•  1
    Czy warto posiadać epistemiczne uzasadnienie?
    Ruch Filozoficzny 3 (3-4). 1999.
  •  171
    Sobel on Arguments from Design
    Philosophia Christi 8 (2). 2006.
    In his ’Logic and Theism’ Sobel claims that the allocation of prior probabilities to theories is a purely subjective matter. I claim that there are objective criteria for determining prior probabilities of theories (dependent on their simplicity and scope); and if there were not, science would be a totally irrational activity. I reject Sobel’s main criticism of my own cumulative argument for the existence of God that I argue illegitimately from each datum raising the probability of theism to the…Read more
  •  251
    How the divine properties fit together: Reply to gwiazda
    Religious Studies 45 (4): 495-498. 2009.
    Jeremy Gwiazda has criticized my claim that God, understood as an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly free person is a person ’of the simplest possible kind’ on the grounds that omnipotence, etc., as spelled out by me are omnipotence, etc., of restricted kinds, and so less simple forms of these properties than maximal forms would be. However, the account which I gave of these properties in ’The Christian God’ (although not in ’The Coherence of Theism’) shows that, when they are defined in cert…Read more
  •  41
    The Indeterminism of Human Actions
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 431-449. 1986.
  •  43
    The Limits of Explanation: The Limits of Explanation
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 177-193. 1990.
    In purporting to explain the occurrence of some event or process we cite the causal factors which, we assert, brought it about or keeps it in being. The explanation is a true one if those factors did indeed bring it about or keep it in being. In discussing explanation I shall henceforward concern myself only with true explanations. I believe that there are two distinct kinds of way in which causal factors operate in the world, two distinct kinds of causality, and so two distinct kinds of explana…Read more
  •  47
    Problem zła
    Roczniki Filozoficzne 57 (2): 135-152. 2009.