•  66
    Conventionalism about space and time
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (3): 255-272. 1980.
    MANY WRITERS HAVE WISHED TO DISTINGUISH, WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS ABOUT SPACE AND TIME, BETWEEN MATTERS OF FACT AND MATTERS OF CONVENTION--TO SAY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS A MATTER OF FACT WHETHER TWO RODS AT THE SAME PLACE ARE CONGRUENT, BUT A MATTER OF CONVENTION WHETHER TWO RODS AT DIFFERENT PLACES ARE CONGRUENT. ANY ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHICH STATEMENTS ARE MATTERS OF CONVENTION WILL RELY ON SOME VERIFICATIONIST DOCTRINE. YET DIFFERENT VERIFICATIONIST DOCTRINES DIFFER IN PLAUSIBILITY AND YIELD …Read more
  •  1
    Rationality
    Philosophical Books 5 (3): 1-2. 1964.
  •  14
    Reply to Wallace
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3). 1976.
  •  1
    Cambridge University Press. 1989.
  •  279
    Personal identity
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74. 1974.
    EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY STATE THAT THE IDENTITY OF A PERSON OVER TIME IS A MATTER OF BODILY CONTINUITY AND/OR SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER. IN CONTRAST, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT WHILE BODILY CONTINUITY AND SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER ARE EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE IT. IT IS SOMETHING UNDEFINABLE. THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT TO SAY IN PUZZLE CASES DOES NOT SHOW THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY EXISTS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OR THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE ARBI…Read more
  •  49
    Probability, credibility and acceptability
    American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3). 1971.
    THE PAPER EXAMINES WHAT IS MEANT BY ’EVIDENCE’ WHEN IT IS SAID THAT A THEORY IS PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE. IT CONSIDERS WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN A THEORY BEING PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE, A THEORY BEING BELIEVED, AND A THEORY BEING CREDIBLE. IT DISTINGUISHES VARIOUS SENSES OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH SCIENTISTS ARE SAID TO ACCEPT THEORIES, ONLY ONE OF WHICH IS THE SENSE OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH IT IS EQUATED WITH ’BELIEVE’. IT ANALYSES THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN A THEORY BEING PROBABLE ON THE E…Read more
  •  1
    In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The Cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the Teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in simple form the main points of my book ’The E…Read more
  •  43
    The Christian Wager
    In J. Houston (ed.), Is it reasonable to believe in God?, Handsel Press. pp. 217--228. 1984.
  •  50
    The argument for design
    In J. Houston (ed.), Is it reasonable to believe in God?, Handsel Press. pp. 199-. 1984.
    The object of this paper is to show that there are no valid formal objections to the argument from design, so long as the argument is articulated with sufficient care. In particular I wish to analyse Hume's attack on the argument in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and to show that none of the formal objections made therein by Philo have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument
  •  7
    Arguments for the existence of God
    In J. Houston (ed.), Is it reasonable to believe in God?, Handsel Press. 1984.
    In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in a simple form the main points of my book The …Read more
  •  20
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3): 308-311. 1978.
  •  84
    New books (review)
    with W. H. Walsh, James Griffin, J. W. N. Watkins, Bernard Mayo, J. A. Faris, C. H. Whiteley, P. F. Strawson, G. J. Warnock, and Christopher Kirwan
    Mind 74 (295): 434-458. 1965.
  •  56
    Popper's account of acceptability
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2). 1971.
    ACCORDING TO POPPER, SCIENTIFIC THEORIES ARE TO BE ACCEPTED IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE FALSIFIABLE AND IN SO FAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED. THE CONCEPTS OF FALSIFIABILITY AND CORROBORATION ARE SUBMITTED TO DETAILED ANALYSIS. THE POINT OF ACCEPTING THEORIES, ACCORDING TO POPPER, IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH VERISIMILITUDE. HOWEVER THE BEST WE CAN DO IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE. POPPER’S CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING THEORIES WILL ONLY LEAD TO THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMI…Read more
  •  55
    The probability of particular events
    Philosophy of Science 38 (3): 327-343. 1971.
    The paper investigates what are the proper procedures for calculating the probability on certain evidence of a particular object e having a property, Q, e.g. of Eclipse winning the Derby. Let `α ' denote the conjunction of properties known to be possessed by e, and P(Q)/α the probability of an object which is α being Q. One view is that the probability of e being Q is given by the best confirmed value of P(Q)/α . This view is shown not to be generally true, but to provide a useful approximation …Read more
  •  304
    Miracles
    Philosophical Quarterly 18 (73): 320-328. 1968.
