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205Design defended: Swinburne Defending designThink 2 (6): 13-18. 2004.Richard Swinburne responds to criticisms of his arguments from design for the existence of God.
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231Second reply to grünbaumBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4): 919-925. 2005.I give a detailed defence against Grunbaum’s 2004 attack on my Bayesian argument for the existence of God from various features of the universe (its conformity to simple laws, the laws being such as to lead to the evolution of humans, etc.). Theism postulates the simplest possible stopping point for explanation of the various features which I mention, and is such that it makes the accounts of those features more probable than they would be otherwise
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Intellectual AutobiographyIn Richard Swinburne & Alan G. Padgett (eds.), Reason and the Christian religion: essays in honour of Richard Swinburne, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--18. 1994.
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130The Modal Argument is Not CircularFaith and Philosophy 15 (3): 371-372. 1998.Hasker’s claim that my modal argument for substance dualism is epistemically circular is implausible. Someone can accept Premise 2 (which, Hasker claims, is the premise which generates the circularity) without ever understanding the conclusion, or without accepting Premise 3.