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435Model-Selection Theory: The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Use-Novelty and Double-CountingBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2016.This article argues that common intuitions regarding (a) the specialness of ‘use-novel’ data for confirmation and (b) that this specialness implies the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ (calibrating) a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what is at stake. Our strategy is to analyse the intuit…Read more
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236Making climate decisionsPhilosophy Compass 10 (11): 799-810. 2015.Many fine-grained decisions concerning climate change involve significant, even severe, uncertainty. Here, we focus on modelling the decisions of single agents, whether individual persons or groups perceived as corporate entities. We offer a taxonomy of the sources and kinds of uncertainty that arise in framing these decision problems, as well as strategies for making a choice in spite of uncertainty. The aim is to facilitate a more transparent and structured treatment of uncertainty in climate …Read more
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62Right decisions or happy decision-makers?Social Epistemology 21 (4). 2007.Group decisions raise a number of substantial philosophical and methodological issues. We focus on the goal of the group decision exercise itself. We ask: What should be counted as a good group decision-making result? The right decision might not be accessible to, or please, any of the group members. Conversely, a popular decision can fail to be the correct decision. In this paper we discuss what it means for a decision to be "right" and what components are required in a decision process to prod…Read more
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629Climate Models, Calibration, and ConfirmationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3): 609-635. 2013.We argue that concerns about double-counting—using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate—deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets. Our analysis turns on a Bayesian/relative-likelih…Read more
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152The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value JudgmentsPhilosophy of Science 79 (5): 893-904. 2012.Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner’s conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between private and public decisions. Our conclusion that scie…Read more
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105Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of DilationErkenntnis 79 (6): 1287-1303. 2014.Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation
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27Review of Husain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10). 2007.
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104Distinguishing indeterminate belief from “risk-averse” preferencesSynthese 158 (2): 189-205. 2007.I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief, such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does…Read more
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65Preference and information , Dan Egonsson. Ashgate, 2007, XI+163 pp (review)Economics and Philosophy 25 (2): 236-242. 2009.
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82Daniel steel philosophy and the precautionary principle: Science, evidence, and environmental policyBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4): 1195-1200. 2016.
Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Applied Ethics |
Philosophy of Probability |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Social Science |