    (I UNDERSTAND BY A MIRACLE, A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE BY A GOD.) A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A NON-REPEATABLE COUNTER-INSTANCE TO IT. CONTRARY TO HUME’S VIEW, THERE COULD BE GOOD HISTORICAL EVIDENCE BOTH THAT A VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED AND THAT IT WAS DUE TO THE ACT OF A GOD
  •  35
    Cohen on evidential support
    Mind 81 (322): 244-248. 1972.
    CENTRAL TO COHEN’S NEW THEORY OF INDUCTION IS THE CLAIM THAT THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY EVIDENCE TO A HYPOTHESIS IS NOT A FUNCTION WHICH OBEYS THE AXIOMS OF THE PROBABILITY CALCULUS. THIS CLAIM DEPENDS ON THE TRUTH OF COHEN’S INSTANTIAL COMPARABILITY PRINCIPLE. UNDER NATURAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THIS PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. EVEN IF IT IS TRUE UNDER OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THAT DOES NOT SHOW THAT CONFIRMATION IN CARNAP’S SENSE DOES NOT OBEY THE AXIOMS
  •  76
    Choosing between confirmation theories
    Philosophy of Science 37 (4): 602-613. 1970.
    ON WHAT GROUNDS OUGHT WE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN COMPETING CONFIRMATION THEORIES? THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONFIRMATION THEORIES AND OTHER THEORIES WHICH MIGHT BE CONFUSED WITH THEM, SUCH AS THEORIES OF ACCEPTABILITY. IT THEN ARGUES THAT A CONFIRMATION THEORY OUGHT TO ANALYSE RATHER THAN EXPLICATE OUR ORDINARY STANDARDS OF CONFIRMATION. IT WILL DO THIS IN SO FAR AS IT IS COHERENT AND DOES NOT YIELD COUNTERINTUITIVE JUDGMENTS
  •  128
    Mind, Brain, and Free Will
    Oxford University Press UK. 2012.
    Richard Swinburne presents a powerful new case for substance dualism and for libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental events are distinct from physical events and interact with them, and claims that no result from neuroscience or any other science could show that interaction does not take place. Swinburne goes on to argue for agent causation, and claims that it is we, and not our intentions, that cause our brain events. It is metaphysically possible that each of us could acquire a new b…Read more
  •  55
    Body and soul: Swinburne Body and soul
    Think 2 (5): 31-36. 2003.
    Richard Swinburne here defends the view that mind and body are distinct substances capable of independent existence. For a very different approach to the question of how mind and body are related contrast Rowland Stout's ‘Behaviourism’, which follows this article.
  •  45
    Reply: A Further Defence of Christian Revelation
    Religious Studies 29 (3). 1993.
    In response to Peter Byrne’s critical notice of my book "Revelation", I argue that if God is to put us in a position freely to choose to seek Him, we need some propositional revelation (about what he is like and how to worship him), but also some scope for sorting out the implications of that revelation. Both of these aims are satisfied if the Christian Bible with the normal tradition of how to interpret it are the vehicle of revelation.
  • The Future of the Soul
    In Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 6--367. 1999.
  •  148
    Is there a God?
    Oxford University Press. 1996.
    At least since Darwin's Origin of Species was published in 1859, it has increasingly become accepted that the existence of God is, intellectually, a lost cause, and that religious faith is an entirely non-rational matter--the province of those who willingly refuse to accept the dramatic advances of modern cosmology. Are belief in God and belief in science really mutually exclusive? Or, as noted philosopher of science and religion Richard Swinburne puts forth, can the very same criteria which sci…Read more
  •  75
    What Makes a Scientific Theory Probably True
    In Melville Y. Stewart (ed.), Science and Religion in Dialogue, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 203--212. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: * Notes
  •  323
    A Posteriori Arguments for the Trinity
    Studia Neoaristotelica 10 (1): 13-27. 2013.
    There is a good a priori argument for the doctrine of the Trinity, from the need for any divine being to have another divine being to love suffi ciently to provide for him a third divine being whom to love and by whom to be loved. But most people who have believed the doctrine of the Trinity have believed it on the basis of the teaching of Jesus as interpreted by the church. The only reason for believing this teaching would be if Jesus led the kind of life which a priori we would expect an incar…Read more
  • Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (4): 412-414. 1976.
  •  47
    Editorial
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1). 2009.