This is an introduction to a collected volume. It distinguishes between evidential, statistical, and physical probability, and between objective and subjective understandings of evidential probability, in the use of Bayes’s theorem. If Bayes’s theorem is to be used to assess an objective evidential probability, a priori criteria--mainly the criterion of simplicity--are required to determine prior probability. The five main contributors to the volume discuss the use of Bayes’s theorem to assess t…
Read moreThis is an introduction to a collected volume. It distinguishes between evidential, statistical, and physical probability, and between objective and subjective understandings of evidential probability, in the use of Bayes’s theorem. If Bayes’s theorem is to be used to assess an objective evidential probability, a priori criteria--mainly the criterion of simplicity--are required to determine prior probability. The five main contributors to the volume discuss the use of Bayes’s theorem to assess the evidential probability of scientific theories, statistical hypotheses, criminal guilt, and miracles; and also its value for assessing physical probability.
