Richard Swinburne

Armstrong's theory of laws of nature as relations between universals gives an initially plausible account of why the causal powers of substances are bound together only in certain ways, so that the world is a very regular place. But its resulting theory of causation cannot account for intentional causation, since this involves an agent trying to do something, and trying is causing. This kind of causation is thus a state of an agent and does not involve the operation of a law. It is simpler to suppose that non-intentional causing is also causing by substances (and not events) in virtue of their powers to act. That raises again the question of why their powers are bound together only in certain ways. The most probable answer is that God, the simplest kind of person there could be, brings this about because it is necessary for the existence of finite rational creatures such as ourselves.

THERE IS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC SENTENCES IF WE DEFINE AN ANALYTIC SENTENCE AS ONE WHICH ENTAILS A SELF-CONTRADICTION. THE PAPER SHOWS THAT ALTHOUGH THIS DEFINES "ANALYTIC" BY TERMS WHICH ARE THEMSELVES ALSO MODAL TERMS, THESE LATTER TERMS CAN BE EXPLAINED BY DEFINITIONS USING LESS TECHNICAL TERMS AND BY EXAMPLES, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE "ANALYTIC" AS CLEAR A MEANING AS IS POSSESSED BY MOST OTHER TERMS OF OUR LANGUAGE. THE FACT THAT THERE ARE BORDER-LINE CASES OF ANALYTIC SENTENCES, AND THAT APPARENTLY SOME OBVIOUS CASES OF ANALYTIC SENTENCES TURN OUT TO BE SYNTHETIC IS NO GOOD OBJECTION TO THE CLARITY OF THE DISTINCTION. IF WE DEFINE AN ANALYTIC SENTENCE AS ONE REDUCIBLE TO A TRUTH OF LOGIC BY SUBSTITUTION OF SYNONYMS, THIS DEFINITION PICKS OUT A DIFFERENT CLASS OF SENTENCES AS ANALYTIC, BUT IT ALSO ALLOWS US TO MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ANALYTIC AND THE SYNTHETIC.

The hypothesis that Jesus rose bodily from the dead is rendered probable in so far as: (1) evidence makes it probable that there is a God, (2) God has reason to become incarnate - to provide atonement for our sins, to identify with our suffering, and to reveal teaching (and so to lead a particular kind of human life, including teaching that he was divine and making atonement, a life culminated by a super-miracle such as his resurrection from the dead), (3) there is evidence of a modest degree of probability to be expected if Jesus was the only prophet in human history who led a life of the above kind, which was culminated in the right sort of way. So, given other evidence that there is a God (and a priori reason to suppose that he would become incarnate),and other evidence about the life of Jesus and other prophets, only a modest amount of historical witness testimony to the Resurrection is necessary in order to show that it occurred

Empiricists have sought to follow Hume in claiming that causality is a relation between events reducible to something more basic, e.g., regularities or counterfactuals. But all such attempts fail through their inability to distinguish cause from effect. The alternative is that causation is irreducible. Regularities are evidence of causation but do not constitute it. We understand what causation is through performing intentional actions which necessarily involve trying, which in turn just is exercising causal power

The central doctrine of Christianity is that God intervened in human history in the person of Jesus Christ in a unique way; and that quickly became understood as the doctrine that in Jesus Christ God became man. In AD 451 the Council of Chalcedon formulated that doctrine in a precise way utilizing the current philosophical terminology, which provided a standard for the orthodoxy of subsequent thought on this issue. It affirmed its belief in ‘our Lord Jesus Christ, … truly God and truly man, … in two natures … the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person’. One individual, one thing that is; and being a rational individual, one person. An individual's nature are those general properties which make it the sort of individual it is. The nature of my desk is to be a solid material object of a certain shape; the nature of the oak tree in the wood is to take in water and light, and to grow into a characteristic shape with characteristic leaves and give off oxygen. Chalcedon affirmed that the one individual Jesus Christ had a divine nature, was God that is; and it assumed that the divine nature was an essential nature.

Events are the instantiations of properties in substances at times. A full history of the world must include, as well as physical events, mental events (ones to which the substance involved has privileged access) and mental substances (ones to the existence of which the substance has privileged access), and, among the latter, pure mental substances (ones which do not include a physical substance as an essential part). Humans are pure mental substances. An argument for this is that it seems conceivable that I could exist without my body. An objection to this argument is that ‘I’ refers to my body, and so what seems conceivable is not metaphysically possible. My response to this objection is that ‘I’ is an informative designator and so necessarily we know to what it refers, and it does not refer to my body.

Although Gregory wrote very little about this. he acknowledged that natural reason can lead us from the orderliness of the physical world to the existence of God; in this, he followed the tradition of Athanasius and other Greek fathers. Unlike Aquinas, he did not seek to present the argument a; deductive: in fact his argument is inductive, and of die same kind as - we now realize - scientists and historians use when they argue from phenomena to then explanatory cause. Gregory wrote hardly anything about how one could obtain knowledge of the truths of the Christian revelation by arguments from non-question-beggining premises; but in his conversations with the Turks he showed that he believed that there are good arguments of this kind. Almost all of Gregory's writing about knowledge of God concerned how one could obtain this by direct access in prayer: this access, he held is open especially to monks, but to a considerable degree also to all Christians who follow the divine commandments.

I'm not going to discuss whether or not there is a God, but simply whether if there is a God, that makes any difference to morality. I shall argue first that the existence and actions of God would make no difference to the fact that there are moral truths—and on this you may already agree with me. But I shall go on to argue that the existence and actions of God would make a great difference to the content of morality, to the seriousness of morality, and our knowledge of morality—and on all that I may need to convince you. I assume a standard Western account of the nature of God, as essentially eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, creator and sustainer of the universe and all that it contains, the kind of God affirmed by Christianity, Judaism, and Islam as well as some other religions.

If there is a God who wants us to become saints worthy of the beatific vision, he will provide us with information how to do so -- that is, with a propositional revelation. The revelation will not be too evident -- in order that we may choose whether or not to search it out and tell others about it -- and its interpretation for new centuries and cultures will require a church. The tests of a genuine revelation are its consonance with our knowledge of God obtained by other routes, and some sort of miraculous foundation.

In this interview of me by Julian Baggini, I defend my view that the existence of evil (bad actions and bad states of affairs) does not count against the existence of God iff it is only by God allowing the evil that a certain good can be achieved; God does everything else he can to bring about that good; God has the right to allow the evil; and the outcome is sufficiently good. I argue that God as our creator has the requisite right and I suggest reasons why the various evils of our world make possible great goods.

I distinguish between the argument to the existence of God from the operation of laws of nature and the argument from the laws being of such a kind as (together with the boundary conditions of the universe) to lead to the evolution of humans. There could not be a ’scientific’ explanation of these data, but there could be a ’personal’ explanation that they were caused by a person in virtue of his powers and purposes. The simplest and so most probably true explanation is that they were brought about by God.