that this basic emotion is the root of injustice and political excessive ambition, in Lucretius’De rerum natura. The third part puts the emphasis on the role of anxiety in passionate love, in the same text. Fear, in its various forms, appears to be the main cause of a number of pathological emotions. It may be concluded that the Epicurean therapy of emotions, far from dealing with separate passions from case to case, is based on a holistic approach of psychic states.

The aim of this paper is to inscribe the argument on the Practical Syllogism of De motu animalium, chapter 7, in its immediate context. Now this framework is by no means a logical one. The De motu is a psychological or zoological treatise, whose scope belongs to natural philosophy. Moreover De motu’s Practical Syllogism cannot be restricted to practical, i.e. anthropological, cases, like akrasia. It is inserted in a physiological development regarding the biological explanation of animal emotions, reactions and actions. Thus, the necessity of the conclusion – here the action itself – does not mean that the conditions for acting are reducible to propositions or to logical connections: rather it stands for the necessity that governs the agent-patient relation in animal movement.

The aim of this paper is to inscribe the argument on the Practical Syllogism of De motu animalium, chapter 7, in its immediate context. Now this framework is by no means a logical one. The De motu is a psychological or zoological treatise, whose scope belongs to natural philosophy. Moreover De motu’s Practical Syllogism cannot be restricted to practical, i.e. anthropological, cases, like akrasia. It is inserted in a physiological development regarding the biological explanation of animal emotions, reactions and actions. Thus, the necessity of the conclusion – here the action itself – does not mean that the conditions for acting are reducible to propositions or to logical connections: rather it stands for the necessity that governs the agent-patient relation in animal movement

La conception épicurienne du temps comporte trois difficultés principales : il y a un temps physique objectif, bien que le temps semble dépendre en lui-même de nos représentations ; le temps peut être perçu par la raison, mais, selon certains textes, il n'est perçu que par la sensation ; Epicure, enfin, se refuse à lui attribuer une unité réelle. Ces difficultés trouvent en partie leur solution à la lumière de la théorie épicurienne du langage, ainsi que dans le statut accidentel et secondaire du temps par rapport aux événements, internes et externes. The Epicurean conception of time leads to three major difficulties : there is indeed a physical objective time, though time seems to depend in itself of our representations ; time may be perceived by reason, but, according to a few texts, it is only perceived but by sensation ; finally, Epicure refuses to grant it some real unity. The latter difficulties find in part their solution in the light of the Epicurean theory of language as well as in the accidental and secondary status of time as related to events be them internal or external.

Les atomistes de l'Antiquité doivent résoudre le problème suivant : comment expliquer la formation des mondes et des corps composés à partir de corps élémentaires - les atomes - qui n'ont en eux-mêmes aucune propriété cosmogonique ? La solution d'Épicure, selon la Lettre à Hérodote, § 45, consiste à adopter une conception subtile de la causalité atomique : les atomes ne sont pas seulement des composants, ou des causes matérielles, mais aussi, par l'intermédiaire d'un processus de sélection spontanée, les véritables agents de la production des mondes et des composés. Ancient atomists face the following difficulty : how can the becoming of worlds and compounds be explained by the elementary bodies, when these - the atoms - do not possess any cosmogonie property ? Epicurus' answer, according to Letter to Herodotus, § 45, is a subtle account of atomic causality : atoms are not only components or material causes, but also, through a spontaneous process of selection, the real agents of the production of worlds and compounds

On ne sait pas grand-chose de la vie de Démocrite d'Abdère. Contemporain de Socrate, il aurait beaucoup voyagé, et son enseignement fut largement diffusé dans le monde grec. Sa méditation sur la nature de l'Être le conduit à construire une philosophie dont l'importance est immédiatement perçue, et dont l'influence sera considérable de l'Antiquité au XIXe siècle : l'atomisme. Philosophie, physique, éthique y sont pensées sans être dissociées, autour d'une intuition fondamentale dont la postérité s'emparera vigoureusement. Pour en prendre la mesure, cette édition propose : - une introduction synthétique sur Démocrite et les problèmes de l'atomisme ; - le texte des "Fragments et témoignages", dans une traduction classique soigneusement lue et réorganisée par grands thèmes ; - un dossier qui témoigne de l'influence de Démocrite dans l'Antiquité ; - les indispensables repères et annexes, notamment une table de concordance avec l'édition Diels-Kranz.